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Abstract 
The examination of factors influencing individual financial risk tolerance (FRT) has been 
heavily researched in the literature because of the importance of effectively assessing an 
individual’s risk-taking behaviour. Noticeably in recent years, FRT is no longer examined 
exclusively, yet an increasing attention has also been paid to risk perception (RP) and risk 
attitude (RAtt). These two constructs are examined as potential mechanisms through which 
differences in FRT occur. It is argued that an acknowledgement of the underlying process of 
one’s FRT formation can be used not only for predictive purposes but also for altering one’s 
risk tolerance level. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by extending insights into 
two important determinants of FRT, namely, age and culture, as well as investigating the 
language one speaks as its new determinant. In addition to the consideration of these 
determinants of FRT, an examination of the underlying mechanisms (RP and RAtt) through 
which they operate is subsequently conducted. The study employs survey responses of 1,889 
respondents from five different cultural and linguistic milieus: the US, the UK, Singapore, 
China and Vietnam. The evidence suggests that older individuals are less risk tolerant than 
younger individuals (lower FRT), not because they are more risk averse (similar RAtt), but 
mainly because they perceive the same investment as riskier (higher RP). Intriguingly, age does 
not only affect FRT directly, but also significantly influences the effect of culture on FRT. 
Particularly, although more collectivistic individuals are more risk tolerant than their 
individualistic counterparts, the increased level of FRT declines with age. However, this 
moderating effect of age does not operate through either RP or RAtt. Lastly, the study found 
that language influences one’s FRT. Particularly, individuals speaking weak-future languages, 
such as Chinese, exhibit higher level of risk tolerance when compared to individuals speaking 
strong-future languages, such as English and Vietnamese. Additionally, the cross-linguistic 
difference in FRT is found to operate mainly through the cross-linguistic difference in RP but 
not RAtt. Overall, the study obtained a consistent finding with the majority of preceding studies 
supporting that individual risk attitude (RAtt) is a stable personality trait, which is constant 
across individuals and is not influenced by external factors.  
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
1.1 Preface 
Understanding the nature of risk taking behaviour is a fundamental topic within economic and 
finance fields. Conventionally, many standard economic theories and models have been 
developed to study and forecast human financial risk taking in terms of decision-making 
process. According to traditional finance, individuals are purely logical, rational, and 
predictable, who consistently seek to maximise their own well-being. This ‘rationality’ 
paradigm suggests that as soon as agents receive new information, they fully and instantly, in a 
normative way, update their beliefs and preferences. Consequently, their choices are always 
consistent through which their expected utility is maximised (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
However, in recent decades, an increasing amount of empirical evidences have shown that the 
‘rationality’ expected utility maximisation assumption cannot be sustained in the real world. 
Indeed, by relaxing this assumption, many investor’s risk-taking behaviours could be 
understood more easily. Consequently, academics have increasingly raised their concerns and 
focuses on the behavioural branch of finance. The field inclines researchers to construct a more 
insightful picture about human actions in the ‘non-ideal’ financial world. Following the essence 
of the debate, the main focus of this thesis is to discover some unsolved problems of the risk-
taking related topic through the behavioural finance stream.     
In many undeveloped and developing countries, social security for old age has never been a 
sufficient source for a comfortable and satisfactory financial life in retirement. It would not be 
a surprise if the security in some countries cannot cover the basic necessity or is not available 
at all. Besides, East Asian nations are recently exposed to another issue such that the retirement 
financial support they usually have from the younger family members has declined, whilst the 
support from state remains unavailable or trivial. Nowadays, even in developed countries, such 
as the US and the UK, a promised adequate life-time income source after the conclusion of 
one’s career is virtually a thing of the past for most households. Overtime, without any creation 
of a new pension plan, more defined benefit plans are being terminated and replaced with 
defined contribution plans (Byrne, 2005). As a result, the responsibility of saving and investing 
has been shifting to the shoulders of households and individuals, producing intense challenges 
that have not been faced before, especially in the current era of increasing longevity. Suddenly, 
many people have awakened to an awareness of the accountability for the outcome of each and 
every single financial choice that they make. Unfortunately, it has been proven that households 
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are not well adapted to such financial self-accountability and they often fail to take proper care 
of themselves financially (Gathergood, 2012). In the midst of the heavier responsibilities that 
individuals are forced to carry in making long-term and major risky financial decisions, it is 
vital to obtain more insight into their willingness to take financial risk, which is consistently 
defined in this thesis as individual’s financial risk tolerance (FRT)1. Therefore, the main aim of 
the current thesis is to provide better understanding about factors that influence individual’s 
FRT as well as the underlying process of these influences. More details related to the aims and 
objectives of this thesis will be explained subsequently. 
1.2 Aim and Scope of the Study 
This thesis is developed by drawing on and uniting contributions from a range of diverse fields, 
including finance, economics, linguistics, psychology, and sociology. Its main purpose is to 
elaborate possible differences in individual financial risk tolerance (FRT) with respect to age, 
cultural background and the language individuals speak. An additional interest in this context 
is to explore whether any observed differences arise through two specific mechanisms: risk 
perception (RP) and risk attitude (RAtt). At the heart of the research agenda is a desire to better 
understand factors that drive investors’ risk appetite, and hence, how their financial decisions, 
as responses to different level of risk, are made across age. The current investigation targets 
five diverse cultural and linguistic milieus. These are the United States, Great Britain, China, 
Singapore, and Vietnam. 
1.3 Motivations and justifications for the study 
As the results of the current transformation of retirement systems in many countries, the 
financial accountability has been gradually shifted to the shoulders of individuals. 
Consequently, more individuals are involuntarily transformed into independent investors 
leading to the increasing importance of self-management of wealth. As almost all investments 
are associated with some levels of risk, individuals are actually wagering on their future 
financial lives. To make a rational and sound investment decision, individual investors are 
required to possess not only complete access to information but also sufficient financial 
knowledge to process and understand those information. Nonetheless, these requirements are 
practically impossible missions for unsophisticated investors, indeed, even for professional 
investors. In this ever-progressively, evolving and complex financial world, investors are 
drowned by a tsunami of information and swiped away by the confluence of a number of 
unprecedented financial turbulences and dramatic unfavourable variations in the global political 
and economic conditions. Consequently, an increasing numbers of unsophisticated investors 
                                                 
1 More detailed definition of FRT will be provided in Chapter 2. 
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are turning to investment managers (or financial advisers or financial planners) for professional 
assistance. This apparent trend has accelerated the need for high quality and superior personal 
financial advice services. 
One of the fundamental obligatory inputs for investment managers to efficiently assist each 
individual client in determining the optimal portfolio allocation is that they must be aware of 
the level of financial risk tolerance (FRT) of their clients, to avoid the disappointment of clients. 
Furthermore, Jacob and Levy (1996) stated that investment funds can be effectively tailor-made 
and heterogeneously constructed across individuals only if investor’s FRT is precisely 
determined. Given the importance of the input in determining the quality of the services, many 
professional service providers, with an extensive assistance from academy, are constantly 
making an effort to effectively identify their clients’ FRT. Consequently, to achieve a more 
effective assessment and better matching process of risk appetite with investments, research 
conducted on identifying factors that influence individual FRT is imperative. Albeit a myriad 
of research has studied the determinants of individual FRT, many fundamental aspects are still 
ambiguous and have not yet been uncovered.  
Although studies on factors influencing FRT are relevant, they can only be used for predictive 
purposes. This provides no room for intervention to alter one’s contemporary risk tolerance 
level. Understanding investors’ risk perception (RP) and risk attitude (RAtt) as determinants of 
FRT is expected to allow professionals to see the prevailing risk perceived and felt by investors, 
and thus to change their risk tolerance by adjusting RP and/or RAtt. Specifically, if investors 
exhibit low levels of FRT because of their perceptions of high level of investment riskiness, 
financial advisors could try to intervene in their cognition (Weber and Hsee, 1998). 
Investigation could be conducted on how the investors’ RP are formed, including how they 
define risk and what information they use. On the other hand, if RAtt is the driving force of 
investors’ FRT. The focus could be paid on their general psychological states and affective 
responses toward their RP (Weber and Hsee, 1998). 
To offer such intervention in practice, academia must first attempt to understand and gain 
insights into the underlying psychological processes by which FRT is formed. Carrying this 
understanding onward, potential real-world relevance can be examined more in detailed so that 
professional financial practitioners can apply academic work into real-world practice in the 
most effective way. For these reasons, the current research investigates a number of factors 
(age, culture, and language) that affect individual FRT, as well as justifying the two underlying 
mechanisms: RP and RAtt. 
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The investigations of these influences on FRT have implications regarding two aspects: aging 
and globalisation. Amid concerns of the impact of global population aging on the world’s 
economies and financial markets, a deeper and wider understanding of age-related responses to 
willingness to taking risk through RP and RAtt is pertinent and valuable at aggregate economic 
level and individual level.  
At the aggregate economic level, implications are drawn on the impact of the current 
demographic structure on a national economy and capital market prices, along with remedies 
to tackle problems imposed on the financial markets by demographic changes. Particularly, the 
reduction in FRT influences the attractiveness of high risk capital, thus causing a surge in the 
cost of capital for productive investment and subsequently, a slowdown of economic growth. 
According to the World Population Aging report 1950-2050, by the year 2050, the proportion 
of the above-60 years old population will increase to one-fifth of the whole world population. 
Concurrently, the proportion of the working group aged from 15 to 59 will experience a slight 
fall from 60% to 58% in 2050. If the age-risk relationship is consistent with the life-cycle risk 
aversion theory. This indicates that one's FRT reduces with age, investors would require a 
considerably higher premium to hold risky assets than they should (Friend and Blume, 1975). 
Consequently, the global aging population imposes challenges on the economy and the financial 
market. On the other hand, at individual level, the successful prevention of conservative 
investment behaviours may improve individual welfare. 
Concurrently, in light of the globalization and liberalization of labour markets, financial 
markets, and associated increases in international capital flows, cross-border trade, and 
sensitivity to foreign prices, cross-cultural and cross-linguistic studies are essential at the 
national level as well as the global level. Financial practitioners can provide better services to 
improve the use of financial advisors by culturally diverse clients, who speak different 
languages. Considering China, the number of Chinese immigrants have significantly surged to 
more than 2 million people in 2013 in the US, nearly 0.9 million in Canada, 0.7 million in South 
Korea, 0.65 million in Japan. Furthermore, it is found that in 2013 roughly 62% of Chinese 
immigrants reported limited proficiency in English and only 10% of them speak English at 
home (Migrationpolicy.org, 2015). By identifying the perceived needs of clients from different 
cultural backgrounds, financial advisors and investment managers can tailor financial plan and 
construct customised investment portfolio that are essential and appealing to specific groups. 
An inaccurate, inappropriate advice may prevent certain cultural and language-speaking groups 
from seeking for professional advisors, which will impose a huge loss for the financial service 
market.  
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1.4  Research overview 
Financial risk tolerance (FRT) is a popular concept in both academy and practice. It measures 
a person’s willingness to engage in risky financial activities. Practically, FRT is used to infer 
one’s risk appetite, and hence their behaviour in financial context. However, a precise 
assessment of an individual’s FRT is a challenging and time-consuming process. Supporting 
practitioners in this case, academic researchers have attempted to determine factors that 
influence FRT. These factors can then be employed as proxies of FRT. For example, if academy 
found that male is significantly more willing to engage in risky investments (higher FRT) than 
female, practitioners (e.g. financial advisers) can use the finding to predict the risk appetite of 
clients based on their genders.  
Recently, the academic body has extended the FRT topic to a new research stream. An 
increasing number of researches do not investigate exclusively the factors that influence FRT, 
but they also examine the underlying mechanisms of these influences. Two mechanisms have 
particularly received extensive attention: risk perception (RP) and risk attitude (RAtt). More 
precisely, these studies are interested in why individuals have different willingness to engage in 
risky financial activities (different FRT): “Is it because they see the riskiness of those activities 
differently (RP) and/or they like financial risk to different extent (RAtt)?” This extension of 
FRT topic to the understanding of RP and RAtt provides room for intervention in an 
individual’s risk appetite (FRT) through either or both of these channels2. For illustration, if 
FRT is formed through RP, individual FRT can be altered if their perception on financial risk 
(RP) changes by, for example, financial training and education, reading more about financial 
investments and their risks.  
Overall, the whole thesis focuses on three main concepts: financial risk tolerance (FRT), risk 
perception (RP), and risk attitude (RAtt). Insights of these three main terms with regards to their 
definitions will be provided in Chapter 2. In this thesis, there are three main empirical studies, 
which will be discussed in detailed in their own empirical chapters (Chapters 4 to 6). The next 
                                                 
2 To better understand the two mechanisms (RP and RAtt) and the intervention property, let consider a simple non-
financial scenario in our daily lives. Imagine that you used to eat potato chips a lot (high willingness to eat chips) 
when you were eight years old. Now you are twenty-five, you realise that you no longer have such strong 
willingness to eat chips like you did before. The question is whether such reduction in your willingness to eat chips 
is because you know/acknowledge so many bad issues that chips bring to our health, which you did not know 
before (change in perception on health risk of chips) and/or you just purely do not like chips as much as before 
(change in attitude towards chips). If perception on the health riskiness of chips is the main cause, it means that 
you still like chips a lot now, at least as much as when you were eight. However, your willingness to eat chips 
reduces because you know that it is unhealthy. With the understanding of the underlying reason for individual’s 
willingness to eat chips, you can alter someone’s consumption of chips by altering his perception, perhaps by 
providing them more knowledge and information about chips. 
6 
 
few sections of this chapter will provide readers with a brief and simple introduction to those 
three empirical studies.  
1.3.1 Empirical study 1. Financial Risk Tolerance Across Age: An Examination of the 
Mediating roles of Risk Perception and Risk Attitude 
The influence of age on FRT has captured an extensive attention from researchers and 
practitioners and is found to be one of the most prominent demographic determinants of FRT 
(Hallahan et al., 2003). Extending the age-FRT topic, the first empirical study of this thesis 
attempts to examine whether RP and RAtt mediate the influence of age on FRT. Given that 
previous literature has extensively tested the age effect on FRT, yet no research has been 
conducted to examine the underlying mechanisms of that age influence, despite that many 
studies has examined the mediating roles of RP and RAtt on other determinants of FRT. These 
include gender (Olsen and Cox, 2001); culture (Bontempo et al., 1997; Luce and Weber, 1986; 
see also3); career (Cooper et al., 1988); situational domains (Nosic and Weber, 2010; Weber 
et al., 2002; see also4); outcome domains (Weber and Milliman, 1997; Mellers et al., 1997); 
and time (Weber et al., 2012; Hoffmann et al., 2013).  Consequently, the study contributes 
additional knowledge to the literature regarding the mechanisms through which the age effect 
on FRT takes place.  
Particularly, the examination of the relationship between age and FRT in previous studies 
provide answer to the following question:  
“Does a 60-year-old individual take more or less risk than a 30-year-old 
individual?” 
Despite the importance of age within the academic and in practice, a research gap regarding 
the underlying process of difference in FRT across age remains unresolved. By identifying 
two mechanisms (RP and RAtt) of the variation in one’s FRT with age, this study discovers 
the answer to the following question: 
"Is a 60-year-old person willing to take more (less) risk than a 30-year-old person, 
because the older one sees the same investment as less (more) risky and/or 
because she simply enjoys to take on higher (lower) risks?” 
                                                 
3 Weber and Hsee, 1998; Cheung et al., 2012 
4 Blais and Weber, 2006; Johnson et al., 2004; Arrow, 1974 
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1.3.2 Empirical study 2. Does Age Influence Cross-cultural Difference in Financial Risk 
Tolerance?  Reduction of Cushion Buffer in Older Individuals 
The examination of age influence on FRT is enhanced to a global level using cross-cultural 
investigation. Numerous research (Bontempo et al., 1997; Weber and Hsee, 1998, see also5) 
have explored that culture is an important factor attributing to the difference in FRT and risk-
related behaviours across individuals. The most common cultural value used in the topic is the 
individualism-collectivism continuum defined by Hofstede (2001).  
The cultural effect on FRT has been obtained by extant research with consistent findings 
indicating that collectivism is associated with increased financial risk tolerance relative to 
individualism. To explain these findings, Weber and Hsee (1998) developed the cushion 
hypothesis, which is based on differences in the natures of collectivism and individualism 
cultural continuums. The hypothesis asserts that, in financial hardship, members of 
collectivistic society can approach their internal groups (family and social network) for help 
and support. Weber and Hsee (1998) claim that such readily available financial support acts as 
a cushion protecting individuals from getting hurt by financial failure and thus, collectivistic 
individuals perceive the same financial option as less risky. Therefore, they are more risk 
tolerant comparing to their individualistic counterparts. Based on this finding, culture is a proxy 
of FRT. However, its predictive power is strong if culture influences FRT independently. 
Nevertheless, a study conducted by Fan and Xiao (2006) shows that the reduction in reported 
FRT across age is faster with Chinese individuals than with Americans. This statistical result 
hints that the cultural difference in FRT between China (collectivism) and America 
(individualism) may reduce across age. Hence, age may influence the cross-cultural difference 
in FRT. The idea is solidified based on previous anthropological and psychological literatures 
that report changes in one’s personal traits, patterns of thinking, judging, and acting, across age. 
Particularly, as collectivistic members grow older, the development of their self-conscious 
emotions (embarrassment, shame, guilt, and self-esteem)6 may reduce their willingness to ask 
for financial help7. According to the cushion hypothesis, collectivistic individuals perceive 
lower financial risk because of their ready access to financial support. However, as they grow 
older, even the support remains, their willingness to ask for such support may reduce. Therefore, 
                                                 
5 See also: Cheung et al. (2013), Hsee and Weber (1999), Weber et al. (1998), Breuer et al. (2012), Fan 
and Xiao (2006) 
6 Hofstede (2001), Mandel (2003), Lewis et al. (1989 and 1991), Benedict (1974), Bedford and Hwang 
(2003), Hwang (2001), Izard (1997), Bedford (1990), Demo (1992), Bengtson et al. (1985), Shaw et 
al. (2010), Giarrusso et al. (2001), Orth et al. (2010), Robins et al. (2002), Rosow (1985), Mirowsky 
and Ross (1992) 
7 Harel et al. (1990), Veroff (1981) 
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the so-called cushion that protects individuals from getting financial pain may get thinner across 
age. Consequently, the RP of older collectivistic may increase and thus their FRT may reduce. 
Consequently, it is predicted that as age increases, the FRT gap between the two cultures 
reduces. 
As a result, the primary contribution of this study is to enhance the culture-FRT relationship by 
investigating if age influences their relationship, along with identifying reasons for such 
influence if found to be present. In other words, this study examines whether age is a factor that 
influences one’s personal cushion and provide an answer to the following question:  
“Does the cushion buffer reduce across age?” 
1.3.3 Empirical study 3. From Language to Financial Risk Tolerance through the 
Channels of Risk Perception and Risk Attitude 
Despite many factors has been found to influence FRT, the current study is the first to propose 
language as an additional factor that may account for differences in FRT. Psycholinguistic 
discipline has argued that language, ‘the vehicle of thought’ (by Wittgenstein in Widhiarso, 
2009), has effects on human thoughts and cognitions (Whorf, 1956; Scholz et al., 2015), 
perceptions and beliefs. The linguistic-FRT hypothesis is built on the conjecture developed by 
Chen (2013) for his linguistic-saving hypothesis.   
More precisely, different languages encode the temporal phases of an event differently in such 
a way that whether time is required a grammatical distinction between the present and the future 
(Dahl, 2000; Thieroff, 2000; Gell, 1992). According to Chen (2013), languages that require 
precise separation between the future and the present using grammatical words or tense 
markers, are referred to as strong future time reference (strong-future) languages. An example 
of strong-future languages is English. The construction of a sentence in English describing a 
future event requires a future marker such as “will”, “is going to”, or “is about to”.  In contrast, 
weak future time reference (weak-future) or futureless languages do not require grammatical 
words or tenses to mark future events, thus future events are often described as present ones 
(Gell, 1992). German and Chinese are two examples of weak-future languages.  
Differences in future description between languages is the key element used in this study. 
According to Chen (2013), such differences in the way languages encode the temporal relations 
in a future event drive speakers of strong-future languages to feel the same future event as more 
distant from the present than speakers of weak-future languages. Combining this difference in 
time perception with the pricing model as explained in Chen’s (2013) study, linguistic-FRT 
association is hypothesised. With the same motivation as the first empirical study of this thesis, 
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after the empirically tests for the linguistic-FRT hypothesis, its underlying mechanism (RP and 
RAtt) will be examined. Overall, this empirical attempts to provide answer to the following 
questions: 
"Is a weak-future language speaking individual willing to take more (less) risk 
than a strong-future language speaking individual? If yes, is it because the weak-
future language speaking person sees the same investment as less (more) risky 
and/or because she simply enjoys to take on higher (lower) risks?” 
1.3.4  Countries under investigation 
Given the cross-cultural and cross-linguistic focuses of this thesis, the investigation is 
conducted in two collectivistic countries in Asia, China and Vietnam, and two individualistic 
countries, the United States and Great Britain (based on Hofstede’s (2001) cultural 
classification). Besides the significant differences in political systems and cultural values 
between these two groups, they are also influential nations in the today’s global economy, world 
trade and international affairs. Particularly, the total GDP of the US, China, and the UK 
accounts for more than 37% of the World GDP (19.31% for the US, 15.4% for China, and 
2.75% for the UK) (Quandl.com, 2015). They are also three dominant merchandised traders in 
the world in 2013 with the total trading amount accounts for roughly a quarter of the world’s 
merchandise trading value (Anon, 2015).  
Recently, Anon (2015b) reported that developing economies has recently played an increasing 
large role in the global economy. Vietnam is a South East Asian developing economy, whose 
GDP takes up only small share of the World GDP (0.41%) in 2013. However, over the past 5-
year from 1998-2013, the GDP share of Vietnam has been increased by 0.03%, comparing to a 
fall of 1.1% and 0.28% of the US and the UK respectively over the same period (Quandl.com, 
2015). Furthermore, the share in merchandise trade of Vietnam from 2012-2013 has 
significantly increased by 16%, which surpassed the increase of the US, China, and the UK 
(Anon, 2015). 
Another country of investigation is Singapore, which is chosen for the controlling purpose as 
the country has been well-perceived and proven as a multicultural and multilinguistic land. 
Especially for the cross-linguistic study, the employment of Singapore can control for the 
overlapping country effect. Specifically, the majority of samples from other countries are either 
weak- or strong- future language, whilst Singapore is the only sample with a well-mixed of both 
language types. Without this sample, the objectives of linguistic study would not be achievable.  
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1.4 Research questions 
Following the overview of the research and consistent with the research objectives, three 
research questions (RQ) are developed to direct this study:  
RQ1: Does difference in financial risk tolerance across age occur through risk 
perception and/or risk attitude? 
RQ2: Does age moderate the cultural difference in financial risk tolerance? If yes, 
does the moderating effect arise through risk perception and/or risk attitude? 
RQ3: Is there observable difference in financial risk tolerance across individuals 
that speak different languages? If yes, is the difference associated with their 
differences in risk perception and/or risk attitude?
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Chapter Two: 
Definition, Measure and Theoretical Background  
2.1    Introduction 
This chapter introduces readers to three main constructs of the study, along with their 
underlying theoretical framework, survey design, and measurements. Initially, definitions of 
the three constructs, namely, financial risk tolerance (FRT), risk perception (RP), and risk 
attitude (RAtt) are provided. Subsequently, theoretical backgrounds of these concepts are 
reviewed, which provide the basis for the development of the survey design and the measures 
used.   
To avoid repetition, the subsequent two general chapters (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) apply to, 
and provide background for, the three research studies presented in three empirical chapters 
(Chapter 4 to Chapter 6) of this thesis.  
2.2    Main terminologies 
2.2.1 Financial risk tolerance (FRT) 
Financial risk tolerance (FRT) is one of the most heavily researched concepts within the 
financial and economic areas. Perhaps the most common definition of FRT is the maximum 
amount of uncertainty that an investor is willing and able to accept when making financial 
decisions (Harlow and Brown, 1990; Grable, 2000; Grable and Lytton, 1999). Another 
conceptualisation of FRT refers to an individual’s willingness to undertake a financial 
behaviour where the attainment of desirable outcomes associated with such behaviour is 
uncertain with the possibility of loss (Irwin, 1993).  
Literature in this field is replete with many terms such as ‘risk attitude’, ‘risk propensity’, ‘risk 
preference’, and ‘risk acceptance’, which basically carry the same notion with FRT 
(Roszkowski and Davey, 2010). In most economic studies, FRT is often understood as, and 
used interchangeably with, risk attitude (Hallahan et al., 2004; Wang and Hanna, 1997). 
However, for the purpose of this study, which proposes risk attitude (RAtt) as a determinant of 
FRT, their concepts are clearly distinct from one another. FRT, as used in this study, carries the 
same meaning as ‘risk preference’ defined by Weber and Hsee (1998). For simplicity, it is 
consistently defined as a person’s willingness to engage in a risky financial investment and is 
measured as one’s willingness to pay for a risky option. For example, if two individuals are 
considering the same risky investment option X, the individual that is willing to pay more for 
X is more risk tolerant than the other. 
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2.2.2 Risk perception (RP) and Risk attitude (RAtt) as determinants of FRT 
Risk perception (RP) and risk attitude (RAtt) have been increasingly suggested as two 
determinants of FRT in a number of empirical studies (see Section 4.2.2). These studies 
examined whether differences in FRT across individuals (with different genders and cultures, 
etc.) are associated with differences in RP and/or RAtt. Furthermore, according to Irwin’s 
(1993) model (Figure 2.1), the effects of predisposing factors, comprising of biopsychosocial 
and environmental factors, on FRT operate through a number of precipitating factors, such as 
experience, cognition and emotional responses. Drawing on Irwin’s (1993) model, this research 
proposes to examine three predisposing factors: age (biopsychosocial factor), culture and 
language (environmental factors) that influence FRT through two precipitating factors: risk 
perception (cognition) and risk attitude (emotional responses and feeling).  
Risk perception is classified as cognition because it is “conceived as primarily as cognitive 
activity, involving the accurate appraisal of external and internal states” (Roszkowski and 
Davey, 2010, p.43). On the other hand, the classification of risk attitude as an emotional 
response and feeling is based mainly on its definition. Attitude is a broad term that comprises 
four interrelated components: affective responses, cognitions, behaviours and behavioural 
intentions (Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991). For the purpose of this research, the main interest is 
paid on the affective component of an attitude. It refers to one’s interpretation, evaluation, liking 
of, disliking of, or emotional responses to a situation, object or person. This affective 
component reflects one’s attitude with sentiments of happiness, pleasure, or anxiety.  
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2.2.2.1 Risk perception (RP) 
Generally, risk perception (RP) is simply defined as the amount of risk that a person perceives 
to be embedded in a financial option. In this study, we consider two main measures of RP, 
namely, objective RP and subjective RP. Basically, objective RP is the amount of financial risk 
that investment theories (such as the Modern Portfolio Theory) assume individuals should 
perceive, such as variance of investment outcomes. With subjective RP, on the other hand, 
individuals can perceive and measure risk in whatever way they deem to be appropriate. 
Objective RP relates closely with the measure of risk in the conventional finance. It assumes 
that the financial risk one perceives is objective, rational, analytic, and wise (Slovic, 1999). 
Given many techniques of measuring objective financial risk have been developed, such as 
variance, mean excess loss, probability of loss, and Weber’s coefficient of variance, there 
remains an unresolved debate over the most robust risk measurement (Bernstein, 1995). 
Following the approach of Weber and Hsee (1998), which is based on the tradition mean-
variance model of Markowitz (1952), the objective RP is measured by the variance of an 
investment option’s outcomes. It assumes that everyone defines and understands risk in the 
same way, as well as measuring the riskiness of an investment using the same technique and 
Figure 2.1: Principal factors affecting financial risk tolerance adapted from Irwin’s (1993) 
model 
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calculation of variance. Consequently, their risk perceptions are objectively the same. In brief, 
objective RP is constant across individuals and can be measured as the variance of outcomes.  
Subjective RP, on the other hand, is a broader concept. It can be conceptualised as: 
 “Beliefs about the riskiness of the choice situation”  
(Weber, Blais, and Betz, 2002, p.267) 
Subjective RP is referred to as an individual’s personal assessment on the riskiness of a financial 
choice. It implies that financial risk can be defined and measured in any way and, therefore 
varies between individuals. Stone and Winter (1987) and Slovic (1999) argued that financial 
risk does not readily exist and hence, needs to be measured at the individual level, as individuals 
tend to “rely on perceptions of risk that are subjective, often hypothetical, emotional, foolish, 
and irrational” (Slovic, 1999, p.690). Basically, “risk means different things to different people” 
(Slovic et al., 1982, p.85). Some may see financial risk as variance, some may perceive it as 
probability of loss, and some tend to measure risk intuitively and unsystematically. 
2.2.2.2 Risk attitude (RAtt) 
As emphasised in Section 2.2.1, FRT and RAtt are two distinct constructs and cannot be used 
interchangeably. Importantly, RAtt is a determinant of FRT. Within different contexts and 
research areas, RAtt can be understood in different ways. Theories underpinning different 
conceptualisations of RAtt will be discussed in Section 2.3. In this study, RAtt can be 
understood as an emotional response and feeling, which refers to the extent to which a person 
likes or dislikes financial risk. The same notion of RAtt was defined by Weber and Milliman 
(1997, p.142) as “the tendency to be attracted or repelled by alternatives that are perceived as 
risky”. For the purpose of this research, the qualitative aspect of RAtt will be quantified using 
the risk-return framework, as in Weber and Hsee (1998) (see Section 2.4.2.3). 
In a similar way to the perception of the riskiness of a financial option being either objective 
(objective RP) or subjective (subjective RP), RAtt can also be objective or subjective RAtt. 
Objective RAtt is the attitude towards financial risk given an individual’s RP is objective, whilst 
subjective RAtt is the attitude towards financial risk given an individual’s RP is subjective. A 
risk-seeking person, who chooses a higher-variance investment instead of a lower-variance one 
(with equal expected value), is said to exhibit a positive attitude towards risk. In other words, 
they truly prefer an investment perceived to be riskier. However, others may make the same 
choice, that is, choose the higher-variance investment, but base it on a different subjective 
perception of the riskiness of the higher-variance investment. Indeed, they see it as the less risky 
investment. In that case, these individuals possess a subjective RP that is different from the 
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objective RP (i.e., variance), and they are choosing what they perceive as the less risky 
investment. As a result, these individuals are risk averse and exhibit negative attitudes toward 
subjective risk. 
According to Van de Venter et al. (2012), RAtt can be conceptualised either as a stable trait or 
a psychological state that changes overtime and is influenced by both internal and external 
factors. They conducted a longitudinal study using the FinaMetrica risk-profiling system and 
the 2002-2006 Smart Investor survey dataset, to examine the variability of RAtt. The results 
indicated that FRT8 is a stable personality trait rather than a variable construct that varies over 
an individual’s life-cycle, or is influenced by demographic and situational factors. Supporting 
such view, Roszkowski and Davey (2010) and Gerrans et al. (2013) provide evidence to confirm 
the stability of RAtt after the 2008 global economic crisis. Furthermore, studies of Weber and 
Hsee (1998), Cheung et al. (2012) and Weber et al. (2002) found that subjective RAtt is 
relatively stable and does not predict risk tolerance as effectively as risk perception.  
On the other hand, there is support for a changeable RAtt. Sherman (1974) and Rubin and Paul 
II (1979) argue that RAtt varies over the life cycle due to the evolutionary or biological process. 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011) analysed data from the Survey of Consumer Finances 1960-2007 
and found that RAtt is significantly lower when individuals have experienced low stock market 
returns throughout their life. In other words, an individual’s RAtt changes as their experiences 
of macro-economic shocks change. Likewise, an extensive body of research found a significant 
change in RAtt across one’s life span, such as Dohmen et al. (2009), Riley and Chow (1992), 
and Hallahan et al., (2003) to mention just a few. Due to the inconclusive nature of these 
findings, the dispute of the stability of RAtt remains an ongoing issue.  
In brief, the whole thesis centres on the two underlying mechanisms, namely, RP and RAtt, 
through which the differences in FRT across individuals take place. As mentioned earlier in 
this section, the thesis focuses on three main explanatory factors, namely, age (study 1), culture 
(study 2), and language (study 3). Figure 2.2 depicts definitions and acronyms of the three main 
terminologies. These terms will be used and remain unchanged across the whole study.  
 
 
                                                 
8 As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, studies that do not distinguish RP and RAtt as determinants of FRT, 
consider FRT as RAtt. In other words, these studies treat the two concepts as the same thing to be used 
interchangeably. 
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In this research, the core definitions, conceptual framework, survey design, and measures of 
FRT, RP and RAtt are mainly adapted from Weber and Hsee’s (1998) study to answer the three 
research questions and to achieve its novelties. Note that the contributions of this study are 
completely different from that of Weber and Hsee (1998). However, the general findings of this 
research can relate back to their study, and other preceding studies in this topic area (more 
explanation in Section 2.2.3). Therefore, this study replicates the Weber and Hsee’s (1998) 
methods as the baseline to contrast the general findings of this research with their own. This 
allows for a comparison of this study’s data to their data. Additionally, the study also applies 
some adjustments and employs alternative methods, where appropriate, to improve the Weber 
and Hsee’s (1998) approaches and hence, to yield better and more robust results. To assist 
readers in distinguishing the novelties of the current research from the research of Weber and 
Hsee’s (1998) study, the following section discusses in detailed the study of Weber and Hsee 
(1998) comprising of their research’s objectives, methodology and findings, as well as how 
their study is relates to the current research.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Understanding main definitions and acronyms 
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2.2.3 Weber and Hsee’s (1998) study 
The main contribution of Weber and Hsee’s study is the examination of the cross-cultural 
difference in financial risk tolerance (FRT). Besides, they also examined whether the obtained 
cross-cultural difference in FRT is associated with the cross-cultural difference in risk 
perception (RP) and/or risk attitude (RAtt). They found a difference in FRT across cultures, 
which mainly goes through the cross-cultural differences in RP, whilst RAtt remains constant 
across cultures. Another fundamental contribution of their study is that they developed the 
cushion hypothesis (discuss briefly in this Section and in more detailed in Section 5.2.1.2) as a 
potential explanation for cross-cultural difference in RP, which subsequently leads to cross-
cultural difference in FRT.  
Weber and Hsee (1998) investigated their cross-cultural study using a convenience sample of 
students from China (N=86), the US (N=85), Germany (N=31) and Poland (N=81) by means 
of questionnaires related to judgments and decisions under risk (refer to as FRT experimental 
task in this thesis). Throughout the survey, respondents reported their willingness to pay for 
given investment options (their FRT), and their risk perception on those options (subjective 
RP). By employing individuals’ reported FRT and subjective RP, together with the expected 
value and variance (objective RP) of the investment options’ outcomes, individual RAtt (both 
objective RAtt and subjective RAtt) is mathematically computed using the risk-return 
framework. Further to the computations of these main constructs, Weber and Hsee employed 
the mosaic bivariate approach (ANOVA and Bonferonni adjusted t-test) as the main statistical 
analysis. The whole analysis comprises three main mosaics, which examines whether there is a 
significant difference in FRT, RP and RAtt, respectively, as a function of nationality. In Weber 
and Hsee’s paper, nationality is the proxy for culture, which is based on Hofstede’s (2001) 
culture classification for the collectivism-individualism dimension. In other words, culture is 
measured at the national level. For example, respondents from China are automatically 
classified as collectivism, whilst American respondents are individualism.  
According to their bivariate analysis results, risk perception (subjective RP) of respondents 
from China are significantly lower than that of respondents from America. Furthermore, 
Chinese respondents on average offered higher prices for investment options than American 
respondents did. In other words, Chinese are more risk tolerant (higher FRT) than Americans. 
Lastly, they found that there are no significant differences in perceived-risk attitude (subjective 
RAtt) across the four countries. Combining the three mosaics together, Weber and Hsee 
concluded that collectivistic individuals are more risk tolerant than their individualistic 
counterparts. However, the cross-cultural difference in FRT was “associated primarily with 
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cultural differences in the perception of the risk of the financial options rather than with cultural 
differences in attitude towards perceived risk” (Weber and Hsee, 1998, pp. 1205, emphasis 
added).  
After these intriguing findings were obtained, Weber and Hsee (1998) developed a conjecture, 
namely, the cushion hypothesis9 as the underlying reasons for the lower RP of collectivism 
which leads to their higher FRT, when compared to individualism. The cushion hypothesis 
generally asserts that collectivistic individuals have greater access to financial help from their 
social network (excluding their spouses). These help act as a cushion buffering them from 
getting hurt due to ‘financial’ falls. Therefore, collectivistic individuals perceive lower risk and 
hence, are more risk tolerant (not because they like risk more than individualistic individuals). 
In this paper, the cushion hypothesis remains a conjecture, which is later tested empirically by 
Hsee and Weber (1999) using a bivariate one-way ANOVA test. They obtain a cushion variable 
that measures the number of social contacts (excluding their spouses) that an individual can 
access for financial support. The obtained result supported the cushion hypothesis such that 
collectivistic respondents report more access to financial support comparing to their 
individualistic counterparts. Such larger cushion made them see the financial risk as smaller 
and hence, they are more willing to take on financial risk. 
Thus far, the objectives, methodology and results of Weber and Hsee’s (1998) paper have been 
discussed. The remainder of this section explains how their research is applied in the current 
study. Although the three research questions have their own academic contributions, the study 
relies on the Weber and Hsee’s (1998) study for two main reasons. Firstly, the study of Weber 
and Hsee is the first to exclusively define and clearly distinguish the three core constructs: FRT, 
RP and RAtt. They also advanced the experimental survey task and mathematical framework 
to quantify these constructs. As this research also aims to examine individuals’ FRT formation 
processes through RP and RAtt, reliance on Weber and Hsee’s (1998) study is a tool to answer 
the three proposed research questions and to achieve the study’s objectives.  
Secondly, it can be said that all studies working on the topic of FRT tend to target one single 
general objective. That is, to determine factors that influence individual FRT, or in other words, 
to understand the differences in FRT across individuals. However, each study aims at either 
one, or a few determinants, of FRT. For example, Weber and Hsee (1998) targets culture whilst 
this thesis targets age, culture (an extending perspective) and language. Furthermore, recent 
research focussing on the FRT topic has been extended. Many studies have increasingly paid 
                                                 
9 The cushion hypothesis will be discussed more in Section 5.2.1.1 
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more attention on RP and RAtt as the two underlying mechanisms of an individual’s FRT 
formation process. The majority of the literature (Section 4.2.2) confirmed that differences in 
FRT across individuals (such as culture, gender, situational domains, outcome domains, and 
time period) are because individuals exhibit different risk perceptions, but not because of 
differences in their attitudes toward financial risk. In other words, individual RAtt is constant 
and stable across individuals. Overall, the general findings of studies working in this topic are 
‘constant RAtt across individuals’, and ‘differences in FRT are associated with differences in 
RP’. The current research employs the Weber and Hsee’s (1998) experimental survey task and 
mathematical derivations to measure FRT, RP and RAtt, as well as employing their statistical 
method (mosaic bivariate analysis) as the baseline. Therefore, our general findings are 
comparable with those of Weber and Hsee’s (1998), which can be used to infer the 
comparability of the data of this research with the data of Weber and Hsee (1998). In general, 
the employment of this baseline method is useful in placing this thesis in a stronger position in 
terms of its sample’s quality, which is at least as good as that of Weber and Hsee (1998). After 
employing Weber and Hsee’s (1998) statistical methods as the baseline, the study employs 
alternative approaches10 (e.g., the model-based mosaic analysis, structural equation modelling 
and so on) with the aims of tackling the drawbacks of their approaches to obtain more robust 
results. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the disparities between Weber and Hsee (1998) and 
the current thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 More details provide in Section 3.4 
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Table 2.1: The comparison between this thesis and study of Weber and Hsee (1998) 
Weber and Hsee (1998) The current thesis 
Research contributions: 
1) Cross-cultural differences in FRT. 
2) RP and/or RAtt as the underlying 
mechanisms of (1). 
3) Conjecture the cushion hypothesis as a 
potential explanation for (1) & (2). 
Research contributions: 
Study 1 (Chapter 4): 
1) RP and/or RAtt as the underlying 
mechanisms of differences in FRT across 
age. 
Study 2 (Chapter 5): 
2) Moderating effect of age on the cross-
cultural differences in FRT. 
3) Underlying mechanisms (RP and/or 
RAtt) of (2). 
4) Reduction in cushion buffer across age as 
an explanation for (2) & (3). 
Study 3 (Chapter 6): 
5) Differences in FRT across individuals 
speaking different languages. 
6) RP and/or RAtt as the underlying 
mechanisms of (5). 
 
Definitions of main construct 
The same notions of FRT, objective RP, subjective RP, objective RAtt, and subjective RAtt. 
 
Experimental task for main constructs (FRT task) 
(Section 2.4) 
The same experimental task is employed to capture individual FRT, RP, and RAtt. 
*Note that FRT and subjective RP are the responses provided by respondents. RAtt needs to 
be computed separately from these responses. 
- The FRT task comprises of 12 
investment products. 
- The FRT task comprises of 6 investment 
products (taken from the 12 products of 
Weber and Hsee)11. 
                                                 
11 The baseline method (exactly the same with Weber and Hsee (1998), i.e. national measure of culture 
and bivariate analysis) is employed to compare the findings obtained in the second study (Chapter 5) 
and those of Weber and Hsee. If the same findings are found, the data of this thesis is comparable to that 
of Weber and Hsee. Therefore, the reduction of investment products does not influence the quality of 
the data obtained. 
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Theoretical framework and Computation of RAtt 
(Section 2.3 and Section 2.4.2) 
The same risk-return frameworks are employed to compute objective and subjective RAtt: 
the traditional risk-attitude model (TRAM) and the perceived risk-attitude model (PRAM). 
Methodology 
Culture measure: 
1) Culture is measured at the national level 
using Hofstede (2001) cultural 
dimensions. Specifically, an individual’s 
country is used as the proxy of her 
culture. 
 
Statistical method: 
2) Mosaic bivariate analysis (ANOVA and 
Bonferroni t-test). 
Methodology 
Culture measure (Study 2, Chapter 5): 
1) Main culture measure is at the individual 
level using 30 likert-scale cultural items 
of Singelis (1994).  
However, the same national measure of 
culture is employed as the baseline.  
 
Statistical method (all studies): 
2) Main statistical approach is the mosaic 
model-based multivariate analysis. 
However, the same bivariate analysis is 
employed as the baseline. 
Moving away from pure definitions of the three main concepts, the remaining sections of this 
chapter will discuss their constructions and quantitative measurements. Firstly, theoretical 
frameworks underpinning the concepts are introduced, from which a bespoke survey is 
designed to derive individual FRT, RP, and RAtt.  
2.3 Theoretical framework 
Various theories were developed to explain FRT. These include the traditional expected utility 
theory (EUT), higher-order EUT (prudence and temperance), non-EUT (prospect theory), and 
modern portfolio theory, MPT (mean-variance model), to mention just a few. For a better 
understanding of FRT, this section will first introduce a fundamental theory of FRT - the EUT, 
followed by the MPT, which is the main theoretical framework of this study.  
Despite of its irrelevance in this research, the reason for discussing EUT is that traditional 
finance considering decision-making under risk relies heavily on this theory. Nevertheless, this 
study primarily employs the MPT risk-return framework because it is the only framework that 
allows for the simultaneous measures of FRT, RP and RAtt, as well as providing a clear 
differentiation between FRT and RAtt. Without such properties, the objectives of the study 
could not be achieved.  
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2.3.1 Financial risk tolerance within the expected utility theory (EUT) 
The expected utility theory (EUT) of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) remains a 
prevalent model that theoretically describes the link between risk tolerance and risk-taking 
behaviour. Based on the EUT framework, individual FRT can be derived from one’s actual 
behaviour. Notably, within the EUT, FRT carries the same meaning with RAtt. The two terms 
are apparently identical and can be used interchangeably. Within EUT, risk attitude is a 
descriptive label for the concavity of the investor’s utility function for money. The utility 
function is a mathematical equation used to compute investor’s actual level of satisfaction from 
the income associated with investor’s choices (Harlow and Brown, 1990; Weber et al., 2002; 
Weber and Milliman, 1997). The Bernoulli measure of risk attitude based on the notion of 
certainty equivalent c(F,u), which can be derived when: 
𝑢(𝑐(𝐹, 𝑢)) = ∫ 𝑢(𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑥) 
Whenever the utility function (u) is concave, the certainty equivalent c(F,u) of lottery F is less 
than its expected value (EF). As individuals accept a certain amount that is lower than the 
expected value of the lottery, a concave function indicates risk aversion. In contrast, a convex 
function indicates risk seeking, as individuals will only forgo the lottery when they are offered 
a sure payment, which is higher than the expected value of the lottery. 
In addition to the Bernoulli certainty equivalent, another metric of risk attitude was developed 
by Arrow (1974) and Pratt (1964), so-called the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion. The coefficient is defined as A(x,u)= –u”(x)/u’(x), where u’ and u” are the first and 
second derivatives of the utility function u, respectively. When A(x,u)>A(x,v), the utility 
function u is more concave than the utility function v. In other words, u is more risk-averse than 
v. Consequently, a risk-averse individual exhibits a concave utility function; a risk-seeking 
individual exhibits a convex utility function; and an individual is risk neutral if her utility 
function is linear. According to the EUT, a risk averter prefers a sure outcome to a gamble with 
the same expected value, i.e. U[E(W)] > E[U(W)]. Generally, the less risk-averse an individual 
is, the higher expected utility of uncertain outcomes she has.  
Although the EUT is the building block and one of the most recognised theories of FRT, the 
risk-return model is the main theoretical framework of the current research as it exhibits a 
property that allows FRT and RAtt to be treated as two different concepts. Consequently, the 
measures of financial risk tolerance (FRT), risk perception (RP) and risk attitude (RAtt) are 
constructed based on this framework. 
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2.3.2 Financial risk tolerance within Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) 
The modern portfolio theory (MPT) of Markowitz (1952) postulates that risk-averters aim at 
holding a diversified portfolio that maximises the portfolio returns for a given level of risk. The 
risk-return framework is a normative theory of risk in which an investor’s willingness to pay 
(WTP) for option X is the function of its value and riskiness. The conventional risk-value 
framework can be formulized as:  
 WTP(X) =f(Value(X),Risk(X))= aValue(X)) + bRisk(X) (eq.2.1) 
According to the traditional risk-attitude model (TRAM) (Fraser-Mackenzie et al., 2014 and 
Sarin and Weber, 1993), the value of X is its expected returns (EV), and the riskiness of X can 
be measured by its variance (VAR). Hence, equation 2.1 can be written as: 
 WTP(X) = aEV(X) + bVARVAR(X) (eq.2.2) 
The TRAM (eq.2.2) is applied when individuals exhibit objective RP, which is the variance of 
investment X. As the magnitudes of VAR(X) and EV(X) of a risky option are the same between 
individuals, differences in risk tolerance, WTP(X), can only be explained by differences in 
attitude towards objective RP (objective RAtt, the risk trade-off coefficient bVAR), assuming 
everyone’s attitude towards money award (coefficient a) is the same.  
However, the TRAM is exposed to limitations with regards to the nature of the investment’s 
riskiness, VAR(X), and the interpretation of the risk-preference term, bVARVAR(X). 
Particularly, individuals do not truly perceive financial risk using variance, and it has been 
shown that variance is only applicable for quadratic utility functions (Fraser-Mackenzie et al., 
2014). In the study of Duxbury and Summers (2004), although variance of an option does affect 
one’s risk perception, their finding remains contradictory to traditional finance. Particularly, 
individuals perceive high variance options as being less risky than options with low variance. 
This indicates that individuals are not variance averse in general, or perhaps not aware of 
variance as a measure of risk. As a result, Nosic and Weber (2010) and Johnson et al. (2004) 
argue that subjective RP is better in predicting risk-taking behaviour. 
Accordingly, Weber and Milliman (1997) and Weber and Hsee (1998) proposed the perceived 
risk-attitude model (PRAM), in which risk of X is measured based on individual subjective 
judgments (subjective RP). The PRAM can be written as follow: 
 WTP(X) = aEV(X) + bRR(X) (eq.2.3) 
where R(X) is the subjective RP, and the risk trade-off coefficient bR is the subjective RAtt, 
attitude towards subjective risk. 
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The PRAM provides an alternative interpretation of one’s decision making under risk, which is 
affected by outcome domains or situational factors. According to equation 2.3, differences in 
choices across different domains, or situations, may be the result of differences in individual 
subjective RAtt (bR), subjective RP (R(X)), or both. The first interpretation is consistent with 
that of the TRAM (eq.2.2) such that differences in choices across different domains/situations 
may occur because individuals perceive similar level of riskiness, but their attitudes toward risk 
are different. In other words, people may like risks in one domain/situation, but dislike risks in 
other domains/situations. The second interpretation is exclusive to the PRAM (eq.2.3). It refers 
to different perceptions on financial risk (subjective RP), whilst the attitudes toward perceived 
risk stay constant at all times. Basically, while the extent to which one likes/dislikes risk are 
similar, individuals may exhibit different FRT because they perceive different levels of 
investment’s riskiness. Alternatively, discrepancies in individual FRT may be the result of 
differences in both subjective RP and subjective RAtt across individuals. For example, two 
investors are considering an investment option X, one is more risk tolerant than the other 
because she likes risk more, as well as perceiving the riskiness of X to be smaller than does the 
other investor.  
After acknowledging the underlying theoretical framework of the three main constructs, the 
subsequent sections explain the survey design for the main experimental task and the 
mathematical computations of individual FRT, RP, and RAtt.  
 
2.4 Survey design and measure 
2.4.1 Question design for FRT, RP, and RAtt (See Appendix 1, Part II) 
Following Weber and Hsee (1998), the same experimental task is employed to capture 
individual FRT, RP and RAtt. Respondents are instructed to examine 6 different investment 
products separately12, each of which carries three potential outcomes, with at least one possible 
gain and one possible loss. The 6 investment products are shown to respondents both 
numerically and graphically, depicting the probabilities of obtaining each outcome. The 
outcomes of the six investment products along with their expected values and standard 
deviations are represented in Table 2.2. Respondents are asked to assume that they have a 
maximum of $30,000 to invest in each investment product.  
                                                 
12 The decision of employing six investment options instead of twelve investment options included in Weber and 
Hsee’s (1998) paper is mainly driven by the respondents’ feedback in the pilot study. The employment of six 
investment options is claimed to improve the quality of respondent’s responses whilst still allows the research 
questions to be answered sufficiently. More explanation will be discussed in Section 2.2.3 and empirical results 
will be provided in later chapters. 
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Table 2.2: Description of 6 Risky Investment Products 
Investment Product Outcome 1 P1 Outcome 2 P2 Outcome 3 P3 EV SD 
1 $600 0.56 -$200 0.38 -$1,100 0.06 $194 $502 
2 $5,200 0.79 -$7,900 0.20 -$24,000 0.01 $2,288 $5,862 
3 $13,900 0.11 $5,100 0.44 -$3,600 0.45 $2,153 $5,822 
4 $6,900 0.56 -$2,500 0.38 -$12,100 0.06 $2,188 $5,748 
5 $1,300 0.11 $500 0.44 -$300 0.45 $228 $533 
6 $25,800 0.01 $12,400 0.20 -$700 0.79 $2,185 $5,746 
Subsequent to the consideration of the possible gains and possible losses that each investment 
product may bring, respondents are asked to answer the following two questions:  
1) What is the maximum price you would be willing to pay for this investment product, 
rather than forgoing it? [If you wouldn’t buy it at any price, write $0.] 
This question captures individual risk tolerance level in facing financial risks (FRT) through 
one’s willingness to pay (WTP) for risky investments. The higher the WTP, the higher risks 
they are willing to endure.  
2)  On a scale of 0 to 100, how risky do you think this investment product is? 
This question captures individual subjective perception in the riskiness of investment products 
(subjective RP). The value of subjective RP is expressed on a numerical rating scale that ranged 
from 0 (not at all risky) to 100 (extremely risky). 
2.4.2 Derivation of main dependent variables: FRT, RP and RAtt 
After the respondents state their WTP and subjective RP for the six investment options, 
measures of an individual’s FRT, RP and RAtt are mathematically derived based on their 
responses. The theory-based measures and the mathematical computations of these constructs 
are summarised in Table 2.3.  
2.4.2.1 Financial risk tolerance (FRT) 
FRT of an individual is calculated as the mean of six WTP values stated by each respondent. 
The FRT calculation can be written as follows: 
 WTP = 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 
∑ 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖
6
𝑖=1
6
 (eq.2.4) 
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2.4.2.2 Financial risk perception (RP) 
I)  Objective RP 
The objective RP for each investment option is its variance. Consequently, the objective RP of 
an individual is the mean variance of the six investment options, which can be written as shown 
in Equation 2.5. As all respondents are given the same investment options, their objective RP 
are the same. 
 VAR = Objective RP =  
∑ 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖
6
𝑖=1
6
  
= 
∑ {[(𝑂1
2∗𝑃1)+(𝑂2
2∗𝑃2)+(𝑂2
2∗𝑃3)]−[(𝑂1∗𝑃1)+(𝑂2∗𝑃2)+(𝑂3∗𝑃3)]
2}𝑖
6
𝑖=1
6
 (eq.2.5) 
where O denotes the outcomes of an investment option and their corresponding probability P. 
II)  Subjective RP 
Subjective RP on six investment options is reported by respondents in the survey. Individual 
subjective RP is calculated as the mean subjective RP of the six investment options. Its 
calculation is shown in equation 2.6:  
 Subjective RP = 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ = 
∑ 𝑅𝑃𝑖
6
𝑖=1
6
 (eq.2.6) 
2.4.2.3 Financial risk attitude (RAtt) 
With regards to the measure of financial risk attitude (RAtt), the study employs the Weber and 
Hsee’s (1998) approach. As discussed in the theoretical framework Section 2.3, there are two 
measures of individual RAtt. These are the objective RAtt (bVAR) and the subjective RAtt (bR). 
These RAtt measures, which are based on the risk-return framework (the TRAM and the 
PRAM), identify whether an individual is risk averse (negative bVAR/bR) or risk seeking 
(positive bVAR/bR). Accordingly, the mathematical computations of RAtt are constructed as 
follows: 
I)  Objective RAtt (bVAR) 
In accordance with the TRAM (equation 2.2), the objective RAtt (bVAR) of an individual is 
derived by regressing the WTP on expected value and objective RP (variance) of the six 
investment options. The intercept term a reflects individual differences in FRT, and the 
coefficient bVAR reflects individual objective RAtt.  
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II)  Subjective RAtt (bR) 
The derivation of subjective RAtt is based on the PRAM (equation 2.3), which relaxes the 
assumption of constant RP across individuals. Similarly, individual subjective RAtt is obtained 
by regressing the WTP on expected value and subjective RP of the six investment options. The 
risk trade-off coefficient bR is the individual subjective RAtt. 
Table 2.3: Theory-based measures of FRT, RP and RAtt 
Main variable 
(Variable Code) 
Theory Measure Formula 
 
 Financial risk tolerance (FRT) 
FRT (WTP) 
 
The TRAM  
WTP(X) = aEV(X) + bVARVAR(X) 
The PRAM 
WTP(X) = aEV(X) + bRR(X) 
Willingness to pay; 
WTP(X) 
WTP = WTP̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = 
∑ WTPi
6
i=1
6
 
 
 Risk perception (RP) 
Objective RP 
(VAR) 
 
The TRAM  
WTP(X) = aEV(X) + bVARVAR(X) 
Variance of X; 
VAR(X) 
VAR =  
∑ VARi
6
i=1
6
 
 
Subjective RP 
(RP) 
 
The PRAM 
WTP(X) = aEV(X) + bRR(X) 
Subjective risk; 
R(X) 
RP = RP̅̅̅̅ = 
∑ RPi
6
i=1
6
 
 
 Risk attitude (RAtt) 
 
Objective RAtt 
(bVAR) 
The TRAM  
WTP(X) = aEV(X) + bVARVAR(X) 
Risk trade-off 
coefficient; bVAR 
Regression analysis 
 
Subjective RAtt 
(bR) 
The PRAM 
WTP(X) = aEV(X) + bRR(X) 
Risk trade-off 
coefficient; bR 
Regression analysis 
 
2.4.2.4 Objective RAtt (bVAR) vs. Subjective RAtt (bR) 
Whilst the objective measure of RAtt is calculated based on the variance of investment option’s 
outcomes, the subjective measure of RAtt is based on the risk that one personally and intuitively 
perceives. For the objective RAtt, it assumes that everyone sees risk as variance, and thus the 
amount of risk individuals perceive are the same. However, in the real world, people can 
understand financial risk in different ways, see financial risk from different perspectives, and 
hence employ different methods to measure it. Although financial specialists may have 
remarkable insight on variance, its computation can be problematic owing to resource and time 
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constraints. Therefore, the assumption of a constant RP across individuals is often violated. As 
a result, subjective measure of RAtt are alternatively employed allowing individuals to 
independently and subjectively perceive and evaluate financial risk. 
In this study, statistical tests are implemented to initially examine whether the assumption of 
constant RP across individuals holds. If RP reported by individuals are the same, both measures 
of RAtt will be taken into consideration and their results will be evaluated and ultimately 
compared. On the other hand, if the reported RP is found to be significantly different across 
individuals, it can be concluded that the assumption of constant RP across individuals is 
violated. Consequently, the objective RAtt (bVAR) will not be pursued further, and only 
subjective RAtt (bR) will be employed.  
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Chapter Three: 
Survey Design, Data Collection, and Research Method 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 has explained the building framework of the whole study that assists the readers in 
understanding the definitions, as well as the quantitative measures of the three main constructs: 
financial risk tolerance (FRT), risk perception (RP) and risk attitude (RAtt). These 
understandings should be carried to this empiric chapter (Chapter 3) to understand how the 
study’s data was obtained and analysed. This chapter will first introduce readers to the 
administration of the survey, which aims to get the survey ready for the data collection process. 
Subsequently, the methods of statistical analysis will be discussed. As previously mentioned, 
this chapter provides information that can be generally used by all empirical studies in this 
thesis. It is created separately to avoid repetition at the later stage. 
3.2 Administration of the survey 
3.2.1 Translation of questionnaire survey 
The primary quantitative data was collected via a bespoke questionnaire, which was originally 
written in English. The same questionnaire surveys were employed in the US, the UK, China, 
Vietnam, and Singapore using their local languages. Specifically, the English survey was 
distributed in the US, UK, and Singapore, and Vietnamese and Chinese surveys were distributed 
in Vietnam and China, respectively. The original English survey was translated into Vietnamese 
and Chinese using back translating method (Brislin, 1986). 
For the translations of Vietnamese and Chinese, two independent professional translation 
companies were employed in each country (Vietnam13  and China14, respectively). One 
company was responsible for translating the original English survey into the target language; 
and the translated version is subsequently translated back to English by the other company. The 
                                                 
13 Translation companies:  
English to Vietnamese: Dịch Thuật Việt Uy Tín, Ho Chi Minh City, Việt Nam  
 Email: sales@dichthuatuytin.com  
Vietnamese to English: Hội Nghiên Cứu Dịch Thuật, Ho Chi Minh City, Việt Nam 
 Email: hncdt1@gmail.com 
14 Translation companies: 
English to Chinese: PTSGI, Taipei, Taiwan 
      Email: Market@PTSGI.COM  
Chinese to English: Ectranslator Translation Services, Shanghai, China 
      Email: sales@ectranslator.com  
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two English versions were then compared and modified by two native-speaking academic 
colleagues15 by means of in-depth discussions. 
3.2.2 Currency exchange 
The US Dollar is chosen as the base currency in the original English survey because the FRT 
experimental question were originally quoted in US Dollars in the study of Weber and Hsee 
(1998). It is unclear whether the $20,000 initial endowment set by Weber and Hsee (1998) is 
random or critically derived. It is possible that the level of the endowment was critically 
originated by the authors, perhaps because it is the most appropriate amount for the study’s 
objectives and for participants from all countries to understand and work with the task 
effectively. In such case, if we chose other currencies as the base currency (£20,000 or 
S$20,000), the initial endowment would be different from the plausible $20,000 decided by 
Weber and Hsee (1998) in the first place. Due to the ambiguity about the decision made by 
Weber and Hsee (1998) on the initial investment amount, it was prudent to use the same amount 
denominated in the same currency ($20,000) with Weber and Hsee’s study. However, to 
account for the relative time value of the amount set by Weber and Hsee (1998) 20 years ago, 
the $20,000 endowment is multiplied by an inflation multiplier of 1.499 (see Section 3.2.3).  
Surveys distributed in the five countries are presented using their national currencies. The 
amounts denominated in the US Dollar (USD) are required to be converted into Pound Sterling 
(GBP), Vietnamese Dong (VND), Chinese Yuan (CNY), and Singaporean Dollar (SGD) for 
the surveys distributed in the UK, Vietnam, China, and Singapore, respectively. The US Dollar 
is converted into four targeted currencies using the market exchange rates of each currency 
against the US Dollar on the 5th of February 2016. The final exchange rates were adjusted for 
the Local Purchasing Power of each country relative to the United States. There were three 
methods considered to account for the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP): the LPPI method, the 
CPI+R method, and the PPP conversion factor method. 
After thoroughly considering advantages and drawbacks of each approach (details provided in 
Appendix 2), the study uses the CPI+R method that gives an approximation of national 
purchasing power based on the costs of living of residents from each country compared to that 
of American residents. The method employs the Consumer Price Plus Rent Index (CPI+R). The 
index estimates the relative price level for consumer goods, including groceries, restaurants, 
transportations and utilities, plus other accommodation expenses (mortgage and rent), of each 
individual country comparing to the US. Table 3.1 provides summary for the market exchange 
                                                 
15 Chinese version: Yuanyu Yang (Y.Yang41@newcastle.ac.uk), Liu Jia (Jia.Liu@newcastle.ac.uk)  
  Vietnamese version: Ngân Đường Cao (the researcher), Vũ Quang Trịnh (Q.V.Trinh2@newcastle.ac.uk) 
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rate and the Local Purchasing Power Index in 2016. For example, the CPI+R of Singapore is 
138.71, which estimates the cost of living in Singapore is 38.71% more expensive than the 
United States in 2016.  
The calculation for currency exchange rates accounting for purchasing power using CPI+R 
method can be written as:  
 S$/i_adj = S$/i * 
𝐶𝑃𝐼+𝑅(𝑖)
𝐶𝑃𝐼+𝑅(𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑈𝑆)
 (eq.3.1)
where S$/i_adj and S$/i are the exchange rates of target currency per US Dollar after and before 
adjusting for PPP, respectively. 
Table 3.1: Exchange Rate and Consumer Price Plus Rent Index (CPI+R) in 201616 
Currency Exchange rate Countries CPI+R (2016) 
USD 1  The US 100 
USD/GBP 0.6858  The UK 104.57 
USD/SGD 1.3969  Singapore 138.71 
USD/CNY 6.5548  China 62.70 
USD/VND 21,920 Vietnam 47.81 
 
After all the data had been collected, monetary values, such as WTP, income and wealth, that 
are denominated in currencies other than the US Dollar are converted back to the US Dollar 
using the same CPI+R method. The conversion is calculated as presented in the equation 3.2.  
 V$ = Vi * 
𝐶𝑃𝐼+𝑅𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑈𝑆
𝑆$/𝑖∗𝐶𝑃𝐼+𝑅𝑖
 = Vi * 
100
𝑆$/𝑖∗𝐶𝑃𝐼+𝑅𝑖
  (eq.3.2) 
where Vi is the converted value in the US Dollar; S$/i is the exchange rates of target currency 
per US Dollar; and CPI+Ri is the CPI+R index of the target country. 
Although the FRT survey task was mainly taken from the study of Weber and Hsee (1998), a 
number of adjustments from the original version were made. The remaining section will explain 
the reasons of those adjustments.  
 
                                                 
16 Sources:  
Currency Conversion (Yahoo Finance, 2016) 
Cost of Living Index for Countries in 2016 (Numbeo, 2016) 
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3.2.3  Adjustments from Weber and Hsee’s (1998) FRT Task 
Adjustment 1: As the study of Weber and Hsee (1998) was conducted about 20 years ago, 
there may be problems regarding the relative time values of the monetary amounts that they set 
for the FRT task. Consequently, the study adjusted all those amounts using the following 
formula:  
 Vadjusted = Voriginal * 1.499 (eq.3.3) 
The inflation multiplier of 1.499 is calculated using the annual inflation rates in the United 
States from 1995 to 2015 collected from the World Bank (2016). 
Adjustment 2: During the process of pilot study17, the FRT questions appeared to be a difficult 
and complicated task for respondents to understand. To assist respondents in interpreting the 
question accurately and consistently, they were initially provided with an example investment 
product along with a guideline answer as presented in Table 3.2.  The answer is explained in 
ordinary language so that participants from different educational and professional backgrounds 
could understand. Nevertheless, being aware of the possible anchoring bias (Ackert and Deaves, 
2010), the guideline answer does not give a specific numerical answer to the example question. 
Alternatively, an alphabetical letter “X” is used to denote the amount of money respondents are 
willing to spend.  
Table 3.2: Example question and guideline answer for the FRT task 
 
                                                 
17 Details for the pilot process provided section 3.3.1 
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Adjustment 3: Although the FRT question was sourced from Weber and Hsee’s (1998) study, 
the logic and understanding of the question that the authors intended to convey is subject to 
ambiguities18. These include two main points:  
 Ambiguity 1: The paper stated that “Respondents were told to assume that they were 
investing their own money and that they currently had $20,000 available to make investments” 
(Weber and Hsee, 1998, pp. 1209). However, the instruction does not clearly explain whether 
the $20,000 endowment is used to invest in each investment option or to distribute among the 
12 investment options. 
Decision: After thorough consideration, the current study assumes that the investment options 
should be independent from one another and the initial endowment of $20,000 is to invest in 
each investment option. There are two rationales for this decision. Firstly, if $20,000 is spread 
among the six investment options, the decision made on each of them will be dependent on the 
riskiness and values of other investment options. Furthermore, the respondents are required to 
constantly keep in mind the amount they have spent on previous investment options with their 
related risks and returns, the available funds, together with assessing the amounts of losses and 
gains, and their respective possibilities of the current option. Consequently, the question would 
have been remarkably complicated and challenging for respondents to answer.  
Secondly, the study aims at investigating the differences in individual RP when facing risky 
financial investments. According to the risk-return framework (Markowitz, 1952), the decision 
made on any investment should only depend on its risks, returns, and investor’s risk attitude, 
but not on other external factors. Indeed, Weber and Hsee instructed their respondents “to 
examine each investment option separately” (Weber and Hsee, 1998, pp. 1210); yet extra 
emphasis on the word ‘separately’ is essential to avoid misinterpretation and confusion of 
respondents.  
 Ambiguity 2: It is vague whether the costs of investment options are reimbursed.  
Decision: In their instructions, Weber and Hsee (1998) used the word “investment options” and 
asked respondents to “invest” in them. Investment is defined in Oxford dictionaries (2016) as 
“the action or process of investing money for profit”. On the other hand, Investopedia (2003) 
refers investment as “a monetary asset purchased with the idea that the asset will provide 
income in the future or appreciate and be sold at a higher price”. Corresponding to these two 
definitions, investors/respondents should be able to get the initial investment back. 
                                                 
18 The researchers contacted the authors via email to clarify these points. However, no response was received.  
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Nevertheless, the objective of the study, that is, to capture one’s FRT and RP, cannot be 
achieved if the investment principal is reimbursed. First of all, the options’ outcomes are 
specific amounts; not percentages of the invested amount. Consequently, if the investor can get 
back the investment cost, the willingness to pay would merely be based on if she thinks the 
investment worth investing. If she wants to invest in a particular investment, there is no 
difference whether the investment costs $20,000 or $1, because that amount will eventually be 
repaid. In that case, although the risk of each investment is still perceived differently across 
individuals, this risk is independent of the willingness to pay. This study is predominantly based 
on the risk-return model which states that FRT is a function of RP.  As a result, it is more 
reasonable for the cost of investment to be a one-off payment that cannot be reimbursed.  
Additionally, Weber and Hsee (1998) asked their respondents to state the maximum amount 
they would be willing to “pay” for the investment options, and if the respondents do not want 
to “buy” the option at any price, say $0. The two words ‘pay’ and ‘buy’ may have indicated 
that the initial investment cost is a one-off cost.  
The ambiguity 2 is used as one criteria to exclude non-qualified answers. Specifically, if the 
respondents understand that they cannot get back the cost of investment, the highest amount 
they would like to pay for any investment option cannot exceed the highest amount of gain 
provided by that investment. Basically, it is not logical to pay a price that you never can recover. 
It is important to notice that for all investment options, the maximum amount19 that respondents 
end up losing in the worst outcome, does not exceed the initial endowment of $20,000. 
Therefore, Weber and Hsee (1998) have given the respondents enough budget to pay for that. 
As the investment cost cannot be reimbursed, it is more appropriate to refer to these options as 
gambles rather than investments. Nevertheless, to ensure that the objectives of the question 
remain unchanged, the study retains the use of the word ‘investment’, but more explanation is 
provided in the instructions to attract the attention of respondents to this point.  
Adjustment 4: An adjustment on the design of the task was made to ensure the quality of the 
data, whilst the purpose of Weber and Hsee’s study remains unmodified. In this study, 
respondents are presented with 6 investment options, instead of the 12 used in Weber and 
Hsee’s study. The main reason for this modification is strongly related to the quality of the 
obtained data. During the pilot study, the majority of respondents provided negative feedback 
on the length of the FRT question when all 12 investment options were included. They showed 
                                                 
19 Net loss = cost of investment* + loss outcome 
* Cost of investment ≤ the highest possible outcome.  
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significant loss in their focus after the first half of the task. According to Baumeister (2003), 
the self becomes depleted and tired after a series of decisions, which causes the subsequent 
decisions to be costly and foolish. Consequently, such decision fatigue leads respondents to 
provide deteriorating quality of decisions and biased answers for latter part of the task 
(Baumeister, 2003). Note that the FRT task is presented in the beginning of the survey after 
roughly one minute of answering demographic questions (Appendix 1).  
Although the number of investment products have been reduced, the purpose of the study is 
maintained and remains comparable to the study of Weber and Hsee (1998). As individual FRT 
is measured as the mean WTP of all investment options, if the results of Weber and Hsee (1998) 
are robust, findings should not change if another random sample is taken to do the task again 
with six investment options. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the study replicates Weber and 
Hsee’s (1998) study in many aspects and uses their mosaic bivariate analysis as the baseline 
statistical method. With this approach, if the same findings are obtained, it can be concluded 
that this study’s data is comparable to theirs. Consequently, the reduction in the number of 
investment products may not influence the results’ quality.  
This study has made a thorough consideration of the six options to be included in the survey, 
accounting for certain heuristics that individuals may use when facing with uncertain choices. 
Specifically, previous literature has reported that individuals can either place relatively more 
weight on the probability of loss (Bontempo et al., 1997; Alderfer and Bierman, 1970), or on 
the magnitude of possible gains (Bontempo et al., 1997; Lopes, 1987), or the magnitude of 
possible losses (Weber and Hsee, 1998; Lopes, 1987; Alderfer and Bierman, 1970), and size of 
payoffs (Holt and Laury, 2002). 
The first two selected investment options are ones with the most desirable, and the most 
undesirable outcomes among the original 12 investment options in Weber and Hsee’s (1998) 
study, in terms of their possible gains and losses. According to Table 2.1, these two options 
exhibit similar expected values (EV) and standard deviations (SD) but different distributions of 
losses and gains. The investment product 2 gives respondents an extremely high amount of loss 
(-$24,000) but only 1% chance that the outcome would occur, whilst the investment product 6 
gives respondents a very high amount of gain ($25,800) but similarly, with only 1% chance of 
occurrence.  
 
The other four options take into account the size effects of the payoffs. Two pairs of options 
are selected, in each of which the probability of possible gains and losses are the same, whilst 
the magnitudes of gains and losses are adjusted and scaled up by a factor of 10 (approximately). 
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Specifically, the outcomes of investment products 3 and 4 are approximately 10 times higher 
than investment products 1 and 5, respectively. 
Adjustment 5: The order of six investment options are the same when being presented to all 
respondents. The main aim of this study is to compare individual FRT. Hence, fixing the order 
of the six investment options can assist the comparability of the task. As recommended by 
Kelley et al. (2003), questions should be standardized and presented to respondents in the same 
order. Similarly, as stated by Fink (2013, pg.65), “it is important to ask everyone the same 
questions in the same way or results will not be comparable”.  
It is noteworthy that the carry-over effects (COE) are not relevant in this FRT task. COE is 
defined by Harrison et al. (2011, pp.5) as “events and processes occurring in one season that 
result in individuals making the transition between seasons in different states (levels of 
condition) consequently affecting individual performance in a subsequent period”. COE would 
be a concern as it causes challenges in distinguishing COEs from other investigated effects. For 
example, the examination of the influence of music on one’s essay quality is likely to be 
subjected to COEs. If respondents are instructed to write an essay without music following by 
writing another essay with music, the higher quality of essay that was written with music may 
be argued to be influenced by COEs rather than the music effect. To be specific, the participants 
might be warmed up after the first essay which causes the higher quality of the second essay (a 
COE of individual’s writing quality). Within the current research, the focus is not on comparing 
the performance (WTP/subjective RP) of the same individual across the six investment options. 
Instead, the examination is mainly conducted to compare the average performance (mean 
WTP/subjective RP) across individuals. Consequently, COEs are not a concern.   
3.3  Data collection 
3.3.1 The pilot study 
Before the translation process took place, the original English survey had been piloted on a 
small-scale sample to examine its quality in terms of its readability, intelligibility, and 
coherence. The pilot study aims at identifying questions that do not make sense, or are 
interpreted incorrectly and inconsistently by respondents, together with other issues that may 
trigger biased answers, such as the design and wording of the questions.  
Pre-pilot and pilot study: For both pre-pilot and pilot studies, native English-speaking staffs 
and students were recruited from the Newcastle University Business School. Before the official 
pilot study, the survey was pre-piloted on five PhD students to skim through the survey to 
identify mistakes, such as typing errors, spelling errors, grammatical errors, and duplicated 
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questions. During the pilot sessions, respondents were provided with a research information 
sheet and a hard copy of the survey (as presented in Appendix 1), which was completed by the 
participants. The whole pilot process was timed and observed by the researcher. Once 
completed, respondents were provided a feedback sheet (Appendix 3, P.I) based on which they 
gave verbal feedback with regards to the length, understandability, sensitivity, layout, and 
presentation of the questions. 
The feedback sheet contains general questions which apply to all participants. Besides, more 
questions were particularly tailored for each respondent to capture their own understanding and 
attitude towards the questionnaire, based on their reactions and emotional responses during the 
survey. For example, if a respondent was hesitant while answering a question, such as taking 
too long to think, changing the answers many times, leaving the question blank, smiling, sighing 
loudly, or shaking their heads, the researcher would take note and discuss with the respondent 
in the feedback time.  
The official pilot study contained two rounds. The first round was conducted on twenty-eight 
participants, and the survey was adjusted once every five respondents. The second round was 
required due to some unresolved issues regarding inconsistent understandings and 
interpretations of the FRT experimental-designed task (Appendix I, Part II). This task was 
exclusively piloted on roughly eighty students additionally. The researchers asked the 
respondents questions which focussed on respondents’ understanding of the task, such as “why 
are you willing to pay £X for this investment but you will only get back £Y (<X) in the best 
scenario?” or “Do you understand whether you can get back the cost of investment?” or “Do 
you understand whether £20,000 is the endowment for each investment option or is allocated 
among six investment options?” (See more in Appendix 3, P.II). Based on the feedback 
received, adjustments were made until a consistent and comprehensive understanding of the 
task was achieved.  
After the pilot study, the final English survey was translated into Vietnamese and Chinese using 
the back-translating method as stated in Section 3.2.1. Subsequently, the translated surveys 
were piloted on about 10-15 Chinese and Vietnamese native respondents for each survey until 
the final qualified questionnaires (as required in the English survey) are attained. 
3.3.2 Official data collection process 
The study targets a broad sample of the population in each country with minimum age of 18 up 
to the age of retirement as the research is solely interested in studying the risk-profile of 
individuals prior to their retirement stage. Furthermore, as the focus is on the age difference in 
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individual FRT, stratified random sampling method is employed. Basically, the whole sample 
is equally divided into 4 age groups. Each age group represents approximately 25% of the whole 
sample. With roughly equal age strata, the age difference can be better examined comparing to 
the using a student sample with limited range of age.  
Participants were recruited through an external data-collecting service20 with the aim of 
collecting at least 300 well completed responses from each country. As the survey needs to be 
distributed across 5 different countries, approaching respondents online through a market 
research company was considered to be the most economically effective method for this 
research. 
To control for the quality of the respondents’ answers, a quality control process was put in place 
throughout the pilot stage until the final data cleaning process. In the market research industry, 
it is a common practice such that low-quality answers will not be charged. One essential criteria 
for a well completed response is that all questions are answered. Additionally, the company 
employs a number of techniques to detect underqualified responses. The first technique is the 
“straight-liner”, which detects participants that tend to select the same exact response over a 
series of questions. The second technique is the “speeder”. It detects respondents that finished 
the survey in less than half of the average length of time. Besides, deficient answers were also 
excluded under the judgements of the researcher as well as using some logical follow-up 
questions to detect if the respondents take the survey seriously (details in Appendix 3, P.III). 
The field work keeps on running until at least 300 completed survey are collected in each 
respective market.  
 
Notably, for the FRT experimental task, respondents who stated the WTP as ‘$0’ for all 
investment options are not excluded as the answers of ‘$0’ do make economic sense such that 
the respondents do not want to invest at all regardless what the investments offer. However, 
respondents who provided a constant but non-zero WTP for all investment options are included 
and would be considered as noise in the data sample (N=43). All multivariate tests (Section 
3.4.3) for all three empirical studies have been implemented which revealed that findings 
remain unchanged when those 43 observations are excluded from the sample. 
With the online sample, the internet literacy penetration may lead to potential selection bias in 
the sample of countries with low internet literacy and coverage as the access to respondents 
                                                 
20 Data collection company:  
iPanel Online Market Research, Rotterdam, the Netherlands 
Email: sales-europe@ipanelonline.com 
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online in those countries may be challenging. Particularly, China and Vietnam have the lowest 
internet coverage of roughly 50% comparing to the other three countries with more than 80% 
internet coverage (IWS, 2017). Such under-coverage issue in these two countries may cause the 
samples to be problematic such that the final participating respondents may not be a good 
representative of the population. Technically, the representativeness of a sample can be tested 
by comparing the population parameters (the distribution of the population) with the statistics 
of the obtained sample. In an ideal world, this procedure can be simply completed. However, 
in practice, there are two restrictions associated with it. Firstly, this study uses the stratified 
sample with respect to age (discussed earlier in this section). Hence, the age distribution of the 
sample is not comparable with that of the population.  The second problem is related to the 
inaccessibility of the population data. However, basic population demographic information of 
Vietnam and China can be found on IndexMundi (2017a,b) database, which reveals that the 
gender ratios (male to female) within the age range of 25 to 65 in China and Vietnam are 1.03 
and 0.98, respectively. Comparing these population figures to those of the samples (1.11 and 
1.01, respectively), the differences are less than 10% (8% in China and 3% in Vietnam). The 
divergence in gender ratios in these two countries can be considered as relatively small. 
Therefore, the representativeness of Chinese and Vietnamese samples may not be an issue. 
However, as further comparisons are restricted due to the unattainability of the population data, 
such conclusion cannot be assured.  
Furthermore, the internet literacy penetration may create another issue with approaching older 
respondents in Vietnam and Singapore. According to Statista (2017a,b), less than 20% of the 
internet users in Vietnam and Singapore age 45 or above. This creates some restrictions 
regarding the age of respondents from Vietnam and Singapore as it is generally difficult in 
reaching audiences with an age above 45 through online channels in these two countries. The 
research market company did inform us of such a restriction initially and we decided to remain 
our focus on collecting a random sample, but with the risk of not getting any respondents from 
Vietnam and Singapore with an age above 45. Fortunately, after the data was obtained, the final 
sample comprised of a sufficient number of Vietnamese and Singaporean participants of this 
age range21. 
It is argued that data collection using fieldwork (such as, postal or interview survey) is not 
exposed to the sampling limitation of under-coverage as with the online data collection method. 
However, this study requires the survey to be distributed in five different countries (the US, the 
UK, China, Vietnam, and Singapore). With a tight timeframe of 3 years and limited financial 
                                                 
21 See Section 4.4.2 for data descriptive statistic of respondents’ age across the five countries 
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funding provided for PhD research, the use of fieldwork for data collection was infeasible. 
Furthermore, no single data collection is perfect; each method tends to be subject to its own 
limitations. Taking into account all the constraints, the online survey is the most sufficient and 
economically feasible method to be employed.  
3.3.3 Final data sample 
The final sample for the study contains 1,889 observations with 413 respondents from the US, 
387 respondents from the UK, 328 respondents from Vietnam, 361 respondents from China, 
and 382 respondents from Singapore. More detailed descriptive statistics of the whole sample 
will be provided in the empirical chapters. 
After the data was obtained, it was carefully cleaned for the statistical analysis. The subsequent 
sections will provide information about the statistical analysis methods being employed in this 
study. 
3.4 Main statistical analysis 
3.4.1 The model-based mosaic multivariate approach 
As previously mentioned in Section 2.2.3, the current study relies on the study of Weber and 
Hsee (1998) in three aspects. Firstly, the definitions of FRT, RP and RAtt (see Section 2.2). 
Secondly, this study also employs the risk-return modern portfolio theory as the main theoretical 
framework (see Section 2.3). Lastly, the same experimental FRT task (subject to a number of 
adjustments for improvement, Section 3.2.3), and how the quantitative measures of the three 
constructs are computed (see Section 2.4). With regards to statistical analysis, this study will 
also employ their main statistical approach, namely, the mosaic bivariate approach (ANOVA 
and Bonferonni adjusted t-test). However, the method is only used as the baseline, not as the 
main test. By conducting the same analytical tests, the general finding, such that RAtt is similar 
across individuals and hence differences in individual FRT are mainly caused by differences in 
RP, can be compared with that of Weber and Hsee (1998). If the same general finding is 
obtained, it can be inferred that the data obtained for this study is comparable to Weber and 
Hsee’s data. Note that this baseline test will be conducted in the first two empirical studies 
(Chapters 4 and 5). After the quality of this study’s data is verified in these two empirical 
studies, the baseline method will be dropped in the third empirical studies (Chapter 
6).Nevertheless, there are a numbers of limitations with the use of bivariate analysis. 
Firstly, as bivariate analysis can only identify linear relationship between two variables, whilst 
their non-linear and causal relationship are ignored, the complexity of reality cannot be 
captured. 
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Secondly, subjective judgements are involved when deciding the number of groups that an 
independent variable should be divided into, and how the division should be conducted. Owing 
to such subjective judgement, the results can be easily manipulated by sub-grouping an 
independent variable in different ways. As an illustration, for the age variable, the whole sample 
can be divided into either four age groups with a range of 10 years old per group, or nine age 
groups with a range of 5 years old per group. Different number of age groups might provide 
different pictures on the relationship between age and FRT. 
Lastly, the analysis fails to take into account other potential factors. This can lead to misleading 
conclusions owing to overlapping characteristics of two variables (Maylor and Blackmon, 
2005). Basically, the obtained significant relationship between an explanatory factor and a 
dependent variable can be spurious when the genuine factor, which has one or more overlapping 
characteristics (highly correlated) with the explanatory factor, has been omitted or failed to be 
controlled for in the bivariate analysis. For example, researchers may think that they have found 
a relationship between culture and individual FRT when the relationship is actually caused by 
other variables, such as, the country variable. Possibly, China and the US have different cultural 
values as well as their macroeconomic conditions, languages, political system and geographical 
locations, which are all captured in the country variable (Weber and Hsee, 1999). Hence, if only 
the culture variable is tested exclusively, the conclusions may be deceptive. 
Due to these limitations, although the mosaic bivariate analysis is still conducted as the baseline, 
the study employs the model-based mosaic multivariate analysis as the main analytical method. 
Weber and Hsee (1999) critically reviewed the methods of conducting a multistudy project that 
aimed at examining the cross-national differences in FRT between the collectivism and 
individualism. They developed two main recommendations for future cross-cultural research, 
namely, model-based approach and mosaics. In their study, they did employ the mosaic 
approach but not the model-based approach. The model-based approach recommendation 
suggests that all cross-cultural studies should be model-based to determine the causal effects, 
as well as moderating and mediating effects, of hypothesised variables on attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviour. As a result, the contribution is not simply an investigation of cross-cultural 
differences in target behaviour, but also a prediction of the behaviour. Accordingly, the study 
employs the model-based mosaic analysis for all three empirical research questions. Such 
model-guided mosaic building follows the recommendation of Weber and Hsee (1999) such 
that the method “provides for cumulative results from multiple studies designed to investigate 
different aspects and determinants of the behaviour of interest” (pp.617).  
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3.4.2  Statistical problems and remedies 
With regards to the model-based approach, OLS models are conducted using the mean-
centering robust standard error method to tackle the issues of nonessential multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and non-normality of error terms.  
3.4.2.1  Nonessential ill-conditioning multicollinearity 
For all employed OLS estimating models of this study, that are based on the general model 
(eq.3.1, Section 3.4.3), the presence of interactive and polynomial variables is likely to create 
concern for the presence of multicollinearity which will be detected by the variance of inflation 
factors (VIFs) for each model. According to Gujarati (2003), multicollinearity would be a 
concern if the VIF is greater than 10. Nevertheless, if the issue arises merely due to high 
correlations between the product terms and their component variables (main effects) rather than 
high correlations between independent variables, the collinearity problem is referred to as non-
essential multicollinearity (Dalal and Zickar, 2012). Many researchers alleviate this 
nonessential ill-conditioning result by mean-centering both the predictor and moderator 
variables (Aiken and West, 1991; Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990). According to Dalal and 
Zickar (2012), Afshartous and Preston (2011), and Paccagnella (2006), further to effectively 
removing multicollinearity, mean-centering improves the precision of estimates and the 
interpretability of results, stabilises regression models, all without affecting the regression 
model fit and the reliability of multiplicative terms. Furthermore, following recommendation 
provided by Aguinis et al. (2017), the mean-centering method is essential as the current analysis 
also focuses on the main effects of predictors, rather than just on the non-linear or moderation 
effects. 
 
3.4.2.2  Heteroskedasticity and non-normality of error terms 
A robust standard error is used as most models are subject to concerns of heteroscedasticity as 
diagnosed by White Test and Breusch-Pagan Test, and/or the issue of normality of error terms. 
A Shapiro-Wilk normality test in error terms states that the hypothesis of normality of error 
terms is rejected at 99% confidence level for all models used in this study.  
3.4.2.3  Endogeneity 
Endogeneity was investigated using the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator for three 
variables which are suspected to be endogenous independent variables due to simultaneity. 
These are wealth, income, and self-reported risk aversion (SRA). Specifically, it is possible that 
the respondent’s wealth, income, and SRA are jointly determined with their FRT, RP, and RAtt. 
To perform the two-stage least square test for each suspected variable, five instrumental 
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variables are employed which are exogenous and correlated with the tested variables. Table 3.3 
provides the coding of the four instrumental variables. In general, no endogeneity is captured 
for any of the three variables. As a result, OLS remains an appropriate method for this study. 
Table 3.3: Instrumental variables for 2SLS test for endogeneity 
MEASURE DESCRIPTION TYPE/SCALE 
SavHorizon 
P.IX (Q1) 
A measure of respondent’s planning horizon for 
saving, in years. 
Ratio (19-65) 
Fsupport 
P.IX (Q2) 
A measure of whether respondents fully or 
partially or not at all support their family 
financially. 
Ordinal (1-3) 
Retsupport 
P.IX (Q3) 
A measure of the extent to which respondents 
expect their children to support them financially 
in retirement. 
Ordinal (1-10) 
 Investhorizon 
P.IX (Q4) 
A measure of how long respondents have 
invested in stocks, in months. 
Ratio (0-480) 
 Inheritimp 
P.IX (Q5) 
How important to leave an inheritance. Ordinal (1-10) 
3.4.3 General estimated models 
Adopt the approach from Weber and Hsee’s (1998) for the mosaic building, this study treats 
the effects of the three main predisposing factors (age, culture and language), which will be 
consistently referred to as ‘explanatory’ factors, on individual FRT, RP and RAtt as three 
mosaics. The whole picture is drawn by combining these three mosaics together. A general 
regression model, which is used across these mosaics, can be written as follows:  
FRT/RP/RAtti = α i + βG1*Group1 + βG2*Group2 + βG3*Group3 + βG4*Group4 + 
βG5*Group5 + βG6*Group6 + ε i, (eq.3.4) 
All the estimating models (equation 3.4) are conducted using the mean-centering robust 
standard error method to tackle statistical problems of nonessential multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and non-normality of error terms (details in Section 3.4.2). 
For the three empirical studies that make up this thesis, there are 23 independent factors being 
employed. These factors are classified into six groups: explanatory factors (age, culture and 
language), demographic factors (group 2), socioeconomic factors (group 3), attitudinal factors 
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(group 4), geographic factors (group 5) and cushion hypothesis factors (group 622). 
Explanations for all these variables are presented in Appendix 4 that briefly describes their 
measures and coding. The specific models for each empirical study, which are slightly modified 
from the general model in terms of their contents of independent factors, will be stated and 
explained in the methodology section of its empirical chapter.  
The choice of all controlling variables being included in this study is mainly built on the extant 
literature. Particularly, demographics as well as socioeconomic and attitudinal factors have long 
been important heuristics in predicting investor’s FRT (Roszkowski et al., 1993; Grable, 2000; 
Hallahan et al., 2003). Consequently, in addition to the explanatory factors, this study controls 
for a number of demographic, socio-economic and attitudinal factors (Variables group 2 to 
group 4) that are suggested by researchers and practitioners to play significant roles in 
identifying FRT of an individual. The Appendix 5 provides a list of studies that have examined 
for those variables as the determinants of FRT. 
Furthermore, to effectively distinguish the cultural effect (at individual level23) from the 
nationality/country effects, geographical variables will be controlled for. No questionnaire is 
required to capture the respondent’s country as the surveys are distributed separately in each 
country. The last controlling variable group is named “the cushion hypothesis factors”. These 
factors are included based on the cushion hypothesis advanced by Weber and Hsee (1998), 
which is suggested to mediate the cultural effects on FRT through RP. More explanation on the 
cushion hypothesis is presented in the second empirical study (Chapter 5).  
The subsequent three sub-sections will provide more details regarding the interpretation of each 
mosaic. Notes that based on the contribution of each empirical study, the orders of these 
mosaics can be modified accordingly.   
3.4.3.1 Mosaic 1: Determinants of individual risk perception (RP) 
This mosaic determines whether the explanatory factors influence individuals’ RP.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 More explanation in empirical Chapter 5 
23 The cultural effect in this study is measured at individual level instead of at national level (country is used as a 
proxy of culture), i.e. individuals from the same country can exhibit different cultural values. More explanation 
and discussion will be presented in empirical Chapter 5. 
Explanatory 
Factors 
(Study 1 – Age, 
 Study 2 - Culture, 
Study 3 - Language) 
Risk Perception (RP) 
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The general estimating regression model for this mosaic can be written as follows: 
RPi = αi + βG1*Group1 + βG2*Group2 + βG3*Group3 + βG4*Group4 + βG5*Group5 + 
βG6*Group6 + εi, 
The result obtains for this mosaic identifies whether the assumption of constant RP across 
individuals in the TRAM is violated. If differences in individual RP are found, the use of 
objective RP (Variance) is deemed to be inappropriate, and thus, the objective RAtt (bVAR) will 
not be pursued further. Therefore, only subjective RAtt (bR) is considered for the next mosaic.  
3.4.3.2 Mosaic 2: Determinants of individual risk attitude (RAtt) 
This mosaic of the picture determines whether the explanatory factors influence individual’s 
RAtt. 
 
 
 
 
As there are two measures of individual RAtt, two estimated models are put in place.  
The general model for this mosaic can be written as follows: 
(bVAR/bR)i= αi + βG1*Group1 + βG2*Group2 + βG3*Group3 + βG4*Group4 + βG5*Group5 + 
βG6*Group6 + εi, 
3.4.3.3 Mosaic 3: Determinants of individual financial risk tolerance (FRT) 
This mosaic is the key part of the picture and the main target of the study. It investigates whether 
the explanatory factors influence individual FRT.  
 
 
 
 
The general model for this mosaic can be written as follows: 
Ln(WTP)i = αi + βG1*Group1 + βG2*Group2 + βG3*Group3 + βG4*Group4 + βG5*Group5 + 
βG6*Group6 + εi, 
To account for the highly skewed distribution of WTP (Section 4.4.1), the natural log of WTP 
is used as the dependent variable. 
Risk Attitude (RAtt) 
Explanatory 
Factors 
(Study 1 – Age, 
 Study 2 - Culture, 
Study 3 - Language) 
Financial Risk Tolerance (FRT) 
Explanatory 
Factors 
(Study 1 – Age, 
 Study 2 - Culture, 
Study 3 - Language) 
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With regards to the general interpretation of the results, if the results are statistically significant 
for all three mosaics, the whole picture depicts that the effects of the explanatory factors (age, 
culture, and language) influence individuals’ FRT through RP and RAtt. On the other hand, 
significance of mosaic 3 (effects of explanatory factors on FRT) and insignificance of the first 
two mosaics (effects of explanatory factors on RP and RAtt, respectively) indicates that there 
are influences of the explanatory factors on FRT, but this influence does not go through the 
channels of RP and RAtt. Alternatively, if the results are statistically significant for either, or 
both, of the first two mosaics but not for the last one, it can be concluded that the explanatory 
factors influence individual RP and/or RAtt, but the effect is not sufficiently strong to change 
one’s FRT. 
Before moving onto the three empirical chapters, it is worthwhile noting that the bivariate and 
multivariate tests are employed in all three empirical studies. Therefore, they are explained in 
this general chapter to avoid repetition later on. However, for the second empirical study, the 
cross-cultural research, two additional statistical tests will be implemented. These are the Baron 
and Kenny four-step mediation model and the structural equation modelling (SEM). The 
reasons of their uses as well as the specific testing models will be explained in detailed in the 
relevant chapter (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter Four: Empirical Study 1 
Financial Risk Tolerance Across Age: An Examination of the Mediating 
role of Risk Perception and Risk Attitude 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at presenting the first empirical study. Its principal objective is to investigate 
the underlying mechanisms (specifically, risk perception and risk attitude), through which age 
influences financial risk tolerance (FRT). During the current global aging and increasing 
longevity era, understanding of age-related responses to risky financial investment is valuable. 
Since FRT is an important determinant of a wide range of financial decisions (Snelbecker et al., 
1990), the influence of age on FRT has captured an extensive attention from researchers and 
practitioners. However, the finding of age-FRT relationship can be used solely for prediction, 
whilst leaving no room for alteration, of an individual’s risk appetite. Therefore, recently, 
academy does not focus exclusively on factors that influence one’s FRT, but extends their 
interests to also the underlying mechanism of FRT formation. The two most researched 
mechanisms are perhaps the risk perception (RP) and risk attitude (RAtt). In addition to an 
implication of predictability, understanding of the underlying process possesses an intervention 
property that allows adjustments of one’s FRT level through altering RP and/or RAtt. Thus far, 
extant studies examined the mediating effects of RP and RAtt on influences of different factors 
(such as culture, gender, career, situational domains, outcome domains and time period) on 
FRT. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, no research has examined whether these two 
channels mediate the differences in FRT across age, despite the important of age influence on 
FRT within the academy and practice. Consequently, the current study aims at addressing this 
literature gap. By identifying the underlying channels of difference in FRT across age, the 
findings are not only used for predictive purposes, but also for interventions in individual’s RP 
and/or RAtt to alter one’s contemporary risk tolerance level based on their age. 
The chapter starts with reviewing the literature on which the study is developed. Subsequently, 
detailed methodology, followed by the data description, empirical results, and robustness test, 
will be presented and discussed. 
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4.2 Literature review 
As the main objective of this study is to examine whether RP and RAtt mediate the effect of 
age on FRT, it is essential to firstly investigate the existence of such age influence. Therefore, 
the literature review section will start with the discussion of preceding research on the 
relationship between age and FRT.  
4.2.1 Effect of age on FRT 
Age has been found to be one of the most prominent demographic determinants of FRT 
(Hallahan et al., 2003). The age-risk relationship has been examined by a myriad of published 
research. However, the findings remain inconclusive as demonstrated by the discussion of the 
literature to follow.  
Dohmen et al. (2009) employed the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) dataset with more 
than 20,000 respondents, and a real-stake lottery field experiment conducted on 450 German 
participants. In both approaches, the key findings of the study are strongly aligned with a 
significant decrease in FRT throughout one’s life-cycle in general as well as in all five tested 
domains: car driving, finance, sports and leisure, health, and career.  
The negative age-risk relationship found by Dohmen et al. (2009) is consistent with findings 
obtained in many other studies. Weber (2014) employed the same dataset used in Dohmen et 
al.’s (2009) paper but used different statistical analysis, that is, the generalized ordered logit 
model. Regarding the age effect, she found that “elderly individuals are more likely to be very 
risk averse and less likely to be more risk tolerant”, thus “risk propensity decreases with age” 
(Weber, 2014, pg. 146).  
The research of Jianakoplos and Bernasek (2006) used three consecutive panels of the Federal 
Reserve-sponsored Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to obtain 2 measures of risk taking: 
the self-assessment in willingness to take risk and the observed portfolio allocation of wealth. 
Similarly, they captured a downward sloping age-FRT relationship for both measures after 
controlling for cohort effect. Using the same source of data (the SCF), Morin and Suarez (1983), 
Schooley and Worden (1996), and Chaulk et al. (2003) reported a strong increasing level of 
relative risk aversion with respect to age. Especially, in a cross-sectional study using the 1998-
2007 SCF datasets conducted by Yao et al. (2011), after decomposing the effect of 
chronological age from the period and generation effects, they reported a statistically significant 
negative age effect on individual FRT. 
Palsson (1996) derived both the pre-tax and post-tax risk aversion coefficients (RRA) from the 
actual investment portfolios of more than 7,000 households in Sweden. He revealed that both 
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RRA coefficients are systematically independent of all investigated variables, such as, gender, 
wealth, and income, but except age. Specifically, risk aversion is found to increase with age or 
in other words, FRT decreases with age. Furthermore, in the study of Bellante and Green 
(2004), the elderly group (70 years old or above) was studied using the Asset and Health 
Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) dataset. It is found that relative risk aversion in 
portfolio allocation was found to increase with age. 
The negative age-FRT relationship was also obtained by more recent studies. Tanaka et al. 
(2010) and Albert and Duffy (2012) employed the Holt-Laury paired lottery choice experiment 
(2002) to elicit financial risk aversion. They confirmed that the older participants was more risk 
averse than their younger counterparts.  
Notably, the age-FRT topic not only attracts scholars from Financial and Economics, but also 
scholars from other disciplines. Harlow and Brown (1990) studied FRT from biological and 
psychological perspectives. They employed a psychometric measure of “sensation-seeking” 
personality traits with measures of enzyme monoamine oxidase. Based on these psychological 
personality traits and neurochemical activity, their findings support the conventional wisdom 
of the reduction in FRT with age due to a higher level of the enzyme monoamine oxidase and 
a lower degree of sensation-seeking.  
Despite the accumulation of evidence for the uniformly linear decrease in individual FRT with 
respect to age, inconsistent results were obtained by other researchers. Two studies conducted 
by Hallahan et al. (2003 and 2004) revealed a non-linear pattern with respect to changes in 
individual FRT across the life course though the relationship remains significantly negative. 
Basically, as people age, their willingness to take financial risk decreases at a decreasing rate.  
The nonlinearity of age-FRT relationship was confirmed by other studies, such as, Riley and 
Chow (1992), Yoo (1994), Bajtelsmit and Vanderhei (1997), and Halek and Eisenhauer (2001). 
However, these three studies reported contradictory results with those obtained by Hallahan et 
al. (2003 and 2004) in terms of the sign of the relationship. A common feature of these studies 
is that the FRT is derived from one’s actual asset allocation decisions, rather than being 
psychometrically derived as in the studies of Hallahan et al. (2003 and 2004). Based on the 
analysis of data from the longitudinal Survey of Income and Program Participation, Riley and 
Chow (1992) found that relative risk tolerance rose with age, and subsequently decreased after 
the retirement age of 65. The same quadratic movement in FRT across the life-cycle were found 
by Yoo (1994) using the 1962 Survey of the Financial Characteristics of Consumers, and the 
1983 and 1986 SCF. The obtained association between age and portfolio allocation indicated a 
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decreasing risk aversion throughout individuals’ working life, following by an increase in risk 
aversion after retirement age. Similarly, Bajelsmit and Vanderhei (1997) suggested that the 
level of FRT, which is derived from investor’s fixed-income holding, initially increased with 
age and subsequently dropped at later stage. Additionally, Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) found 
that as one gets one-year older, her risk aversion falls by 4.72-5.1%. Nevertheless, when 
individuals reach the age of 65 or above, their risk aversion significantly surged by about 95-
114%. 
In a work conducted by Faff et al. (2008), FRT was computed by two approaches: a 
psychometrical survey and an online lottery choice experiment. Across both measures, the study 
explored a non-linear convex linkage between age and FRT. Particularly, FRT initially reduces 
following by an increase at the latter stage.  
In contrast to these above findings, a decline in risk aversion or increase in risk tolerance across 
age were also obtained. For example, based on data obtained from the SCFs 1983-1989, Wang 
and Hanna (1997) conclude that “relative risk aversion decreases as people age (i.e., the 
proportion of net wealth invested in risk assets increases as people age) when other variables 
are held constant” (Wang and Hanna, 1997, pg. 30).  
Similar age-FRT pattern was uncovered in studies of Grable (2000) and Sulaiman (2012) such 
that older participants were more financial risk tolerant than their younger counterparts. In 
addition, based on the actual investment allocation of almost 1000 active financial investors 
obtained by means of a questionnaire survey, Cohn et al. (1975) reported that there is a plunge 
in relative risk aversion throughout investors’ life span. 
Summers et al. (2006) employed data from the International Institute of Banking and Financial 
Services’ (IIBFS) Financial Well-being Survey (FWS) to conduct two studies. The first study 
examines how individuals think they should allocate their portfolio investment. The second 
study investigate their actual investment behaviour. The results interestingly revealed that 
individuals’ intuition is different from their actual behaviour. Particularly, people felt that they 
would be less risk tolerant as they age, by invest more in a deposit account and less in equities. 
However, their investment allocation shown the opposite such that as age increases, people tend 
to invest more aggressively in equity, indicating an increase in FRT.  
Thus far, the literature has shown that although the age-FRT association has been heavily 
researched, their relationship has yet been conclusively established. Particularly, a linear 
negative age-FRT relationship were assured by many studies, such as Dohmen et al. (2009), 
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Weber (2014), and see also24. Especially, Hallahan et al. (2003 and 2004) and Faff et al. (2008) 
also obtained a negative effect of age on FRT yet the effect is non-linear. The former found that 
FRT reduced with at an increasingly rate, whilst the latter revealed a convex relationship such 
that FRT reduced across age but subsequently increased at the later stage.  Inconsistently, 
findings of other studies indicate a positive linear relationship between age and FRT. These 
include Wang and Hanna (1997), Grable (2000), Sulaiman (2012), and Cohn et al. (1975). Other 
studies, on the other hand, reported a concave age-FRT relationship, such as Riley and Chow 
(1992), Yoo (1994), Bajelsmit and Vanderhei (1997), and Halek and Eisenhauer (2001). 
Regarding these inconsistent findings of age effect on FRT, prior to the examination of whether 
age influences FRT through RP and/or RAtt, it is important to clarify the existence of the age 
effect on FRT. For this reason, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
Subsequent to the examination of difference in FRT across age, the interest moves toward the 
main concern of this study. That is, whether age influences FRT through RP and RAtt. As 
mentioned, a handful of preceding research has investigated the mediating roles of RP and RAtt 
in the influences of different determinants of FRT. These include culture, gender, situation 
domain, outcome domain, and time period. They consistently found that differences in FRT 
across these factors are mainly associated with differences in RP, rather than with differences 
in RAtt. The subsequent section will discuss the literature in more detailed.  
4.2.2 Mediating roles of risk perception (RP) and risk attitude (RAtt) 
Many scholars reported the variation of RP as the primary cause of the variation in FRT. Due 
to such obtained differences in RP, these studies supports the subjective RP rather than 
objective RP. Nosíc and Weber (2010) observed investors’ stock investment decisions in 
hypothetical scenarios to identify whether objective RP (variance or standard deviation), or 
subjective RP is a better determinant of risk-taking behaviours. The study concluded that 
investor’s risk-taking behaviour in the stock investment domain could be better explained by 
subjective RP rather than objective RP. However, only subjective RP varies causing FRT to 
change, whilst “subjective financial risk attitude is a stable predictor of risk-taking behavior” 
(pp.295). 
The same pattern of findings pertained to differences in domain-specific risk taking behaviours. 
Weber et al. (2002) conducted studies assessing individual’s risk taking (FRT), risk perception 
                                                 
24 See also: Jianakoplos and Bernasek (2006), Morin and Suarez (1983), Schooley and Worden (1996), 
Chaulk et al. (2003), Yao et al. (2011), Palsson (1996), Bellante and Green (2004), Tanaka et al. 
(2010), Albert and Duffy (2012), Harlow and Brown (1990). 
H1: There is a statistically significant difference in individual FRT across age 
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(subjective RP), and perceived-risk attitude (subjective RAtt) in six content domains using 
questionnaires on undergraduate students at The Ohio State University. They reported that the 
content-specificity of individuals’ degree of risk taking are primarily associated with 
differences in the risk perception, rather than with differences in perceived-risk attitude 
(subjective RAtt).  
Blais and Weber (2006) revised the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale advanced 
by Weber et al. (2002) on a broader range of adult populations in terms of ages, cultures, and 
educational levels, along with more sophisticated statistical analysis. Based on data obtained 
from 172 English-speaking and 187 French-speaking respondents, the study revealed a 
significant negative association between FRT and RP across the five domains of investigation, 
and inferred the attitude towards (perceived) risk as a relatively constant variable.  
Johnson et al. (2004) also employed the English version of DOSPERT Scale on more than 500 
Germany students in the Free University of Berlin with the aim of obtaining a valid German 
DOSPERT scale. Based on the scale, they obtained analogous findings such that differences in 
RP across domains could “almost completely” (pp.161) explain differences in risk-taking. 
However, subjective RAtt rather shown a stable nature across those domains thus hardly could 
explain for the differences in FRT. 
Regarding outcome domains, Weber and Milliman (1997) found that differences in risky choice 
behaviour are associated with differences in RP, but not in RAtt. Specifically, using 
experiments in commuting train and in stock investment choices, they found that choices of 
participants is significantly different between the gain and loss domains. However, such 
differences are found to be systematically associated with differences in risk perception, whilst 
participants’ risk preferences toward perceived risk (i.e. subjective RAtt) are considerably 
consistent across both domains.  
Similar findings were reported by Mellers et al. (1997). The study instructed participants to 
make choices between pairs of risky gambles, they found the ‘risk-averse’ behaviour in the gain 
domain, and the ‘risk-seeking’ behaviour in the loss domain.  By noticeably distinguishing the 
economic risk attitude (objective RAtt) from the perceived-risk attitude (subjective RAtt), a 
stable pattern of perceived-risk aversion25 was reported in both gain and loss domains. 
Consequently, differences in willingness to take risk (FRT) between the gain and loss domains 
                                                 
25 Perceived-risk aversion = Negative subjective RAtt. Specifically, if individuals choose a higher-
variance option (objective RAtt is positive) because they perceive that option as less risky, it indicates 
that their subjective RAtt is negative. In other words, individuals are actually risk-averse after their 
lower subjective RP is taken into account.  
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are mainly due to different levels of riskiness being perceived (subjective RP) for gain and loss 
situations.  
Individual’s RP in financial activities was also found to vary substantially across cultures. 
Bontembo et al. (1997) observed choices in a set of monetary lotteries of students from two 
Western countries (Netherland and America) and two Chinese cultural countries (Taiwan and 
Hong Kong), together with a group of fifty Taiwanese security analysts. The results indicated 
cross-cultural differences, but not occupational differences, in the individual perception of 
financial risks, which caused cross-cultural differences in risky choice behaviour. Furthermore, 
using the conjoint expected risk (CER) model developed by Luce and Weber (1986), the 
findings suggested that the magnitude of potential losses was more influential to the risk 
perception of respondents from Hong Kong and Taiwan, whilst the probability of losses had 
larger effects on the risk evaluation of the two Western samples.  
Using the DOSPERT Scale advanced by Weber et al. (2002), Cheung et al. (2012) compared 
the RP and RAtt of respondents from Hong Kong and mainland China. Supporting the view 
that RP is a better predictor of risk-taking behaviour, they reported that respondents from Hong 
Kong were more risk tolerant, as they perceived the “riskiness” associated with the choice 
options as relatively less than did their mainland China counterparts in the social, recreational, 
health/safety, and financial context domains. 
In a cross-cultural study, Weber and Hsee (1998) reported the cross-cultural difference in FRT 
which is associated mainly with cross-cultural difference in RP rather than with cross-cultural 
difference in RAtt. In the study, individual FRT was measured using the willingness to pay for 
risky financial options of participants from the United States, Poland, Germany, and China. The 
elicited cross-cultural variations in FRT was found to be the result of the subjective beliefs in 
the riskiness (subjective RP) of the investment options, whilst the perceived-risk attitudes 
(subjective RAtt) revealed a far greater consistency. More information about their study was 
discussed in Section 2.2.3. 
Weber et al. (2012) observed a fluctuation in investors’ risk taking from time to time based on 
the survey of Barclays online brokerage personal investors for the period from September 2008 
to June 2009. Their study focused on determining whether the change was the result of change 
in risk expectation and/or risk attitude. They specified the reason to lie mainly in variations in 
the investors’ subjective return and risk expectations over survey period, rather than in their 
risk attitudes. 
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Consistently, Klos et al. (2005) investigated the effect of time horizon on investment behaviour 
by employing a gambling experiment on business graduate students. They found that as the 
number of repeated plays increased, the participants tend to perceive the lotteries as less risky. 
As a result, such lower RP leads them to provide higher certainty equivalents for the gambles. 
In other words, RP significantly predicts and negatively influences one’s FRT. 
Another evidence from Hoffmann et al. (2013) wherein investors’ investment behaviours in 
stock market were recorded during the financial crisis 2008-2009, together with their FRT, RP, 
and stock return perception. Using the monthly survey data from 1,510 investors in the 
Netherlands between April 2008 and March 2009, the findings indicated that during the crisis, 
investors’ FRT reduced which was driven by an increase in their RP. The substantial variations 
in stock trading over the investigated period was accounted for by variations in investors’ risk 
perception. Interestingly, in contrast to the conventional views about investors’ behaviour, 
although the magnitude of risks they perceive increased during the crisis, along with a decrease 
in their reported FRT, the investors did not cease their trading activities or de-risk the 
investment portfolios. Instead, they tend to take advantage of the depressed stock prices during 
the period. 
In another piece of research implemented by Olsen and Cox (2001), they conducted a 
questionnaire survey on roughly 500 professional men and women investment managers, 
including Chartered Financial Analysts (CFA) and Certified Financial Planners (CFP). A 
gender difference in risk-taking behaviour was found to be the result of gender difference in the 
perceptions of investments’ riskiness (subjective RP). In particular, professional women 
investors take on less financial risk as they tend to weight the potential downside of the activities 
more heavily than do their male counterparts.  
Cooper et al. (1988) conducted an analysis on 2,994 entrepreneurs to measure their perceptions 
in probability of success. They found that entrepreneurs exhibit greater willingness to take risk 
than other managers and the reason for that lies mainly in an excessively optimistic perception 
of the risks contained in decisions they make.  
Arrow (1974) argued that gamblers tend to have subjective judgement on the risk of a bet, which 
is lower than the objective judgement on the risk of the same bet. The expected utility theory 
has not been able to fully explain the simultaneous behaviours gambling (implied a convex 
utility function) and insurance (implied a concave utility function). Hence, this finding of Arrow 
(1974) could provide a potential solution to the puzzle such that gamblers do exhibit risk-averse 
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utility functions, they engage in gambling activities owing to their underestimation of the risk 
embedded in the bet.   
All the above-mentioned studies have shown a substantial interest in this topic. They 
consistently found evidences supporting the variability in FRT across different factors. These 
include gender (Olsen and Cox, 2001); culture (Bontempo et al., 1997; Luce and Weber, 1986; 
see also26); career (Cooper et al., 1988); situational domains (Nosic and Weber, 2010; Weber 
et al., 2002; see also27); outcome domains (Weber and Milliman, 1997; Mellers et al., 1997); 
and time (Weber et al., 2012; Hoffmann et al., 2013). Primarily, they confirmed that the 
differences in FRT across these factors are associated with differences in RP, whilst RAtt is a 
relatively stable construct. According to these findings, it is expected that if age is found to 
influence FRT, the influence is mediated by RP but not RAtt. As a result, the following 
hypotheses will be tested: 
 
 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Mosaic Bivariate analysis: ANOVA and Bonferroni t-test 
As defined by Iversen and Norpoth (2002), an analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to 
compares the average values of two or more independent groups for one dependent variables. 
Applied on this study, ANOVA is used to compares the means of FRT (WTP), RP and RAtt of 
different age groups. Therefore, the age variable is divided into four age groups forming 4 
binary variables as follows: 
 Age1: Respondent’s age ranges from 18 to 29 years old. 
 Age2: Respondent’s age ranges from 30 to 39 years old. 
 Age3: Respondent’s age ranges from 40 to 49 years old. 
 Age4: Respondent’s age ranges from 50 to 65 years old. 
 
                                                 
26 Weber and Hsee, 1998; Cheung et al., 2012 
27 Blais and Weber, 2006; Johnson et al., 2004; Arrow, 1974 
H2: There is a statistically significant difference in individual RP across age 
H3: There is a statistically significant difference in individual RAtt across age 
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The three hypotheses of this empirical study (H1 – H3) will be tested using ANOVA and 
Bonferroni t-test28. 
H1 [Financial risk tolerance]: 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅Age1 = 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅Age2 = 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅Age3 = 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅Age4; 
H2 [Risk perception]: 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ Age1 = 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ Age2 = 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ Age3 = 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ Age4; 
H3 [Risk attitude]:  
(1) [Objective RAtt]: 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ Age1 = 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ Age2 = 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ Age3 = 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ Age4; 
(2) [Subjective RAtt]: 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅Age1 = 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅Age2 = 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅Age3 = 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅Age4; 
Despite the limitations of bivariate analysis (Section 3.4.1), the analysis is the first test to be 
conducted as the baseline. The main purpose is to compare the general findings29 obtained with 
that of Weber and Hsee’s (1998) study. Particularly, since the study of Weber and Hsee (1998) 
is the key cross-cultural study that examined the mediating roles of RP and RAtt, the current 
study replicates their study in many aspects. One of them is the mosaic bivariate analysis. As 
explained in the literature review (Section 4.2.2), all studies that examined the mediating roles 
of RP and RAtt in the influences of different factors on FRT, including the study of Weber and 
Hsee (1998), obtained the same general findings such that RP is a variable construct that 
explains the variability in FRT, whilst RAtt is found to be relatively stable. As a result, by 
employing the same statistical analysis, if the same general finding is obtained, it can be inferred 
that the data of this study is comparable with that of Weber and Hsee (1998).  
Following the baseline analysis, the study investigates its main interest using the model-based 
mosaic multivariate analysis as the main statistical approach. Specific empirical models will be 
discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
28 Subsequent statistical tests are stated in null hypothesis 
29 General findings: Constant RAtt and Variable RP across individuals (Section 2.2.3) 
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4.3.2 Multivariate analysis: Model-based mosaic analysis 
The analysis composes three mosaic. Firstly, the study will re-examines the age effect on FRT 
(mosaic 1). If found to be present, the mediating roles of RP (mosaic 2) and RAtt (mosaic 3) 
will be tested.  
Mosaic 1: Age influences FRT 
To test the hypothesis “H1: There is a statistically significant difference in individual FRT 
across age”, the regression specification is as follows:  
Ln(WTP)i = αi + βG1*Group1 + βG2*Group2 + βG3*Group3 + βG4*Group4 +  
βG5*Group5 + εi, 
 
 
Where the content for each independent variable group is listed in Table 4.1 (See Appendix 4 
for more explanation of each variable component). 
Table 4.1: Content of each independent variable group 
Independent variable 
Classification content 
*Explanation see Appendix 4 
Group 1: Main variables Age; Age2 
Group 2: Demographic variables 
Age*LnW; Single; Gender; Child; Highschl; 
Hhsize; LnW; LnInc 
Group 3: Socioeconomic variables Unemp; Selfemp; Homeown 
Group 4: Attitudinal variables Rbelief; IncStab; Health; SRA; Ecoexp; Interestexp 
Group 5: Geographical US; UK; VN; SG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGE FINANCIAL RISK TOLERANCE 
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Mosaic 2: Age influences RP 
To test the hypothesis “H2: There is a statistically significant difference in individual RP across 
age”, the regression specification is as follows:  
RPi = αi + βG1*Group1 + βG2*Group2 + βG3*Group3 + βG4*Group4 +  
βG5*Group5 + εi, 
If significant age effect on RP is found, it can be concluded that individuals with different age 
exhibit different level of risk perception. In other words, older individuals perceive the same 
investment option to have different riskiness comparing to their younger counterparts. As a 
result, it indicates that RP contributes to the effect of age on FRT. 
 
 
Mosaic 3: Age influences RAtt 
To test the hypothesis “H3: There is a statistically significant difference in individual RAtt 
across age”, the regression specification is as follows:  
(bVAR/bR)i= αi + βG1*Group1 + βG2*Group2 + βG3*Group3 + βG4*Group4 +  
βG5*Group5 + εi, 
If significant age effect on RAtt is found, it can be concluded that individuals with different age 
exhibit different attitudes toward financial risk. Therefore, age difference in their RAtt 
contributes to the age difference in FRT.  
 
 
Furthermore, the selection of the most appropriate measure of RAtt will be evaluated based on 
the result of mosaic 2. Particularly, as discussed in Section 3.4.3.1, if RP is found to vary across 
individuals, objective RAtt (bVAR) will not be pursued further. 
 
 
 
 
AGE RISK PERCEPTION 
AGE RISK ATTITUDE 
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4.4 Data description 
The current section describes the data sample by presenting the descriptive statistics of all 
variables included in the study. These are the three main dependent variables and the five 
independent variable groups as discussed in Section 3.4.3 and Appendix 4. Based on a total 
sample size of 1,889 respondents, their central tendencies, dispersions and frequencies are 
calculated and graphically depicted where appropriate.  
4.4.1 Main dependent variables: FRT, RP and RAtt 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistic of the main dependent variables of this study which 
measures individual FRT, RP and RAtt. 
 
 
The average amount that the respondents are willing to pay for the investment options is around 
$1,308 whilst the median WTP is only $425.3. The much higher mean comparing to median 
implies a large proportion of respondents reported low WTP, which indicates a likely positive 
skew distribution of the variable. Figure 4.1 plotted the distribution of individual FRT, which 
evidently reveals the highly positive skewness of WTP. Specifically, more than 50% of 
respondents reported a mean WTP of around $0-$500 for the six investments, which 
significantly pulled down the value of median to roughly $425.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
Variable Measure Mean Median Std Dev Min Max N 
FRT WTP $1,308 $425.3 $1,991 $0 $8,954 
1,889 
Subjective 
RP 
RP 54.182 53.333 19.583 0 100 
RAtt 
bVAR 0.00040 0 0.0015 -0.00482 0.00794 
bR -16.793 -0.837 151.287 -2644.59 2492.08 
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of individual FRT (mean WTP) 
 
The distribution of individual subjective RP (RP) is potentially close to the normal distribution 
than the other dependent variables, both mean and median RP are around 50, which is the 
approximate mid-point of the RP range (1-100). For the measures of RAtt, the objective RAtt 
(bVAR) implies the general risk-neutral characteristic of respondents as both its mean and median 
are close to zero. On the other hand, the subjective RAtt (bR) is rather negatively skewed 
(Median > Mean) and on average individuals tend to be risk-averse. This is inherently possible 
and anticipated according to the notion of ‘risk repugnant’ mentioned by Yates and Stone 
(1992) such that risk is repellent to people, and for people to take on any risk, a premium should 
be offered. 
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4.4.2 Variable group 1: Explanatory variable (Age) 
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive of age factor that determine individual FRT.  
*Note: Explanation of the variable can be found in Appendix 4 
 
Age: The mean age of the sample is around 40 years old with the median age of 38 and standard 
deviation of 11.9. As discussed in Section 3.3.2, the study employs the stratified random 
sampling method based on age. Therefore, the whole sample is divided roughly equally among 
four age groups in the whole sample as well as in each country. The pie chart of the frequency 
distribution of respondent age is presented in Figure 4.2. Furthermore, due to the low internet 
literacy in Singapore and Vietnam for individuals that are 45 years old or above, the study 
exposed to the risk of missing data for this age group in these countries as the attempt to 
maintain a random sample was given a priority (Section 3.3.2). Despite such risk, according to 
Table 4.3, the sample has sufficiently included respondents who fall in this group.  
Figure 4.2: Frequency Distribution of Age 
 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Age (Group 1) 
Variable Measure Mean Median Std Dev Min Max N 
Age Age 39.596 38 11.883 19 65 1,889 
Age across Countries 
Sum of 
the UK 
Sum of 
The US 
Sum of 
Singapore 
Sum of 
Vietnam 
Sum of 
China 
18-29 112 107 95 81 97 
30-39 99 112 102 82 91 
40-49 88 106 97 84 93 
50-65 88 88 88 81 98 
Grand Total 387 413 382 328 379 
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4.4.3 Variable group 2: Demographic variables (Wealth, Income, Household size, 
Children, Gender, Marital Status, Education) 
The descriptive statistic of demographic variables is presented in Table 4.4. 
Note: Explanation of the variables can be found in Appendix 4 
Wealth and Income: The mean wealth and income of the whole sample is $210,463 and 
$32,972 with the median of $69,723 and $22,488, respectively. The smaller means comparing 
to medians indicate their positively skewed distributions. As these two variables are controlled 
for in the multivariate estimating models (Section 4.3.2), a natural logarithmic transformation 
is applied to tackle such skewness of the two variables. Furthermore, with this transformation, 
the model can assume a constant change in each dependent variables to be associated with a 
relative difference in one’s level of wealth and income. Moreover, it also reduces the weight 
given to individuals with extreme levels of wealth and income. 
Household size: The variable’s distribution are skewed toward smaller amount of people living 
in a household. On average, individuals are living with 4 people besides themselves, whilst the 
range of the variable is from one to sixteen people. Figure 4.3 presents the mean household size 
of the respondents across the five countries. It can be seen that the respondents from China and 
Vietnam tend to live with more people than do respondents of the other countries. This pattern 
is anticipated as China and Vietnam are classified by Hofstede (2001) as collectivistic cultural 
countries, within which the formation of large group is common. Singapore, on the other hand, 
exhibits similar average household size with the US and UK. Based on the data obtained in this 
study, Singapore is found to be an individualistic country as so do the US and the UK (see 
Section 6.2.3). 
 
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables (Group 2) 
Variable Measure Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Wealth Wealth $210,807 $69,723 $373,778 $0 $5,000,000 
Income Income $32,972 $22,488 $38,847 0 $864,000 
Household size Hhsize 3.765 4 1.559 1 16 
Dummy Variable Count Percent 
Children Child    1206 63.84 
Marital Status Single    597 31.60 
Gender Male    965 51.09 
Education Highschl    1528 80.89 
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Figure 4.3: Household Size across Countries 
 
Gender, education, marital status and children: The gender variable contains roughly 51% 
of male and 49% of female. Such distribution is quite a representative pattern of gender, which 
should be obtained if the data is random. The sample comprises a large proportion (81%) of 
well-educated individuals who have attained their high school certificates. Furthermore, 
roughly 32% of respondents are single (not a widow, not separated or divorced) and 63.84% of 
the sample (1,206 respondents) haves at least one child. The descriptive of these two variables 
are reasonable as their sum is less than 100%. 
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4.4.4 Variable group 3: Socioeconomic variables (Self-employment, Unemployment, and 
Homeowner) 
To capture the influence of the respondent’s employment status on their FRT, two variables are 
used, which state whether the respondents are self-employed (self_emp) or unemployed 
(unemp). The simultaneous use of these two variables follows previous studies, such as, Yao et 
al. (2011), Halek and Eisenhauer (2001), and Palsson (1996). According to Table 4.5, the 
frequency distributions of these two socio-economic variables as well as the homeowner 
variable seem sensible. The proportion of respondents that fall in either the self-employed or 
unemployed categories is less than a fifth of the whole sample. With regards to homeowner 
variable, it has been revealed that 1,534 out of 1,889 respondents own at least one house either 
with or without mortgage. Such amount represents more than 80% of the sample.  
 
 
Note: Explanation of the variables can be found in Appendix 4  
4.4.5 Variable group 4: Attitudinal variables (Income Stability, Health, Self-reported risk 
aversion, Economics Expectation, Interest Expectation, and Religious Belief) 
Table 4.6 provides the descriptive statistic of six attitudinal variables. The variable measuring 
the respondent’s judgement on their income stability (IncStab) seems to be symmetric with a 
normal shape as its mean and median are approximately the same (4.998 versus 5) with a range 
from 1 to 10. With regards to the health status, the respondents show an optimistic view as they 
rated their health 7 on the scale of 10 on average. For the self-reported risk aversion (SRA) 
variable, its mean value is approximately 3 out of 5. This indicates that on average, individuals 
are risk neutral where they are willing to “take average financial risk expecting to earn average 
returns” (Appendix 1, P.VI_Q3). Lastly, the descriptive statistic of the respondent’s 
expectations on the future economy and interest rate (Ecoexp and Interestexp) reveal that 
respondents on average are pessimistic about the future economic prospect. Particularly, they 
expect the economy to perform worse in the next 5 years (meanecoexp = 2.6 out of 5) with an 
increase in interest rates over the coming year (meaninterestexp = 2.5 out of 5).  
 
 
Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics of Socioeconomic Variables (Group 3) 
Variable Measure Count Percent N 
Self-employment Self-emp 119 6.30 
1,889 Unemployment Unemp 169 8.95 
Homeowner Homeown 1534 81.21 
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Note: Explanation of the variables can be found in Appendix 4. 
4.4.6 Variable group 5: Geographical variables 
As there are five countries being investigated, respondents recruited in each country take up 
roughly 1/5 or 20% of the sample as presented in Table 4.7. The study has successfully achieved 
the target set prior to the data collection stage, that is, to obtain at least 300 respondents from 
each country (Section 3.3.2). To capture the country effect, the study employs four dummy 
variables (US, UK, VN, SG) which are denote 1 if respondents are recruited from the US, the 
UK, Vietnam and Singapore, respectively. 
Note: Explanation of the variables can be found in Appendix 4 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6:  Descriptive Statistics of Attitudinal Variables (Group 4) 
Variable Measure Mean Median Std Dev Min Max N 
Income Stability IncStab 4.998 5 2.482 1 10 1,889 
Health Health 7.306 8 1.777 1 10 1,889 
Self-reported risk 
aversion  
SRA 3.011 3 1.255 1 5 1,889 
Economic 
expectation 
Ecoexp 2.632 2 1.063 1 5 1,889 
Interest expectation Interestexp 2.536 2 0.924 1 5 1,889 
Dummy Variable Count Percent N 
Religious belief Rbelief 797 42.19 1,889 
Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics of Geographical Variables (Group 5) 
Variable Count Percent N 
US 413 21.86 
1,889 
UK 387 20.49 
VN 328 17.36 
SG 382 20.22 
CN 379 20.06 
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4.4.7 Correlation matrix of all independent variables 
The Pearson correlation coefficients between each independent variable and the others are 
reported in Table 4.8, in which pairs of variable with significant correlation coefficient are 
marked bold. According to the guidelines of Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), most of 
significantly correlated variables are in the weak range (|r| < 0.3) except from four pairs of 
variable with absolute correlation coefficients are greater than 30%. These are correlations 
between age and single (rage_single = -0.449); age and child (rage_child = 0.359); single and child 
(rsingle_child = -0.69); and between wealth and income (rwealth_income = 0.449). The respondents’ age 
is negatively related to their marital status, and positively related to whether they had a child. 
The two associations are plausible and anticipated. Specifically, as one gets older, one is more 
likely to have found a partner and to be in a family building stage; or filed a divorce; or gone 
through the loss of their partner. Therefore, they are less likely to be single and more likely to 
have at least one child. There is a strong negative relationship between the variables single and 
child. It is not a surprise to find a single person who have yet been in an official relationship to 
be less likely to have a child. Note that, a person reported herself as single which means she is 
not a widow, or has divorced or separated from her husband/partner. Lastly, a positive 
correlation between wealth and income is also predicted. Ones would expect that high earners 
are more likely to accumulate higher net wealth. Overall, although the four pairs of variables 
are moderately correlated, their absolute correlation coefficients fall below the acceptable limit 
of 80% for multicollinearity to be a concern (Kennedy, 2008). Notes that the multicollinearity 
issue will be further tested for each regression using the Variance of Inflation Factor (VIF), 
which will be presented in the multivariate analysis result section (Section 4.5.1). 
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Table 4.8: Pearson Pair-wise Correlation Matrix (N = 1889) 
Column1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
Age 
(1) 
1 -0.449 0.020 0.359 -0.165 -0.102 0.176 0.037 0.058 0.048 0.007 0.051 -0.085 -0.127 0.148 0.088 0.065 0.008 -0.015 -0.006 -0.012 -0.101 -0.087 
Single  
(2) 
 1 0.005 -0.690 -0.040 -0.161 -0.161 -0.129 0.066 -0.022 -0.125 -0.069 0.090 0.003 0.026 0.059 -0.017 0.045 0.084 -0.104 0.091 -0.040 0.022 
Gender  
(3) 
  1 -0.013 0.063 -0.028 0.096 0.173 -0.142 0.027 0.036 0.002 -0.034 0.077 -0.171 -0.056 -0.045 0.033 -0.012 -0.010 -0.006 -0.079 0.036 
Child  
(4) 
   1 0.010 0.270 0.157 0.136 -0.058 0.009 0.095 0.099 -0.036 -0.004 -0.065 -0.088 -0.012 -0.050 -0.044 0.141 -0.120 0.064 -0.024 
Highschl 
(5) 
    1 0.015 0.143 0.161 -0.206 -0.057 0.107 -0.024 -0.081 0.129 -0.191 -0.044 -0.021 -0.075 -0.040 0.006 0.003 0.065 0.010 
Hhsize  
(6) 
     1 -0.013 0.013 -0.060 0.032 0.198 0.132 0.047 0.061 -0.105 -0.110 -0.098 -0.136 -0.210 0.307 0.178 0.084 0.048 
WealthN  
(7) 
      1 0.449 -0.108 -0.028 0.180 0.021 -0.147 0.112 -0.137 -0.043 0.012 0.011 0.013 -0.085 -0.083 0.056 -0.003 
AnnualInc  
(8) 
       1 -0.139 -0.052 0.130 0.142 -0.052 0.135 -0.230 -0.100 -0.120 0.250 0.056 -0.172 -0.066 -0.025 0.032 
Unemployment 
(9) 
        1 -0.081 -0.191 0.066 0.109 -0.192 0.187 0.144 0.009 0.193 0.039 -0.095 -0.010 -0.075 -0.044 
Self_employed  
(10) 
         1 -0.037 -0.010 0.073 -0.014 0.031 0.028 0.022 -0.037 0.014 0.123 -0.044 -0.013 -0.026 
HomeOwner  
(11) 
          1 0.073 -0.052 0.139 -0.183 -0.129 -0.004 -0.152 -0.189 0.181 0.084 0.108 0.026 
Rbelief  
(12) 
           1 0.099 0.071 -0.136 -0.068 -0.200 0.251 -0.139 -0.004 0.160 -0.072 0.031 
IncStability  
(13) 
            1 -0.102 -0.033 0.083 -0.071 0.039 0.019 -0.015 0.107 -0.065 -0.062 
Health  
(14) 
             1 -0.202 -0.253 -0.096 -0.020 -0.093 0.077 -0.033 0.127 0.057 
SRA  
(15) 
              1 0.232 0.147 -0.056 0.091 -0.001 -0.025 -0.064 -0.038 
EcoExp  
(16) 
               1 0.268 -0.052 0.081 -0.215 0.209 -0.111 -0.080 
InterestExp 
(17) 
                1 -0.125 -0.016 -0.169 -0.043 0.023 0.009 
US  
(18) 
                 1 -0.269 -0.242 -0.266 -0.128 -0.022 
UK  
(19) 
                  1 -0.233 -0.256 -0.097 0.020 
VN  
(20) 
                   1 -0.231 0.194 0.053 
SG  
(21) 
                    1 -0.134 -0.030 
Note: Bold figures denote the result is statistically significant at the 5% level or below. 
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4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Bivariate mosaic analysis (Weber and Hsee, 1998) 
The study employs the bivariate mosaic analysis of Weber and Hsee (1998) as the baseline 
method despite a number of limitations exposed to the method per se. By contrasting this 
study’s results using this method with those found by Weber and Hsee (1998) which support 
the notion of variable RP and constant RAtt, the comparability of the data of this study to that 
of Weber and Hsee (1998) can be inferred.  
Table 4.9 provides a brief summary of mean judgments of individual FRT (WTP), RP, and RAtt 
for the four age groups. The ANOVA results stated in column (1) reveal a non-significant 
difference in the magnitude of WTP as a function of age (F-value = 1.01; n.s). It indicates that 
individuals from different age groups exhibit relatively similar level of FRT. In other words, 
the willingness to engage in risky financial option of individuals with different age is not 
significantly different from each other.  
Comparing the average WTP of each age group with the average expected value of the six 
investment options (𝐸𝑉̅̅ ̅̅  = $1,539), individuals from all age groups are classified as risk-averse 
under the traditional expected-utility view as they are willing to pay less than the expected 
returns of the investments. According to the ANOVA results along with the box plot diagram 
for WTP displayed in Figure 4.4, no apparent trend in WTP across the four age groups is 
identified. As revealed in the diagram, median values for all age groups are smaller than their 
mean values, which implies a highly positive skewed distribution of WTP. Particularly, 75% of 
respondents from each age group reported a WTP of lower than $2000, whilst the upper 25% 
of respondents reported a WTP ranging from $2000 to $5000.  
With regard to age difference in RP, the ANOVA analysis ascertains a statistically significant 
difference in the magnitudes of perceived riskiness judgement between the four age groups. 
According to column (2) of Table 4.9, an F-value statistic of 2.63 is statistically significant at 
5% critical level. Subsequently, the Bonferroni t-test indicates that RP differs significantly 
between age group 1 and age group 3 at 5% level, with individuals from age group 3 perceiving 
the riskiness of the investment options higher than do their counterparts from age group 1 (𝑅𝑃3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
= 56.12 > 𝑅𝑃1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 52.79). 
Moving on to the last construct (individual RAtt), it is worthy to mention about the definitions 
of the two measures of RAtt as discussed in Section 2.2.2. The objective RAtt (bVAR) is the 
attitude towards financial risk given that individuals perceive risk in the same way using the 
variance computation. On the other hand, the measure of subjective RAtt (bR) relaxes the 
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assumption of constant risk perception across individuals. According to the last two columns 
of Table 4.9, the ANOVA results for the objective RAtt (bVAR) and the subjective RAtt (bR) 
reveal two different findings. Based on their definitions, as the study found that there is a 
significant difference in RP across age (Table 4.9, column 2), the assumption that everyone 
perceives the same level of risk is evidently violated. Therefore, objective RAtt (bVAR) is proved 
irrelevant. Hence, only the subjective RAtt (bR) should be taken into consideration. Its statistical 
result reveals that subjective RAtt (bR) is insignificantly different as a function of age 
(𝐹𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑏𝑅 = 0.57). In other words, individual RAtt is constant across age.  
Table 4.9: Mean Judgements of WTP and RP as A Function of Respondents’ Age 
Age 
Group 
Respondents’ 
Age 
Sample 
Size (N) 
WTP 
(1) 
Risk Perception 
(2) 
Objective 
RAtt - bVAR 
(3) 
Subjective 
RAtt - bR 
(4) 
1 18-29 492 1220 52.79a 0.000240a -11.697 
2 30-39 486 1349 53.50 0.000325 -23.259 
3 40-49 468 1418 56.12a 0.000489 -13.709 
4 50-65 443 1246 54.44 0.000542a -18.617 
F-Value30 (DF = 3) 0.95 2.63** 4.10*** 0.57 
Note: Two age groups with the same superscripts down each column (comparing only with the first country 
group assigned with the superscript) indicate that their means are significantly different at the 0.05 level using 
Bonferroni T-test. 
*, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Firstly, Levene’s test for equal age group variances is implemented. If the assumption of homogeneity of 
variances is violated, the ANOVA result is based on the Welch’s test.  
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Figure 4.4: Box plot for Willingness to Pay across four age groups 
 
In general, findings obtained from bivariate analysis suggest that individuals’ FRT do not differ 
across age groups. Therefore, even difference in RP as a function of age is found, it does not 
cause age difference in FRT. As discussed in Section 3.4.1, there are few limitations exposing 
to bivariate analysis, which challenge the reliability of these findings. For example, one main 
issue of ANOVA for identifying the difference in FRT across age is that the findings can be 
easily manipulated with categorical age variable (division of age group). As tested, if the study 
divides the sample into nine age groups with a range of 5 years old per group instead of the 
current four age groups, a significant difference in FRT will be obtained. Despite of these 
limitations, ANOVA is conducted as the baseline method to compare the findings with those 
of Weber and Hsee (1998). At the bottom line, with the same statistical method, the general 
finding of this study (variable RP and constant RAtt) is the same with Weber and Hsee’s and 
other preceding studies (Section 4.2.2). Consequently, it can be concluded that the data 
employed is comparable to Weber and Hsee’s data. This comparability implies that the 
reduction of the 12 investment options to six investment options in the FRT experimental task 
(Section 2.4.1) may still allow the research to be conducted sufficiently.  As discussed, after the 
baseline analysis (mosaic bivariate analysis), the multivariate regression analysis is used as the 
main approach whose results are presented in the subsequent section. 
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4.5.2 Multivariate analysis: Model-based mosaic approach 
In this section, summary result tables reveal the estimated coefficients and significance levels 
of main variables for five model variations. The first variation contains only variable group 1 
(main variables) which capture the pure age effects. As the study sample is pooled data from 
five countries, the second variation attempts to examine pure age effects after controlling for 
specific country effect by adding 4 country dummy variables (group 5). The third variation, on 
the other hand, controls for demographic and socioeconomic factors (group 2 and group 3). The 
fourth variation additionally controls for the attitudinal variable group 4. Lastly, the fifth 
variation is the full model that contains all variables indicated in Table 4.1.  
The full results for the fifth variation of the estimating regression models are presented in the 
appendix section (Appendix 6-8). These appendix tables contain results for both uncentered 
and centered regressions, along with the corresponding variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all 
variables to test for multicollinearity. Furthermore, the results for heteroscedasticity, normality 
of error terms, and endogeneity can be found in Appendix 9 (Part 1) and Appendix 10 (Part 1), 
respectively. Overall, the results indicate that the estimating OLS models of this study do not 
have endogeneity problem but are subjected to heteroscedasticity and non-normality issues. 
However, as discussed in Section 3.4.2, these issues are tackled using the mean-centering robust 
standard error approach. 
4.5.2.1 Mosaic 1: Does individual FRT vary across age? 
 
Table 4.10 reveals that all five variations of mosaic 1 report consistent results such that age 
significantly negatively influences individual FRT at 1% critical level (βA = -0.0165, βB = -
0.0174, βC = -0.0335, βD = -0.0279, βE = -0.0271). The results indicate that as age increases, 
people are less willing to take on financial risks. Although many previous studies captured non-
linear effects of age31, non-significant results are found on the coefficients of Age2 (βA = -
0.00031, βB = -0.00025, βC = -0.00059, βD = -0.00055, βE = -0.00052; n.s). This indicates that 
there is no presence of non-linear relationship between age and FRT. 
Furthermore, adjusted R-square increases when more factors are controlled for. The fifth model 
variation has the highest adjusted R-square of 6.17%, which means that all proposed controlling 
factors significantly improve the explanation power of the estimating model and thus should be 
included.  
                                                 
31 Section 4.2.1: Yoo (1994); Hallahan et al. (2003); Riley and Chow (1992); Bajelsmit and VanDerhei (1997). 
H1: There is a statistically significant difference in individual FRT across age 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
For more information, the full result of the fifth model variation is presented in Appendix 6. As 
revealing in the appendix table, when uncentered method is employed, VIFs are high for 
variables Age, Age2, LnW and Age*LnW (VIFs = 70.5, 61.6, 13.7, and 33.2, respectively). 
These statistically high VIF values indicate the concern of nonessential multicollinearity 
(Section 3.4.2.1). By employing mean-centering method, VIFs of these variables reduce 
significantly to around 2, where multicollinearity is no longer a concern.  
The insignificant estimate of the interaction term between age and wealth (Appendix 6, βAge*LnW 
= 0.00224; n.s) rejects the moderating effect of wealth on the relationship between age and 
FRT. In other words, the extent to which FRT reduces across age is independent of one’s wealth 
level.  
Besides age, one’s wealth and level of self-reported risk aversion (SRA) are significant 
predictors of FRT. Their effects are statistically significant at 1% critical level. Wealth is found 
to positively influence FRT (Appendix 6, βLnW = 0.1237; t-stat = 4.21). This implies that, the 
richer individuals are, the more risk tolerant they are in the financial context. On the other hand, 
SRA is negatively associated with FRT (Appendix 6, βSRA = -0.2763; t-stat = -4.73) implying 
that the general subjective risk judgements they have on themselves are accurately predicted 
their FRT. Specifically, when individuals think of themselves as being less willing to take on 
risk in general, they report smaller WTP figures.  
Table 4.10: Determinants of Financial Risk Tolerance. Dependent Variable: LnWTP 
Mosaic 1  Centered-score Regression (Robust Standard Errors) 
Independent 
Variables 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Intercept 
5.2803*** 5.7874*** 4.3615*** 5.0621*** 5.4209*** 
Age 
-0.0165*** -0.0174*** -0.0335*** -0.0279*** -0.0271*** 
Age2 
-0.00031 -0.000250 0.000589 0.000550 0.000527 
Group 2 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 3 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 4 
NO NO NO YES YES 
Group 5 
NO YES NO NO YES 
Sample size 
1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-Square 
0.0049 0.0147 0.0477 0.0594 0.0617 
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For mosaic 1 (Appendix 6), three foremost independent variables that are significantly 
associated with FRT at critical value of 5% or below, and account for the highest proportion of 
variance in FRT, are wealth, SRA, and age, in descending order. Their η2partial values32 are 
0.0240, 0.0132 and 0.006, respectively. Consequently, it can be said that individuals’ wealth, 
their subjective general risk judgement, and their age are the three most important determinants 
of their willingness to take financial risk. 
4.5.2.2 Mosaic 2: Is RP accounted for changes in FRT across age? 
 
The result for mosaic 2 is presented in Table 4.11. It is found that as individuals get older, they 
perceive higher risks embedded in a financial option. This finding is drawn from the significant 
positive coefficients of Age variable at 5% critical level or below for all five model variations 
(βA = 0.089, βB = 0.091, βC = 0.156, βD = 0.105, βE = 0.097; p-value < 0.05). Besides, non-
linear effect of age on RP is failed to be captured due to the nonsignificant estimates of Age2 
(βA = -0.0037, βB = -0.0036, βC = -0.0057, βD = -0.0047, βE = -0.0042; n.s). Based on this result, 
it can be concluded that the increased RP contributes to the reduced FRT across age. 
Among the four model variations, the fifth variation exhibits the highest value of adjusted R-
square of 0.0496. It is the strongest model in explaining the variability of individual RP. Hence, 
the results obtained from this model variation should be interpreted and taken as the main 
finding of the mosaic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 The partial eta-square (η2partial) measures the proportion of variance in a dependent variable that is accounted 
for by each independent variables.  
 
H2: There is a statistically significant difference in individual RP across age 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Appendix 7 provides the full result of the fifth model variation of mosaic 2. The qualitative 
findings are consistent regardless of whether uncentered regression or centered regression is 
employed. However, to efficiently abolish the problem of nonessential multicollinearity, the 
results are mainly drawn from the mean-centering method. As expected, VIF values of 
multiplicative terms and their component variables reduce tremendously after the centered-
score regression is used.  
Wealth is also found to significantly influence one’s RP at 5% level, but negatively in this 
mosaic (Appendix 7, βLnW = -0.4385). The richer individual is, the smaller risk she perceives. 
Due to such smaller level of risk perceived by richer individuals, they exhibit higher levels of 
FRT as found in mosaic 1.  
The interaction term between age and wealth is significantly negative at 5% level (Appendix 7, 
βAge*LnW = -0.0319, t-stat = -2.26). It indicates the moderating effect of wealth on the 
relationship between age and RP. Consequently, coefficient of age is no longer interpreted as a 
main effect but a conditional effect, which is dependent on individual’s wealth level. Basically, 
older people tend to perceive higher financial risk. Nevertheless, if they are wealthier, such 
increased RP becomes smaller. In other words, higher wealth level reduces the effect of age on 
one’s RP.  
As age effect on RP is significantly conditional on wealth level, partial eta-square (η2partial) of 
age effect should be the sum of η2partial_age and η2partial_Age*LnW. According to the η2partial values of 
all variables reported in Appendix 7, five main determinants of RP that are statistically 
significant at 5% critical level or below, and are at source of the highest proportion of variance 
Table 4.11: Determinants of Financial Risk Perception. Dependent Variable: RP 
Mosaic 2  Centered-score Regression (Robust Standard Errors) 
Independent 
Variables 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Intercept 
54.698*** 53.4985*** 55.0981*** 41.2299*** 41.0400*** 
Age 
0.0889** 0.0910** 0.1564*** 0.1047** 0.0973** 
Age2 
-0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0057 -0.0047 -0.0042 
Group 2 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 3 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 4 
NO NO NO YES YES 
Group 5 
NO YES NO NO YES 
Sample size 
1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-Square 
0.0018 0.0105 0.0279 0.0472 0.0496 
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in RP, are SRA, wealth, economic expectation, unemployment, and age, in descending order 
(η2partial = 0.0113, 0.0099, 0.0078, 0.0064, and 0.0056, respectively). Despite the ranking of age 
among these five main factors, it still holds an important influence in one’s RP comparing to 
many other factors.  
Noticeably, the obtained results support the repellent nature of risk such that higher RP leads 
to lower FRT. Specifically, younger and richer individuals who think themselves as a risk-taker 
in general tend to see lower financial risks, and thus, they are more risk tolerant than others. 
4.5.2.3 Mosaic 3: Is RAtt at source of changes in FRT across age? 
 
As explained in Section 3.4.3, when mosaic 2 is incorporated into the picture with mosaic 1, it 
plays an important role in determining the best suited piece of mosaic 3, that is, the best measure 
of RAtt. Mosaic 2 depicts that RP is not constant across individuals of different ages. 
Apparently, the assumption of constant RP (objective RP) is proved to be invalid. This implies 
that objective measure of RAtt (bVAR) is not applicable and should be excluded from the entire 
picture. 
Table 4.12 reveals the result for mosaic 3 with the subjective RAtt (bR) as the dependent 
variable. According to the results obtained, nonsignificant estimates of Age and Age2 across all 
five model variations indicates a constant RAtt across age. Notably, the almost zero adjusted 
R-square values of all model variations and their substantial and statistically significant 
intercepts at 1% critical level, inherently support the notion of RAtt as a personality trait which 
is stable and not influenced by other factors. Once again, this finding is consistent with the 
literature and especially with Weber and Hsee (1998) when the same computation method of 
RAtt (PRAM model) is employed.  
Matching together the three obtained mosaics, the picture draws a story such that older people 
are less risk tolerant in financial context as they see higher risk, whilst their attitudes toward 
financial risk do not change.  
 
 
 
 
 
H3: There is a statistical significant difference in individual RAtt across age 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The result of the full model (model variation E) with bR the dependent variable are provided in 
Appendix 8. As previously discussed, the subjective RAtt (bR) reveals its nature as a stable 
characteristic of individuals. Hence, none of the controlled factors shows significant effect on 
the construct, except for gender where male individuals tend to like financial risk more than 
female, but the effect is only significant at marginal level (βGender = 13.16).   
4.6 Robustness test: GMM and Aggregating Bootstrap Estimators 
The aim of the robustness tests is twofold. Firstly, it examines if the findings obtained by the 
main statistical approach (the model-based mosaic multivariate method) remains if different 
statistical method is employed. This study employs the generalized method of moment (GMM) 
as a robustness test. The reason is that in addition to the robust standard error, GMM is an 
alternative remedy for the heteroscedasticity issue exposed to the OLS models. Secondly, the 
test clarifies the robustness of the Weber and Hsee’s (1998) measure of RAtt (bVAR and bR) 
using the bagging resampling method (bootstrap aggregating) advanced by Breiman (1996). 
This robustness test is conducted on mosaic 3 exclusively, in which RAtt is the dependent 
variable. As discussed in Section 2.4.2.3, the study employs Weber and Hsee’s (1998) method 
to compute individual RAtt (both objective RAtt and subjective RAtt). Specifically, the 
derivation of RAtt is based on the risk-return framework. It is obtained by regressing the WTP 
on expected return and objective RP (variance) or subjective RP of the six investment options. 
The risk trade-off coefficient bVAR and bR are the individual objective and subjective RAtt, 
respectively. The concern of this method is that as each respondent was provided with six 
Table 4.12: Determinants of Subjective RAtt. Dependent Variable: bR 
 
Mosaic 3  Centered-score Regression (Robust Standard Errors) 
Independent 
Variables 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Intercept 
-18.8400*** -24.758*** -58.682*** -28.852*** -42.664*** 
Age 
-0.0161 -0.0152 -0.1221 0.0323 0.1058 
Age2 
0.0145 0.0126 0.0267 0.0242 0.0214 
Group 2 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 3 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 4 
NO NO NO YES YES 
Group 5 
NO YES NO NO YES 
Sample size 
1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-Square 
0 0.0023 0 0 0.0019 
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investment options, only six observations are fitted to each regression. This may provide a wide 
range of estimates (vibration of effect) or instability of estimates, which largely vary with a 
minor change in the sample (Button et al., 2013). Accordingly, to tackle this issue of ‘unstable’ 
estimates, bagging resampling method (bootstrap aggregating) is employed, which can 
effectively reduce variability in the estimates of RAtt and improve their accuracy (Breiman, 
1996; Dudoit and Fridlyand, 2003; and Buhlmann and Yu, 2002). 
The bagging procedure to compute individual objective RAtt (bVAR_b) and subjective RAtt 
(bR_b) starts by forming randomly non-parametric bootstrap replicates with replacement for 
each individual sample. Subsequently, aggregating bootstrap estimates of bVAR_b (TRAM 
regression) and bR_b (PRAM regression) are built for each replicate. Eventually, the average of 
these bootstrap bVAR_b and bR_b are calculated and used as individual objective RAtt and 
subjective RAtt, respectively. 
Whilst employing GMM provides an assurance for the findings, the use of the bootstrap 
aggregating method offer an alternative check on the data obtained of this study. The current 
study employed Weber and Hsee’s (1998) FRT experiment task to derive FRT, RP and RAtt. 
However, to ensure the quality of participant’s responses for the task, the study has reduced the 
number of investment options from the original 12 to six. Consequently, to check for the 
comparability of this study’s data sample with that of Weber and Hsee, the same statistical 
analysis, the mosaic bivariate approach, is employed as the baseline. As stated in Section 4.5.1, 
the same general finding (variable RP and constant RAtt) was obtained. As a result, it can be 
concluded that despite the reduction of investment options presented, the data of this study can 
be comparable to that of Weber and Hsee, and thus sufficiently achieves the research objective. 
Alternatively, the bagging procedure provides a different computation of RAtt. If the constant 
RAtt remains, it implies that the data of this study may be comparable to Weber and Hsee’s 
even with less investment options.  
The results for the robustness tests (GMM and bagging bootstrap method) mentioned above in 
this section are presented in Table 4.15. It can be seen that the final story remains unchanged 
such that older individuals are less risk tolerant because they perceive higher level of riskiness. 
Specially, when individual RAtt is derived using aggregating bootstrapping method, the 
adjusted R-square of 0.0043 also indicates risk attitude as a personality trait which is constant 
and stable across individuals. This notion of constant RAtt is consistent with that obtained by 
the Weber and Hsee’s RAtt used in the main analysis, as well as with previous literature. Notes 
that the quadratic term of age (age2) is statistical significant, but only at marginal level. 
However, as the independent effect of age on RAtt (bR_b) is not significant in the first place, the 
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significant of age2 is ambiguous and not economically meaningful. Particularly, the non-
significant coefficient of age (bAge = 4.416) becomes even more significant as the significant 
coefficient of age2 is negative (𝑏𝐴𝑔𝑒2= -0.4219). Overall, age does not significantly influence 
one’s RAtt. 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.13: Robustness Tests (GMM) and Aggregating Bootstrapping RAtt (bR_b) 
GMM Regression  Bagging Bootstrap  
IVs 
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 1: LnWTP)  
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 2: RP) 
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 3: bR) 
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 3: bR_b) 
Intercept 5.421*** 41.0400*** -42.66* -384.466 
Age -0.0271*** 0.0973** 0.1057 4.416 
Age2 0.00053 -0.0042 0.0214 -0.4219* 
Group 2 YES YES YES YES 
Group 3 YES YES YES YES 
Group 4 YES YES YES YES 
Group 5 YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-
Square 
0.0617 0.0612 0.0019 0.0043 
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4.7 Summary and conclusion 
The study has presented tests for the three hypotheses developed to provide findings for the 
first empirical research. Table 4.14 presents a summary of the hypothesis testing results and the 
obtained story, respectively. 
Table 4.14: Empirical Study 1 – Summary of the Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypothesis Expected Effect Result Obtained Sign 
H1 There is a statistically significant difference 
in individual FRT across age 
Supported Negative 
H2 There is a statistically significant difference 
in individual RP across age 
Supported Positive 
H3 There is a statistically significant difference 
in individual RAtt across age 
Not 
Supported 
- 
 
The literature has shown a strong interest in the age-FRT relationship, yet a conclusive finding 
has yet emerged. Nevertheless, the majority of extant studies reported a decreased financial risk 
tolerance (FRT) across age. This association supports the life-cycle risk aversion hypothesis of 
Bakshi and Chen (1994).  The hypothesis asserts that as individuals get older, their remaining 
paychecks decline and future income becomes more uncertain. Consequently, people become 
more repellent to financial risk as they cannot afford to lose when there are fewer opportunities 
for potential losses to be covered by labour income. As stated by Yao et al. (2011), “individuals 
approaching or in retirement may shift focus from asset accumulation to asset preservation” 
(p.885). This negative age-FRT finding can be used for predicting one’s appetite in investment 
based on his age. Nevertheless, beyond the predictability implication, many researches recently 
have attempted to acquire also the ability to alter one’s risk appetite by investigating the 
underlying mechanisms of FRT formation. Virtually all extant studies working in this area 
obtained the same general finding such that differences in FRT across difference factors 
(gender, culture, career, outcome domain, situational domain and time) is mainly caused by 
differences in RP across these factors, whilst RAtt is a relatively stable and constant construct. 
As can be seen, no study has been conducted to examine the mediating roles of RP and RAtt in 
the effect of age on FRT.  
Consequently, the current study extended the age-FRT topic by investigating the underlying 
mechanisms of their association. Particularly, the study is interested in whether the effect of 
age on FRT is mediated by risk perception (RP) and/or risk attitude (RAtt). Firstly, consistent 
with the majority of studies, the result drawing from the first hypothesis H1 assured that age 
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negatively influences one’s FRT. Most importantly, it is found that, as clarified in the last two 
hypotheses (H2 and H3), the decreased FRT is caused by an increase in RP, whilst RAtt remains 
constant across age. Notably, this general finding obtained in this study such that differences in 
FRT is associated with differences in RP rather RAtt is consistent with that of literature.  
In brief, the study concluded that older individuals are less willing to take on financial risk 
because they perceive the same financial investment as riskier, whilst their attitudes toward 
financial risk are generally the same with their younger counterparts. In this case, it is the age 
difference in risk perception causes the age difference in risk tolerance. Therefore, if the risk 
perceptions of older individuals are reduced, their risk tolerance level may increase. As Weber 
and Hsee (1998) suggested, to alter individuals’ RP, their cognition should be targeted by 
providing more information about investment, risk-return relationship, measures of financial 
risks, and so on.  Wider practical implications of this study will be discussed further in Chapter 
7.
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Chapter Five: Empirical Study 2 
Does Age Influence Cross-cultural Difference in Financial Risk Tolerance? 
Reduction of Cushion Buffer in Older Individuals 
5.1 Introduction 
Acknowledging the importance of assessing FRT, many studies attempt to generalise the 
assessment process in practice by identifying its determinants. Due to the subjective nature of 
FRT, these significant factors are used as proxies to estimate one’s risk tolerance level. Thus 
far, numerous factors have been documented as having an impact on FRT, such as, demographic 
(age and gender), socioeconomic (employment, wealth and income), and attitudinal (economic 
and interest expectations) factors. Notably, over the last decade, the FRT research has changed 
its direction from the focus on a single culture to a cross-cultural perspective. Weber and Hsee 
(1998) is the first to explore the fundamental influence of culture on FRT. This shift made by 
Weber and Hsee (1998) has fostered many other studies to the investigation of cross-cultural 
and cross-national differences in FRT using samples of different countries. A review of these 
extant studies reveals a consistent finding that collectivism is found to be associated with 
increased FRT relative to individualism. As the founder of the culture-FRT topic, Weber and 
Hsee (1998) introduced the cushion hypothesis as a potential explanation for their findings. 
Specifically, in financial hardship, members in collectivistic society can approach their internal 
groups (family and social network, excluding spouses) for help. Weber and Hsee (1998) claim 
that such readily available financial support covers the riskiness of financial options. 
Consequently, collectivistic individuals perceive the same financial option as less risky (lower 
RP), and hence they are more risk tolerant comparing to their individualistic counterparts. This 
finding implies that individuals coming from a collectivistic society may be more willing to 
take on financial risk compared to those from an individualistic society. However, making 
predictions of an individual’s risk appetite based on their cultural background can be susceptible 
to error if culture does not independently influence FRT. 
Before progressing into the current study, it is important to consider the study conducted by 
Fan and Xiao (2006). Their empirical results show that the reduction in reported FRT across 
age is faster with Chinese individuals than with Americans. This finding suggests that the 
cultural differences in FRT between China (collectivism) and America (individualism) may 
reduce across age. Hence, age may influence the cross-cultural difference in FRT. According 
to the previous empirical study of this thesis and numerous preceding research, age has been 
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well documented as an important determinant of FRT. Therefore, it is possible that its effect 
may be influential enough to moderate other determinants of FRT, including culture.  
Progressing the idea with further exploration into the literature, previous anthropological and 
psychological research reported changes in one’s personal traits, patterns of thinking, judging, 
and acting, across the life span. Particularly, as collectivistic individuals grow older, the 
development of their self-conscious emotions (embarrassment, shame, guilt, and self-esteem)33 
may reduce their willingness to seek financial help34, especially in societies with high level of 
power distance (strong social hierarchy) assuming that the availability of support stays 
unchanged. In this event, perhaps older collectivistic individuals have the same level of 
financial support as do younger collectivistic individuals, but avoid asking for support. The 
question is whether the availability of financial support can still be perceived as ‘cushion’ when 
individuals do not consider using the available support in their financial distress. Consequently, 
the effect of the cushion hypothesis, which asserts that collectivism perceives lower financial 
risk due to their larger pool of financial support, may be dampened across age. Building on 
these conjectures, the current study extends the culture-FRT literature by investigating the 
potential moderating effect of age on the cross-cultural difference in FRT. 
Consequently, this chapter aims at presenting the second empirical study of this thesis, a cross-
cultural research, whose principal objectives are twofold. Firstly, the study examines whether 
age moderates the effect of culture on FRT. Secondly, the study investigates if reductions in 
one’s cushion across age are the underlying reasons for the moderating effect of age if found to 
be present. The study is conducted by surveying the responses of 1,889 individuals from five 
different countries: the US and the UK (individualism); China and Vietnam (collectivism); and 
Singapore (a multicultural nation, allowing within-country cultural heterogeneity). The chapter 
starts with reviewing the literature on which the study is developed. Subsequently, detailed 
methodology, followed by the data description, empirical results, and robustness test, will be 
discussed. 
 
                                                 
33 Hofstede (2001), Mandel (2003), Lewis et al. (1989 and 1991), Benedict (1974), Bedford and 
Hwang (2003), Hwang (2001), Izard (1997), Bedford (1990), Demo (1992), Bengtson et al. (1985), 
Shaw et al. (2010), Giarrusso et al. (2001), Orth et al. (2010), Robins et al. (2002), Rosow (1985), 
Mirowsky and Ross (1992) 
34 Harel et al. (1990), Veroff (1981) 
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5.2 Literature review 
The literature review section is divided into three main parts. The first part aims at explaining 
the cultural value of an individual as suggested in the literature. The remaining two parts are 
closely related to the main contributions of the study. This is developed by two arguments: the 
increased FRT of collectivism through their lower RP compared to individualism, and the 
cushion hypothesis. Therefore, the second part reviews how the literature links culture with 
financial risk tolerance (FRT). Lastly, the third part will discuss the conjecture of the 
moderating effect of age on the cross-cultural difference in FRT.  
5.2.1 Cultural values 
Culture is a widely used notion with many interpretations and connotations. In broad terms, 
anything that is associated with the creativity of man (material and spiritual products) in the 
course of employment is considered to be the product of culture, including language, ethics, 
law, science, religion, literature, art, and tools for living, food, clothing, and many more.  
In social science, Breuer et al. (2012) defines culture as unchanged customary beliefs and values 
that are transmitted from one generation to another. On the other hand, Hofstede (2001, pp.12) 
metaphors culture as “the crystallization of history in the minds, hearts, and hands of the present 
generation”; and as the collective programming of the mind of members of a group that is 
distinctive from any other social groups. Weber and Hsee once reported that “culture has been 
shown to influence a wide range of basic psychological processes” (1999, pp.611). Through 
culture, one’s values and attitude are developed, which orient the behaviour of individuals and 
groups.  
The culture of a nation, ethnicity, or community is an incredibly abstract subject. But at its core, 
culture is an overbearing determinant of the thoughts, perceptions, and actions of individuals, 
organisations, and societies. Consequently, anthropologists consistently focus on learning about 
culture with the aim of constructing a common measure to analyse and assess a particular 
culture, and to compare it with others. Apparently, it is no easy task to achieve.  
A cultural measure is a tool to quantify, to the most possible extent, the abstract aspect of 
culture. One of the most well-known cultural measures has been used in numerous studies is 
the five cultural dimensions developed by Geert Hofstede (2001). These dimensions include 
power distance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, uncertainty avoidance and 
Confucianism dynamism (Long-term orientation). Among these five, perhaps the most 
common measure that has been used in the literature to examine the cross-cultural difference in 
FRT through RP and/or RAtt is the individualism-collectivism cultural dimension. 
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Furthermore, the development of this study’s contribution is built on the Weber and Hsee’s 
(1998) cushion hypothesis, which explains the difference in FRT between individualism and 
collectivism. Consequently, the current study will employ this individualism-collectivism 
continuum as the main cultural measure. The subsequent section will discuss in detailed the 
nature of this cultural continuum prior to the explanation of the cushion hypothesis.  
5.2.1.1 Hofstede’s cultural classification: Individualism-Collectivism 
According to Hofstede (2001), different cultures have different family structures. Compared to 
collectivistic societies, within individualistic societies the majority of children are born in 
families consisting of only parents and children, whilst other relatives tend to live elsewhere 
with less frequent contact with each other. Growing up in such family-style society, children 
learn to think of themselves as “I”, their personal identity, which is distinct from other personal 
identities or group identities. The purpose of education in individualism is to help children stand 
on their own feet in any circumstances of life. Hence, no single healthy members in the 
individualistic society must bear any responsibility or dependence on the group. 
In contrast, there are societies where group interests are of higher importance than individual 
rights. Hofstede (2001) refers these societies as Collectivism. In collectivistic societies, while 
growing up, children learn to think of themselves as part of the “we”, the so-called internal 
group. The internal group is the main source of human identity, and is also a secure safeguard 
when one is facing hardships of life. As a result, the reliance of collectivistic individuals on 
their family and other social group members is perceived as the key to stability and security. In 
turbulent times, one’s family and social group acts as a reliable ‘lifejacket’ for an individual. 
However, in return, collectivistic members are obligated to a lifelong loyalty to their internal 
group and any act that violates this loyalty is considered to be the worst misconduct. The 
dependent relationship between members and their internal group is developed both practically 
and psychologically. Over time, embedding in collectivistic members is the priority of the 
internal group’s goals over their own personal goals. 
Based on these differences between the independent self in the individualism and the symbiotic 
relationship in the collectivism, Weber and Hsee (1998) developed the cushion hypothesis to 
explain the higher levels of FRT exhibited by collectivism. In essence, in financial hardship 
members in collectivistic societies can approach their internal groups (family - excluding 
spouses and social network) for help. Such readily available financial support is claimed by 
Weber and Hsee to be the source of the concealment of the risk embedded in financial options. 
It acts as a ‘cushion’ that protects people from getting hurt when they ‘fall’ financially. 
Consequently, with the provided cushion, collectivistic individuals perceive the same financial 
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option as less risky (lower RP), and hence they are more risk tolerant (higher FRT) comparing 
to their individualistic counterparts. 
It is worthwhile emphasizing that the notion of the cushion developed by Weber and Hsee 
(1998) refers entirely to one’s personal private network. The size of the network is measured 
by the number of people that individuals can access for financial help (excluding their spouses). 
Therefore, public cushion (state benefits and supports) and personal access to overdraft, credit 
or loan, are not considered. The main reason is that a public cushion and personal financial 
access do not differ across cultures, hence, it cannot be used to explain the cross-cultural 
difference in FRT. Particularly, the former is the right that everyone is eligible for within a 
nation and there are binding restrictions to certain types of support available. The latter indicates 
that individuals engage in other financial commitments rather than a financial support. 
Primarily, both public cushion and personal financial access tends to differ across countries and 
socioeconomic characteristics, rather than cultures.  
Moving away from the concept of culture and the cushion hypothesis, the main concern of this 
research topic is to have a measure of culture. Up until now, all research (Section 5.2.2) studying 
the culture-FRT relationship employs the Hofstede’s cultural classification. In these studies, 
country is used as a proxy for culture. In other words, cultural value is measured at the national 
level. For example, based on Hofstede’s (2001) individualism index, the US and the UK have 
high individualism index. Therefore, respondents from these countries will be automatically 
classified as individualistic. However, this culture’s proxy is subject to a number of limitations 
and has increasingly been challenged and critiqued by the literature (Section 5.2.1.2). 
Consequently, as a way for improvement, the current study does not proxy culture but measures 
it at the individual level. Basically, the cultural value is measured specifically for each 
respondent participating in the survey by employing the Singelis’s (1994) self-construal scale. 
The rationales for the measure of culture at an individual level and the use of the Singelis’s SCS 
scale will be discussed in the subsequent Section 5.2.1.2. 
5.2.1.2 Singelis’s independent & interdependent self-construal measurement (SCS) 
To start with, this section discusses the drawbacks of Hofstede’s cultural dimension. The 
Hofstede’s individualism index has been applied in numerous empirical studies in different 
fields over the last three decades due to its convenience and straightforward practice (Kirkman 
et al., 2006). However, its application has increasingly received lots of challenges and critiques 
from academic scholars (Schwartz, 1994; Smith and Bond, 1999; McSweeney, 2002; Smith, 
2002, cited in Kirkman et al., 2006, p.285). The main argument is in regards to its simplistic 
and obsolete conceptualization. The ‘simplicity’ critique raises two concerns. Firstly, as the 
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measure uses the country individualism index to assign cultural values to all of its members, 
this causes overlap between country effect and culture effect such that obtained cross-cultural 
differences can be indeed cross-country differences (differences in macroeconomic conditions, 
geographic or politics). Technically, it is questionable to assign the cultural value of an 
employee of a company to the entire country.  Even Hofstede (2001) himself argues that 
individuals possess their own “mental programme” and these programmes only contain parts 
of the national culture. Furthermore, the index usage does not provide room for within-country 
cultural heterogeneity among individuals and does not allow for variation of culture overtime. 
According to Matsumoto (1996, pp.81), “culture is not a static entity” which changes across 
time and is different among individuals. Other researchers also found significant within-country 
differences in cultural values (Au, 1999, cited in Kirkman et al., 2006, p.288). This 
heterogeneity and alterability of culture becomes increasingly observable in face of many 
multicultural nations. This gives rise to concerns that the symbiotic relationship in collectivism 
will face challenges as a shift toward individualism as the habit of independent thinking 
gradually takes place. As a result, these arguments have supported McSweeney (2002) that 
one’s nation is not a robust unit to measure culture.  
The latter argument questions the reliability of the index as the data was collected in the 1960s 
and early 1970s (Kirkman et al., 2006). Such outdated measure may no longer be applicable at 
the current point of time. As a result, an individual level of cultural analysis can tackle all these 
limitations of the Hofstede’s framework. It ensures the data is up-to-date, and allows for the 
possibility that culture is dynamic, and is different across individuals of the same country. 
One potential argument against of Hofstede’s Individualism-Collectivism dimension (2001) is 
whether individualism and collectivism are two independent aspects of culture, or two extreme 
ends of the same cultural facet (Rhee et al., 1996). According to Hofstede (2001), he 
conceptualised individualism and collectivism as a single bipolar construct, which are on the 
two opposite sides of a coin, thus an individual can exhibits his/her sense of either 
individualistic or collectivistic. The two aspects of a culture under Hofstede view are inversely 
related. In comparing cultures of two societies, the average score of individuals’ personal values 
in each society represents its general cultural characteristics. If a society highly scores in 
Individualism, all members will be classified as individualistic; and vice versa. Nevertheless, 
individuals within a society tend to pursue various personal values; a person may 
simultaneously have high scores on Individualism in one aspect and high scores on Collectivism 
in other aspects. For example, a person can possess a high sense of responsibilities in his family 
(collectivism). However, he may be a self-responsible person such that he has his own 
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judgements on his education/career plan, instead of strongly considering his family’s advice 
(individualism). As a result, by comparing individuals’ cultural values, Individualism and 
Collectivism are two independent aspects.  
Overall, in this study, the individualism-collectivism cultural dimension will be primarily 
measured at individual level using Singelis’s measurement of independent and interdependent 
self-construal (1994). Singelis (1994) accepts the existence of individualism and collectivism 
as two distinct constructs. Consequently, an individual can exhibit both constructs, but one may 
dominate the other. Details about the mathematical computation of an individual’s cultural 
value will be explained in Section 5.3.1. According to the reviews by Cozma (2011) and Hardin 
et al. (2004), the SCS of Singelis (1994) is a particularly popular measure which shows “strong 
evidence for reliability and validity” (Cozma, 2011, pp.14). It has been cited more than 180 
times, and either one, or both, of the independent and interdependent subscales have been 
employed in more than 50 studies across different disciplines in different languages and 
countries. Hardin et al. (2004) also validated the reliability of Singelis’s SCS on 786 European 
American and Asian/Asian American college students. Consequently, its use has been 
recommended for future cross-cultural research. 
In brief, this first part of the literature review discussed the main cultural dimension used in this 
study, the individualism-collectivism dimension. Based on the differences between these two 
continuums, the cushion hypothesis was developed to explain the cross-cultural difference in 
FRT. The key concern for this cross-cultural research is the measure of culture. As explained, 
due to a number of limitations of using country as the proxy for culture based on Hofstede’s 
cultural classification, this study assesses the cultural value of each individual in the sample. 
This individual level of cultural analysis is conducted using the Singelis’s (1994) SCS scale. 
Moving away from the concepts of culture and its measure, the next section will discuss the 
literature investigating the differences in FRT across cultures.  
5.2.2 Cross-cultural differences in FRT 
According to Weber (2014), cultural background does influence one’s FRT and risk taking 
behaviour. The study of cross-cultural differences in FRT is initiated by an intriguing finding 
of Weber and Hsee (1998). Their findings indicate that Chinese respondents are systematically 
more risk tolerant in the financial domain than their American counterparts. Weber and Hsee 
(1998) recruited university students for their surveys from four countries: People’s Republic of 
China, America, Germany, and Poland. They inferred the respondents’ FRT from their reported 
willingness to pay for risky financial investment options. The results suggested that among four 
countries of investigation, Chinese participants are the most financial risk tolerant whereas 
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Americans and Germans exhibit the lowest levels of FRT. The authors attribute the cross-
cultural differences in FRT to cross-cultural differences in RP, rather than cross-cultural 
differences in perceived-risk attitude (subjective RAtt). In other words, individuals’ attitudes 
toward financial risk, the extent to which they like or dislike risk, are relatively the same across 
cultures, and the difference in willingness to pay between members of different cultures is 
because of the differences in their perceptions in the option’s riskiness. Based on these findings, 
the cushion hypothesis (Section 5.2.1.1) was first developed to explain the decreased RP, which 
leads to the increased FRT, of collectivism compared to individualism. However, at that stage, 
the cushion hypothesis remains a conjecture, which has yet been empirically tested. 
In their later study, Hsee and Weber (1999) re-confirmed the results by asking American and 
Chinese students to participate in a different experimental questionnaire. The results again 
revealed that American respondents are less risk tolerant than Chinese respondents. According 
to the cushion hypothesis as conjecturing in their previous study, it is expected that Chinese 
respondents are members of a collectivistic society wherein they have more access to financial 
help from other members than do Americans. As a result, they perceive risk of the same risky 
option as smaller than Americans do, and thus are more risk tolerant.  
To justify for the cushion hypothesis, Hsee and Weber (1999) empirically conducted tests on 
individual FRT in financial, medical and academic contexts. The results confirmed the 
prediction of the cushion hypothesis by showing that Chinese participants exhibited a higher 
level of FRT than American participants only in the investment domain, but not in the other 
two domains. The study also found that the size of one’s social network significantly mediates 
the effect of culture on FRT. In essence, the larger and readily supporting social network of the 
Chinese causes their RP to be lower and hence, their FRT to be higher than those of the 
American.  
Another study of Weber and her colleagues (Weber et al., 1998) investigated the FRT of 
American, German and Chinese samples. In this study, they employed the German sample as 
the control group, which exhibited similar standard of living, political and socio-economic 
conditions with the United States, whilst exhibited a closer score of collectivism and similar 
governmental social safety-net to China. As expected, the study found that with the higher level 
of social relatedness and interdependence, Chinese and German participants revealed greater 
risk taking than their American counterparts. Once again, these findings advocate the prediction 
of the cushion hypothesis such that systematic cross-cultural differences in FRT are the results 
of the longstanding cultural norms and values of the collectivism rather than the national 
situational circumstances. 
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Bontempo et al. (1997) employed a model-based approach in their cross-cultural investigation 
on financial RP, so-called, the Conjoint Expected Risk (CER) model, and obtained consistent 
results with Weber and Hsee (1998, 1999). They found that respondents from two 
individualistic countries (America and Netherland) exhibited significantly higher RP than 
respondents from two collectivistic countries (Taiwan and Hong Kong). Furthermore, to 
exclude the national situational effects, they compared RP of Taiwanese students with RP of 
Taiwanese security analysts, who are from the same cultural environment. The results revealed 
that they had similar risk judgements, which were significantly different from other cultures. 
The study suggested that the longstanding cultural values play greater roles in shaping one’s 
RP than situational circumstances, incentives, or loss functions.  
Fan and Xiao (2006) examined the self-reported FRT and stock participation of non-student 
samples from China (N=470) and America (N=2,671). After controlling for a number of 
demographic factors, they found that Chinese were more risk-tolerant in making financial 
decisions, and were more likely to participate in equity markets than Americans. Nevertheless, 
as the variable capturing the respondent’s participation in the stock market was self-reported 
and dichotomous, the observed behaviour might be different from the actual and the quantitative 
differences in amounts invested in stock cannot be captured. To account for the obtained 
differences in FRT and investment behaviour across culture, the authors proposed a rationale 
in addition to the cushion hypothesis with regards to insufficiency in financial knowledge. They 
stated that owing to the lack of financial education and knowledge of the Chinese about the 
financial risk-return relationship, they erroneously calibrate the magnitude of risk embedded in 
the equity investment.   
Another study conducted by Statman (2010) in which students from 23 countries were 
approached to complete a survey about their FRT through hypothetical scenarios in the domains 
of job and investment portfolio. The study provided evidence that levels of FRT for both job 
and portfolio domains are higher in societies that are more collectivistic, low uncertainty 
avoidance, and relatively hierarchical (high power distance). Out of the 23 countries of 
investigation, there were four countries that the current research targets, namely, Vietnam, 
China, the United Kingdom, and the United State. Consistently, Vietnam and China, countries 
with the same score in individualism continuum, revealed higher FRT in investment portfolios 
than the other two individualistic countries (16.34 and 17.06 versus 11.64 and 12.61, 
respectively). The same results were obtained in a previous study of Statman (2008), which 
found that Vietnam and China possess higher propensities to take on portfolio risk than the UK 
and the US. Statman (2010) also investigated whether public cushion, which was determined 
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by levels of social spending in the investigated nations, would impose the same impact with the 
private cushion on individual’s FRT. However, the results did not support this prediction. 
Similarly, Schneider et al. (2017) investigated the ‘social’ cushion hypothesis and the ‘state’ 
cushion hypothesis in three countries: Austria, Italy, and the USA. Repeatedly, their results did 
not give support for the ‘state’ cushion, whilst partly support the ‘social’ cushion hypothesis. 
More specifically, American habitants exhibited higher levels of FRT than their European 
counterparts, despite the weaker state support network. The underlying reason for the increased 
FRT of the Americans lay in part due to their larger social networks. In other words, one’s 
social cushion partially mediates the differences in FRT between countries, as the nationality 
variable remained statistically significant after social network information was controlled for 
in the regression model. 
Wang and Fischbeck (2008) conducted a multi-outcome lottery experiment on thirty-five US 
students and thirty-seven Chinese students to infer their FRT through willingness to pay and 
their RP. They found that Chinese participants on average were more risk tolerant in both the 
gain and loss domains. Their results were consistent with those obtained by Hsee and Weber 
(1999), as the study found that the higher degree of FRT found in the lottery tasks are not 
inherent in health, safety, and other everyday non-financial contexts.  
Despite the extensive evidence of cross-cultural differences in FRT supporting the cushion 
hypothesis, there were several exceptions. Rieger et al. (2014) ran the largest-scale international 
survey on FRT in 53 nations. The respondents were instructed to provide their willingness to 
pay for hypothetical lotteries with different gain and loss compositions. As suggested by the 
prospect theory, the study found that respondents across all countries of investigation were risk-
averse in the gain domain and risk-seeking in the loss domain. However, findings on cross-
cultural differences in FRT were inconsistent with the cushion hypothesis addressed in the 
aforementioned literature. Particularly, members of cultures with higher individualism scores 
were found to have higher FRT. Nevertheless, subsequent to the input of Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index (UAI) as a controlling variable, the effect of individualism-collectivism 
continuum became statistically insignificant. The results further revealed that respondents from 
countries with higher UAI exhibit higher degrees of irrational preferences, as they were more 
risk-averse in gains and more risk-seeking in losses.  
In a study conducted by Breuer et al. (2012) on a sample comprising of 449 economic students, 
they concluded that individuals’ FRT and their financial risk-taking behaviour were 
significantly positively associated with individualism. Hence, the study implied a prediction 
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that equity holdings should be high in countries with high individualism, and low in countries 
with low individualism. They also tested and confirmed this prediction using data from EIU 
WorldData on stock portfolio allocation such that stock market participation was positively 
related to individualism score of the countries. A behavioural rationale was put in place to 
account for this relationship, which asserts that members of individualistic societies tend to be 
overconfident and overoptimistic, thus leading to their higher willingness to take risk in 
financial market.  
To sum up, the entire literature working in this topic assures there is a cross-cultural difference 
in FRT. Except from two studies of Rieger et al. (2014) and Breuer et al. (2012), all other studies 
(Weber and Hsee, 1998; Hsee and Weber, 1999; see also35) found that collectivistic individuals 
are more willing to take financial risk comparing to individualistic individuals. The reason for 
such higher FRT levels exhibited by collectivism lies mainly on their lower risk perception 
(RP), whilst their attitudes toward financial risk are similar to individualism. To explain for 
these findings, the cushion hypothesis is supported empirically (Hsee and Weber, 1999; and 
Schneider et al., 2017). Note that the main contribution of this study is to investigate whether 
culture independently influences FRT. Therefore, the effect of culture on FRT as well as the 
cushion hypothesis are required to be clarified initially. Following these key studies, the 
following hypotheses will be tested: 
Cross-cultural difference in FRT through RP and/or RAtt (H4 to H6): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The cushion hypothesis (H7): 
 
                                                 
35 Weber et al., 1998; Bontempo et al., 1997; Fan and Xiao, 2006; Statman, 2010; and Wang and Fischbeck, 
2015. 
H6: More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly higher level of FRT than less 
collectivistic and individualistic individuals.   
H4: More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly lower RP than less collectivistic 
and individualistic individuals.   
H5: More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly higher RAtt than less collectivistic 
and individualistic individuals.   
H7: More collectivistic individuals have significantly more access to financial support than 
less collectivistic and individualistic individuals.   
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Extending the culture-FRT relationship, this study conjectures that older collectivistic 
individuals may experience different self-conscious emotions comparing to younger 
collectivistic individuals. Specifically, they experience higher levels of embarrassment, guilt, 
shame and self-esteem.  The development of these emotions may reduce the willingness of 
older collectivistic members to seek financial help. The financial support of these older 
collectivistic individuals may remain the same as their younger counterparts, but because they 
are less willing to ask for help the buffer of the cushion they perceive is less than that of younger 
collectivistic individuals. Overall, the reduction in cushion’s buffer of the older collectivistic 
individuals may cause the cultural differences in FRT to decline across age. Nevertheless, as 
this lies beyond the scope of this thesis, the development of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and 
self-esteem remains a conjecture to explain why age may influence the cultural effect on FRT. 
This study cannot explicitly measure and test it. Nonetheless, the implication of a reduction of 
a collectivistic individual’s cushion buffer across age is drawn from consensus findings of many 
studies. The next section will discuss those studies in more detailed. 
5.2.3 Age effect on one’s self-conscious emotions and help-seeking attitudes  
The novel idea of the mitigating age effect on the cushion hypothesis was originated from the 
statistical findings of studies conducted by Fan and Xiao (2006). According to the statistical 
testing result Table 2 of Fan and Xiao’s study (2006, pp.65), it is noticeable that individuals 
tend to be less risk tolerant as they age, but the marginal decrease in FRT was larger for the 
Chinese than for the American. With the obtained differences in FRT between the two cultures, 
the larger reduction in FRT across age of the Chinese implies that the cross-cultural difference 
in FRT may be narrowed as age increases. In other words, age may moderate the cultural 
influence on FRT.  
The proposed idea is formulated based on anthropological and psychological literature. 
Hofstede (2001) found that age influences values of individuals in the same way as national 
culture. Value refers to feelings and “a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over 
others” (Hofstede, 2001, pp.5). In essence, values are the basic concepts for humans to make 
assessments on what is right, wrong, good, bad, just, fair, important, and unimportant. This 
research suggests that an individual’s values differ across age because the development of self-
conscious emotions, including embarrassment, shame, guilt, and self-esteem, may occur, 
reducing the willingness of older collectivistic members to seek financial help.  
According to Cohen (1999, pp.67), when facing the need to ask for support, people need to 
“overcome a wide range of social and psychological obstacles that may, in the end, preclude 
the articulation of the request and the subsequent receipt of assistance”. Although no research 
93 
 
has directly studied the relationship between age and financial help-seeking attitudes, Harel et 
al. (1990) and Veroff (1981) found that older adults resist help seeking more than younger 
adults in the medical context. Brown (1978) conducted a longitudinal study of 1106 adults aged 
from 20 to 70 years in Chicago and obtained the same result that there was an evident decline 
in the seeking of help in different events across age for both genders with a dramatic drop 
among the elderly. 
Notably, the current study conjectures not only the reduction in willingness to ask for help 
across age, but also that such a reduction tends to occur in collectivistic societies. Therefore, 
the remainder of this section provides evidences supporting for the increased guilt, shame, self-
esteem and embarrassment of older collectivistic individuals. In essence, asking for financial 
support increases the likelihood that one is put into a state of embarrassment, guilt, shame and 
loss of self-esteem. Therefore, older collectivistic members may be less willing to ask for 
financial help to avoid such circumstances.  
First of all, it is important to understand another cultural continuum classified by Hofstede 
(2001), namely, power distance. Although this cultural continuum is an independent cultural 
dimension, it closely relates to the individualism-collectivism continuum. A power distance 
culture relates to the degree of inequality between individuals within a society. A society with 
high power distance will generally accept and perpetuate the inequalities in power between 
humans, and members of such society distinctly perceive their position and status within the 
community, and are unconditionally submissive to ones with higher power. Geert Hofstede 
(2001) suggested that societies with high score of power distance tend to be high scoring in 
Collectivism and vice versa. The development of self-conscious emotions (shame, loss of self-
esteem, embarrassment and guilt) over the lifecycle emerges from one’s social status in 
societies with high power distance (highly collectivistic).  
Benedict (1974) refers to collectivism as the shame culture. A person is put into a state of shame 
when the wrongdoing is known by others (Hofstede, 2001). Shame occurs when a person fail 
to live up to one’s role or status expectations, and is the feeling of loss of standing in the eyes 
of the other people within their society (Bedford and Hwang, 2003). In higher power distance 
societies, maintaining one’s status is the duty of higher ranked members (Hwang, 2001). 
Basically, the role and status of older collectivistic members is usually greater than when they 
were young. As a result, it becomes more essential for them to act appropriately according to 
the standards, rules and goals of the group so that they may earn and maintain respect from 
lower status members, and maintain their status or identity. Importantly, Hofstede (2001) 
mentioned the concept of ‘face’ in collectivist families, members of collectivistic societies care 
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more about avoiding losing face, which occurs when one’s own actions, or one’s closely related 
members, fail to meet the expectations and requirements placed upon him by one’s social 
position and status. 
A handful of psychological studies report changes in one’s self-esteem over a person life course. 
Majority of studies conclude either a stable (Demo, 1992; Bengtson et al., 1985) or an 
increasing level (Shaw et al., 2010; Giarrusso et al., 2001) of self-esteem as age advances. 
Nevertheless, Orth et al. (2010) and Robins et al. (2002) found that the level of self-esteem 
increases over the life of adulthood until the age of 60 and then sharply declines. The rationale 
for this is that self-esteem is structured by the acquisition and loss of social roles (Rosow, 1985; 
Mirowsky and Ross, 1992). The acquisition occurs throughout adulthood, but when people get 
older in later life, their roles are gradually eroded and replaced. Therefore, in a strong 
hierarchical society (or higher collectivism), once in adulthood individuals tends to pay 
intensive care to their social status, and thus exhibit high and increasing sense of self-worth. 
Furthermore, Amsterdam and Levitt (1980) and Lewis et al. (1989) concluded that the state of 
embarrassment is not established without the emergence of self-awareness. In other words, 
individuals without self-recognition, which evidently presents itself with self-esteem, will not 
show or exhibit the feeling of embarrassment. Therefore, the development of self-esteem across 
age may cause the development of embarrassment. Furthermore, Mandel (2003) stated that 
members of collectivistic societies care about avoiding embarrassment more than members of 
individualist society. Additionally, Lewis et al. (1991) observed that the level of embarrassment 
increases with age. 
Lastly, Hofstede (2001) states that within individualism, children are taught to be on their own 
feet since they are born, and live away from their parents when they turn into adolescents. 
Parents are supposed to live on their own without being dependent on their children. In contrast, 
in collectivistic societies, parents have the responsibility to raise and take care of their children, 
and later on, they are taken care of by their grown-up children. Consequently, as growing older, 
the financial responsibility and obligation to one’s family increases in the collectivism. 
According to Bedford and Hwang (2003), Izard (1997), and Bedford (1990), when individuals 
accept and bear some feelings of responsibility, the state of guilt will be established. Hence, the 
higher responsibility tolerated by older collectivistic individuals will cause them to bear the 
feeling of guilt for wrong doings with, or without, the wrong doing being known by others. 
In brief, this evidence suggests that older collectivistic individuals care more about avoiding 
any conduct or behaviour that may increase the likelihood they are put into a state of 
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embarrassment, guilt, shame and loss of self-esteem. Seeking financial support when facing 
financial problems or failures is an example of this behaviour. As a result, these older members 
of the collectivism are less willing to ask for financial help even though their access to support 
remains intact. Therefore, it is conjectured that older collectivistic individuals may 
subconsciously perceive their cushion as thinner compared to younger collectivistic individuals.  
As the cushion of older collectivistic individuals is thinner, their risk perception is higher, and 
hence they have lower FRT, compared to younger collectivistic individuals. Eventually, the 
cross-cultural differences in FRT become smaller with age. Accordingly, the moderating effects 
of age on the cross-cultural difference in FRT through RP and/or RAtt, following from the 
shrinkage of the collectivism’s social cushion will be tested as stated in the following 
hypotheses:  
The moderating effect of age on cross-cultural difference in FRT through RP and/or RAtt (H8 
to H10): 
 
 
 
 
The shrinkage of individual’s cushion (H11 and H12): 
 
 
 
5.3 Methodology 
Before the discussion of statistical methods employed to conduct this cross-cultural study, it is 
fundamental to present the quantitative measure of an individual’s culture. As mentioned in 
Section 5.2.1, instead of employing Hofstede’s (2001) cultural classification to proxy culture, 
the study employs the Singelis’s (1994) SCS to measure the culture at an individual level. 
Therefore, each respondent will be assigned with a cultural value and respondents from the 
same country can exhibit different cultural views.  
 
H11: Older collectivistic individuals have significantly less access to financial support than 
younger collectivistic individuals 
 H12: Older collectivistic individuals are significantly less willing to ask for financial help 
than younger collectivistic individuals 
 
H10: Age significantly negatively affects the cross-cultural difference in FRT 
 
H8: Age significantly positively affects the cross-cultural difference in RP 
 H9: Age significantly negatively affects the cross-cultural difference in RAtt 
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5.3.1 Cultural value of an individual  
The construct is a two-dimensional scale for measuring individualism and collectivism. It 
contains thirty 7-point likert-scale items out of which fifteen items measure the individualistic 
aspect and the other fifteen items measure the collectivistic aspect.  
Measure of culture variable (COL_IDV): Each cultural continuum contains 15 questions36, 
which will be averaged to obtain the mean scores of collectivism (𝐶𝑂𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) and individualism 
(𝐼𝐷𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅). The culture variable (COL_IDV) is the difference in their mean scores calculated by 
subtracting the mean score of individualistic construct from that of collectivistic construct. The 
formula of culture variable can be written as follows: 
 COL_IDV = 𝐶𝑂𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  - 𝐼𝐷𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
Individuals with collectivistic value dominates individualistic value, that is, COL_IDV is 
greater than zero, are classified as collectivism dominance. In contrast, individuals with 
negative COL_IDV are dominated by individualistic construal, and thus are classified as 
individualism dominance. In the case the culture variable is equal to zero (COL_IDV = 0), 
individuals are culturally neutral. Consequently, the culture variable (COL_IDV) forms an 
ordinal variable ranged from -6 (most individualistic) to 6 (most collectivistic). 
Moving away from the measure of culture, the subsequent section will provide the statistical 
approaches for the main empirical parts. The whole empiric section is divided in to three main 
parts. The first part is the examination of the cross-cultural differences in FRT through RP 
and/or RAtt, together with the main contribution of this study, which is, the moderating effect 
of age on the cross-cultural differences (Age-culture-FRT analysis). Subsequently, the second 
part provides the approach that the study uses to clarify the Weber and Hsee’s (1998) cushion 
hypothesis (Effect of cushion). Lastly, the investigation of the shrinkage of an individual’s 
cushion, which is conjectured to be the rationale for the age moderating effect on the culture-
FRT relationship, will be discussed (Shrinkage of cushion).  
                                                 
36 Appendix I, P.IV: 
Independent Subscale (Individualism) Item1, Item2, Item5, Item7, Item9, Item10, Item13, Item15, 
Item18, Item20, Item22, Item24, Item25, Item27, Item29  
Interdependent Subscale (Collectivism) Item3, Item4, Item6, Item8, Item11, Item12, Item14, 
Item16, Item17, Item19, Item21, Item23, Item26, Item28, Item30 
97 
 
5.3.2 Age-culture-FRT analysis 
5.3.2.1 National analysis - Weber and Hsee’s (1998) approach: Using country as culture’s 
proxy and mosaic bivariate analysis 
The statistical analysis in this section is an important test, which uses the exact same approach 
as Weber and Hsee’s (1998). Firstly, the culture is measured at a national level using Hofstede’s 
(2001) cultural dimensions. Specifically, country is used as the proxy for respondent’s culture. 
Therefore, the cross-cultural differences in FRT can be inferred based on the cross-country 
differences in FRT. Secondly, the same statistical analysis, the mosaic bivariate analysis 
(ANOVA and Bonferroni t-test) is employed. Consequently, the findings regarding the cross-
cultural differences in FRT through RP and/or RAtt, can be directly compared with those of 
Weber and Hsee (1998). 
The three proposed hypotheses regarding cross-cultural differences in FRT, RP, and RAtt (H4 
– H6; Section 5.2.2) will be tested37.  
H4 [Risk perception]: 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ US = 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ UK = 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ SG = 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ VN = 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ CN;  
H5 [Risk attitude]:  
(1) [Objective RAtt]: 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ US = 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ UK = 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ SG = 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ VN = 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ CN; 
(2) [Subjective RAtt]: 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅US = 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅UK = 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅SG = 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅VN = 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅CN; 
H6 [Financial risk tolerance]: 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅US = 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅UK = 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅SG = 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅VN = 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅CN; 
5.3.2.2 Mosaic bivariate analysis:  Individual level of culture analysis (Singelis’s SCS) 
In this section, the study continues using the mosaic bivariate analysis approach. However, 
culture is measured at an individual level using the Singelis’s SCS (1994) instead of country-
level measure. As explained in Section 5.3.1, each individual’s cultural value is denoted 
COL_IDV (𝐶𝑂𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  - 𝐼𝐷𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅). The whole sample is divided into three main cultural groups: 
individualism dominance (IND, COL_IDV<0), collectivism dominance (COL, COL_IDV>0), 
and cultural neutrality (N, COL_IDV=0). 
 
 
                                                 
37 Subsequent statistical tests are stated in null hypothesis 
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The ANOVA and Bonferroni t-test are conducted to test whether there are significant 
differences in FRT, RP, and RAtt between individuals as a function of culture (H4 – H6; Section 
5.2.2).  
H4 [Risk perception]: 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ IND = 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ COL = 𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ N; 
H5 [Risk attitude]:  
(1) [Objective RAtt]: 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ IND = 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ COL = 𝑏𝑉𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ N; 
(2) [Subjective RAtt]: 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅IND = 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅COL = 𝑏𝑅̅̅ ̅N; 
H6 [Financial risk tolerance]: 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅IND = 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅COL = 𝑊𝑇𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅N; 
The two bivariate tests with the country-level measure and the individual-level measure of 
culture (Section 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2, respectively) are the baseline methods of the study. The 
findings obtained in these tests will be compared directly with those of Weber and Hsee (1998). 
Consequently, the comparability of this study’s data can be inferred. The next section presents 
the main statistical analysis (model-based mosaic approach).  
5.3.2.3 Model-based mosaic multivariate analysis - Individual level of culture analysis 
For each mosaic, the presence of cultural influences on the main constructs (FRT, RP and RAtt) 
will be initially examined, followed by the investigation of age as a moderator of the cultural 
effects on those main constructs. 
Mosaic 1: Age influences the cross-cultural difference in RP 
To respectively test the two proposed hypotheses:  
“H4: More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly lower RP than less collectivistic and 
individualistic individuals” & “H8: Age significantly positively affects the cross-cultural 
difference in RP” 
The estimating regression model can be specified as follows: 
RPi = αi + βG1Group1 + βG2Group2 + βG3Group3 + βG4Group4 + βG5Group5 +  
βG6Group6 + εi, 
 
 
 
 
CULTURE RISK PERCEPTION 
CULTURE *AGE RISK PERCEPTION 
(H4) 
(H8) 
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Where the content for each independent variable group is listed in Table 5.1 (See Appendix 4 
for more explanation of each variable component). 
Table 5.1: Classification content for each independent variable group 
Independent variable Classification content 
*Explanation see Appendix 4 
Group 1: Main variables COL_IDV, COL_IDV*Age; Age; Age2 
Group 2: Demographic variables 
Age*LnW; Single; Gender; Child; Highschl; 
Hhsize; LnW; LnInc 
Group 3: Socioeconomic variables Unemp; Selfemp; Homeown 
Group 4: Attitudinal variables Rbelief; IncStab; Health; SRA; Ecoexp; Interestexp 
Group 5: Geographical US; UK; VN; SG 
Group 6:  
Cushion hypothesis variables 
Finhelp; Helpatt; Age*Finhelp; 
COL_IDV*Finhelp; Age*Helpatt; 
COL_IDV*Helpatt; COL_IDV*Helpatt; 
Finhelp*Helpatt; COL_IDV*Age*Finhelp; 
COL_IDV*Age*Helpatt 
Mosaic 2: Age influences the cross-cultural difference in RAtt 
To respectively test the two proposed hypotheses:  
“H5: More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly higher RAtt than less collectivistic 
and individualistic individuals” & “H9: Age significantly negatively affects the cross-
cultural difference in RAtt” 
The estimating regression specification as follows: 
(bVAR/bR)i = αi + βG1Group1 + βG2Group2 + βG3Group3 + βG4Group4 + βG5Group5 + 
βG6Group6 + εi, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CULTURE RISK ATTITUDE 
CULTURE *AGE RISK ATTITUDE 
(H5) 
(H9) 
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Mosaic 3: Age influences the cross-cultural differences in FRT 
To respectively test the two proposed hypotheses:  
“H6: More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly higher level of FRT than less 
collectivistic and individualistic individuals” & “H10: Age significantly negatively affects 
the cross-cultural difference in FRT” 
The estimating regression specification as follows: 
Ln(WTP)i = αi + βG1Group1 + βG2Group2 + βG3Group3 + βG4Group4 + βG5Group5 + 
βG6Group6 + εi, 
 
 
 
 
The study then moves away from the main findings of whether culture influences FRT through 
RP and/or RAtt, and whether its influence is moderated by age, to the reasons behind these 
effects. Initially, to explain the cross-cultural difference in FRT through RP (as found by 
literature, Section 5.2.2), the study clarifies the cushion hypothesis of Weber and Hsee (1998) 
using exactly the methods employed by Hsee and Weber (1999) and two alternative statistical 
methods as explained in the following section. 
5.3.3 Effect of cushion (The cushion hypothesis) 
The main variable that Hsee and Weber (1999) used to validate their cushion hypothesis 
measures the number of people that individuals can access for financial help, excluding their 
spouses. The study employs the same questionnaire with Hsee and Weber (1999) to measure 
the same variable, termed ‘Finhelp’, as presented in Appendix 1 (Part VII, 3rd question). The 
question asks the respondents to state the number of people from their social network (stated in 
questions one and two) that they can ask for financial support. Individuals with better access to 
financial support tend to have more buffering cushion in case of financial failure or difficulty. 
There are three statistical methods employed to clarify the cushion hypothesis. Firstly, exactly 
the same bivariate analysis (ANOVA) of Hsee and Weber (1999) is employed as the baseline. 
Alternatively, two additional tests are implemented to verify this cushion hypothesis. These are 
the four-step mediation model of Baron and Kenny (1986) and the structural equation modelling 
(SEM). The use of these two methods aims to improve the bivariate method of Hsee and Weber 
CULTURE FINANCIAL RISK TOLERANCE 
CULTURE *AGE FINANCIAL RISK TOLERANCE 
(H6) 
(H10) 
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(1999). Particularly, the results of the ANOVA analysis only determine whether collectivistic 
individuals have significantly more access to financial help compared to individualistic 
individuals. If that statement is supported, the cushion hypothesis is confirmed. Nevertheless, 
it is possible that the greater access to financial support may have nothing to do with lower RP 
and higher FRT. Therefore, the story that is made from different separate mosaics rather than a 
completely connected picture does not allow for the examination of the mediating effect of 
one’s social cushion (Finhelp) on the cross-cultural difference in RP and FRT. For this reason, 
the Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation model and the SEM are employed to overcome the 
issue.  
5.3.3.1 Bivariate analysis: Cross-cultural difference in social cushion 
Completely replicating Hsee and Weber’s (1999) approach, the ANOVA analysis and 
Bonferroni t-test are conducted to examine the differences in individual’s financial support 
availability (𝐹𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) across cultures. Hence, “H7: More collectivistic individuals have 
significantly more access to financial support than less collectivistic and individualistic 
individuals” is examined as follows: 
H7: 𝐹𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ IND = 𝐹𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ COL = 𝐹𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ N; 
To verify the cushion hypothesis in a more comprehensive manner, the study conducts an 
examination of the mediating effect of financial support availability (Finhelp) on cultural 
differences in FRT, RP, and/or RAtt. Two statistical models: the four-step mediation model of 
Baron and Kenny (1986) and the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) are employed and 
presented in the following Section 5.3.3.2 and Section 5.3.3.3, respectively. 
5.3.3.2 Mediation model 1: The four-step mediation model (Baron and Kenny, 1986) 
In the first empirical part (Section 5.3.2), the influence of culture on FRT through RP and/or 
RAtt was examined. The whole study includes three mosaics: cultural influences on RP, RAtt 
and FRT (mosaics 1 to 3, respectively). In this empirical part, the main objective is to clarify 
the cushion hypothesis of Weber and Hsee (1998). Specifically, the study tests whether the 
cultural effects on RP, RAtt, and FRT operate through the individual’s access to financial 
support (Finhelp). With the use of the Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation model, these three 
mosaics are further tested with financial support availability (Finhelp) is the mediating variable 
in each mosaic.  
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The four-step mediation model of Baron and Kenny (1986) is depicted in the following diagram 
(Figure 5.1):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 briefly describes the mediation model diagram depicted in Figure 5.1. The first three 
steps of the mediation model for each mosaic (path a, b, and c) aim to examine the existence of 
zero-order relationships among the variables. Particularly, three regressions for each mosaic are 
run: (Step 1 – path c) COL_IDV  RP (mosaic 1) – bVAR/bR (mosaic 2) – LnWTP (mosaic 3), 
(Step 2 – path a) COL_IDV  Finhelp, and (Step 3 – path c) Finhelp  RP (mosaic 1) – 
bVAR/bR (mosaic 2) – LnWTP (mosaic 3). According to Baron and Kenny (1986), if any of these 
tested relationships in the first three steps of each mosaic are insignificant, the result indicates 
no mediation. Otherwise, test proceeds with the final step. In the last regression model, both 
culture (COL_IDV) and financial support availability (Finhelp) are controlled for as 
independent variables which influence RP (mosaic 1), bVAR/bR (mosaic 2), and LnWTP (mosaic 
3). If the effects of Finhelp on RP, RAtt, and FRT (path b) remain significant after controlling 
for COL_IDV the conclusion of either full mediation, or partial meditation is reached. This 
depends on the direct effect of culture on RP, RAtt, and FRT (path a). If the direct effect c’ 
becomes insignificant, full mediation is acknowledged. On the other hand, if the direct effect 
c’ remains statistically significant, researchers often conclude that partial mediation is 
supported. 
Culture  
(COL_IDV) 
 Financial Risk Tolerance (LnWTP) 
 Risk Perception (RP) 
 Financial Risk Attitude (bVAR/bR) 
Financial Support  
(Finhelp) 
c 
Figure 5.1: The mediation paths in examining the cushion hypothesis (Four-step model) 
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Table 5.2: The four-step Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation model 
 Visual Depiction Mediating effect of Finhelp 
Step 
1 
 Direct effects of culture on financial 
risk tolerance, risk perception, and risk 
attitudes to test for path c, 
 
      
 
  
 
 
Step 
2 
 A regression with culture predicting 
financial support availability (Finhelp) 
to test for path a, 
Finhelp = β0 + β1COL_IDV + e 
 
 
 
Step 
3 
 A regression analysis with financial 
support predicting financial risk 
tolerance, risk perception, and risk 
attitude, to test for path b, 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Step 
4 
 A multivariate regression with both 
culture and financial support availability 
predicting financial risk tolerance, risk 
perception, and risk attitudes 
 
 
 
 
Controlling variables (Appendix 4): Age, Age2, Age*LnW, Helpatt, Age*Helpatt, Single, Gender, 
Child, Highschl, Rbelief, Hhsize, LnW, Lninc, Incstab, Unemp, Selfemp, Homeown, Health, 
SRA, Ecoexp, Interestexp, US, UK, VN, SG.  
 
c 
COL_IDV 
LnWTP 
RP 
bVAR/bR 
a 
COL_IDV Finhelp 
b 
Finhelp 
LnWTP 
RP 
bVAR/bR 
c’ 
COL_IDV 
LnWTP 
RP 
bVAR/bR 
Finhelp 
LnWTP 
RP 
bVAR/bR 
 
= β0 + β1COL_IDV + e 
 
LnWTP 
RP 
bVAR/bR 
 
= β0 + β1Finhelp + e 
 
LnWTP 
RP 
bVAR/bR 
 
= β0 + β1COL_IDV + 
β2Finhelp + e 
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5.3.3.3 Mediation model 2: The Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
Although the Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation model allows for the examination of 
moderating roles of financial support availability (Finhelp) on the three mosaics (RP, RAtt, and 
FRT, respectively), the three mosaics are tested separately. In other words, the four-step model 
is implemented three times for the three main constructs. However, the story is glued together 
better by comparing this to the use of Hsee and Weber’s (1999) approach (bivariate analysis). 
For further improvement, the study employs the SEM with maximum likelihood estimation, 
which visually presents all mosaics to one complete picture as depicted in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SEM is a confirmatory technique that examines complex (direct and indirect) relationships 
between more than one independent variables and more than one dependent variables. Its goal 
to validate the proposed model as specified a priori in Figure 5.2. The figure shows the complete 
culture-FRT picture. Specifically, collectivism exhibits greater access to financial support 
(COL_IDV  Finhelp). The greater support acts as a cushion for those collectivistic 
individuals. Hence, they perceive the same investment option as less risky (Finhelp  RP) 
and/or they like risk more (Finhelp  RAtt) compared to their individualistic counterparts. 
Because of the lower RP and/or higher RAtt, individuals of collectivism are more tolerant than 
those of individualism.  
 
 
 
Culture  
(COL_IDV) 
Financial Support  
(Finhelp) 
 Risk Perception (RP) 
 Financial Risk Attitude (bVAR/bR) 
  
Financial Risk 
Tolerance (LnWTP) 
Figure 5.2: The mediation paths in examining the cushion hypothesis (SEM) 
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5.3.4 Shrinkage of cushion effect 
As the cushion hypothesis causes cultural differences in FRT through RP and/or RAtt, changes 
in such cultural difference may be explained by differences in individual’s social cushion across 
ages. Firstly, it is possible that older collectivistic individuals have less access to financial 
support (finhelp) compared to the younger individuals. Alternatively, as projected, older 
collectivistic individuals are less willing to ask for help as they try to avoid being put into the 
stage of shame, guilt, embarrassment and loss of self-esteem (Section 5.2.3). Therefore, if older 
collectivistic individuals have less access to financial support and/or are less willing to ask for 
financial help from others, it can be said that the cushion buffer of collectivistic individuals 
reduces across ages. Because of that decreasing cushion buffer, older collectivistic individuals 
perceive higher risk, and hence, their FRT increases comparing to younger collectivistic 
individuals. 
Consequently, to test this conjecture, the study is the first to propose a factor, namely, attitude 
towards financial help (helpatt), which potentially adds to the explanation of the variation in 
cultural difference in FRT across age. To obtain an individual’s help attitude four 7-point likert-
scale items, developed by Cohen (1999), were asked (Appendix 1, P.VIII). The Helpatt variable 
is constructed by calculating the mean score of the answers to those four questions. Therefore, 
the variable ranges from 1 (least willing to ask for help at all) to 7 (most willing to ask for help). 
Note that question 1 and question 2 are inverse scales and need to be converted to the common 
scale by subtracting the respondent’s answer from 8. 
5.3.4.1 Bivariate analysis: Individual’s social cushion across age 
Initially, the ANOVA and Bonferroni t-test are employed on the full sample to examine if 
cushion hypothesis variables change as a function of age.  
(1) 𝐹𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ Age1 = 𝐹𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ Age2 = 𝐹𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ Age3 = 𝐹𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ Age4; 
(2) 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅Age1 = 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅Age2 = 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅Age3 = 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅Age4; 
5.3.4.2 Multivariate analysis: Individual’s social cushion across age 
To test these conjectures as stated in hypothesis H11 and H12 (Section 5.2.3), the full sample is 
divided into collectivism and individualism. Subsequently, two multivariate estimating models 
are specified as follows:  
 
  
 
 
αi + β1*Age + βG2Group2 + βG3Group3 + βG4Group4 + 
βG5Group5 + βG6Group6 + εi, 
(1) Finhelpi 
(2) Helpatti 
= 
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Where the content for each independent variable group is listed in Table 5.3 (See Appendix 4 
for more explanation of each variable component). 
Table 5.3: Classification content for each independent variable group 
Independent variable Classification content 
*Explanation see Appendix 4 
Group 1: Main variables Age, Age2 
Group 2: Demographic variables 
COL_IDV; COL_IDV*Age; Age*LnW; Single; 
Gender; Child; Highschl; HhSize; LnW; LnInc 
Group 3: Socioeconomic variables Unemp; Selfemp; Homeown 
Group 4: Attitudinal variables Rbelief; IncStab; Health; SRA; Ecoexp; Interestexp 
Group 5: Geographical US; UK; VN; SG 
Group 6: Cushion hypothesis  
 Model 1 - Dependent variable: Finhelp  
Helpatt; Age*Helpatt; COL_IDV*Helpatt; 
COL_IDV*Age*Helpatt 
 Model 2 - Dependent variable: Helpatt  
Finhelp; Age*Finhelp; COL_IDV*Finhelp; 
COL_IDV*Age*Finhelp 
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5.4 Data Description 
This section describes the data sample by presenting the descriptive statistics of the variables 
included in this study. These are the three main dependent variables and the five independent 
variable groups as discussed in Section 3.4.3 and explained in Appendix 4. However, to prevent 
repetition, only the main independent variable group 1 (cultural value, COL_IDV), and cushion 
hypothesis variables group 6 (Finhelp and Helpatt) are discussed here. All other variables have 
been explained in the first empirical study (Chapter 4, Section 4.4). 
5.4.1 Variable group 1: Main independent variables 
Table 5.4 presents the description of the individual cultural value (COL_IDV), which is the 
main proposed determinant of individual FRT. The sample contains individuals ranging from 
very individualistic (minCOL_IDV = -5.73) to very collectivistic (maxCOL_IDV = 5.2). On average, 
individuals are slightly individualistically dominant (meanCOL_IDV ≈ -0.14) with a standard 
deviation of 0.926. 
 
 
5.4.2 Variable group 6: Cushion hypothesis variables 
The description of the last variable group is presented in Table 5.5. The financial help 
availability (Finhelp) reported by the study sample has mean of 2.971 and median of 2. The 
variable exhibits a positive skewness of distribution as depicted in Figure 5.3. The number of 
people who could be approached for financial help most respondents reported are ranged from 
zero to six. Figure 5.4 provides a comparison of financial help available across the five 
countries. As expected, China and Vietnam reveal the highest mean values (4.06 and 4.26) 
compared to a mean value of around 2 for the other three countries. The variable Helpatt which 
measures one’s attitude towards financial help is rather skewed to the high willingness to ask 
for financial help. Its mean and median values are both around 4.  
 
 
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of Culture (Group 1) 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max N 
COL_IDV -0.1365 0 0.926 -5.73 5.2 1,889 
Table 5.5:  Descriptive Statistics of Cushion Hypothesis Variables (Group 6) 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max N 
Finhelp 2.971 2 3.031 0 40 1,889 
Helpatt 4.0527 4 0.938 1 7 1,889 
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Figure 5.3: The distribution of Finhelp variable 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Financial Support across Countries 
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5.5 Empirical results 
Before discussing the findings for the main tests as explained in the methodology section 5.3, 
the overall cultural value of each five investigated countries will be revealed using both 
Singelis’s SCS and Hofstede’s cultural classification. As noticed in Section 5.2.1, the 
Hofstede’s cultural conceptualization is critiqued as simplistic and obsolete, so that it may no 
longer a robust proxy for individual culture. Consequently, the current study measures culture 
at individual level using the Singelis’s (1994) SCS to tackle these limitations. Basically, the 
study initially tests for the aggregating cultural values of the five countries using the Singelis’s 
SCS and subsequently, the cultural classification based on the results is compared with that of 
Hofstede (2001).   
5.5.1 Cultural values of investigated countries (Hofstede versus Singelis) 
This section measures the general cultural values of the five tested countries using the Singelis’s 
(1994) SCS, and accordingly classifies their cultures based on the obtained results. 
Subsequently, this Singelis’s cultural classification will be compared to the cultural 
classification of Hofstede (2001). Table 5.6 reports the cultural value of each country using 
both measures. 
According to Hofstede, the US and the UK are categorised as individualistic countries with the 
highest individualism indexes in the world. On the other hand, the remaining countries, 
Singapore, Vietnam, and China, are collectivistic countries that exhibit the lowest individualism 
indexes in the world. The Hofstede’s cultural indexes for the five countries are presented in the 
upper panel of Table 5.6. 
Alternatively, the cultural classification of these countries is classified using the individual level 
using Singelis’s SCS. As explained in the previous Section 5.3.1, each individual’s cultural 
value is denoted COL_IDV (𝐶𝑂𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  - 𝐼𝐷𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅). To derive the culture of a country, the mean cultural 
value of all individuals from each country (𝐶𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝐷𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦) is tested to determine whether it 
is statistically different from zero using an independent sample t-test. If the 𝐶𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝐷𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 is 
not statistically different from zero, the country is classified as ‘culturally neutral’. In contrast, 
if the 𝐶𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝐷𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 is statistically positive, the country is classified as collectivism 
dominance, and otherwise, individualism dominance.  
According to the statistical result (the lower panel of Table 5.6), 𝐶𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝐷𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 is found to 
be statistically significant at the 1% critical level, which is negative in the UK, the US, and 
Singapore (𝐶𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝐷𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 = -0.3537, -0.3758 and -0.1353, respectively), and positive in 
Vietnam (𝐶𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝐷𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 = 0.2482). China, on the other hand, its mean cultural value is not 
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significantly different from zero (𝐶𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝐷𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 = 0.0116, n.s). Similar to Hofstede (2001), 
Singelis’s SCS also classifies the US and the UK as favouring individualism, and Vietnam as 
favouring collectivism. However, different from what Hofstede found, Singapore is dominantly 
individualistic, and China exhibits a cultural neutrality. 
Table 5.6: Cultural Value of Each Investigated Country 
HOFSTEDE SCALE 
Country Individualism Index Cultural classification 
The UK 90 Individualism 
The US 91 Individualism 
Singapore 25 Collectivism 
Vietnam 20 Collectivism 
China 20 Collectivism 
SINGELIS SCALE (COL_IDV) 
Country N Mean t-statistic Cultural classification 
The UK 387 -0.3537a -6.31*** Individualism Dominance  
The US 413 -0.3758b -7.06*** Individualism Dominance 
Singapore 382 -0.1353a,b,c -3.63*** Individualism Dominance 
Vietnam 328 0.2482a,b,c,d 5.33*** Collectivism Dominance 
China 379 0.0116a,b,d 0.38 Culture Neutrality 
F-value (DF = 4) 30.57***  
Note: Two country groups with the same superscripts down each column (comparing only with the first 
country group assigned with the superscript) indicate that their means are significantly different at the 0.05 
level using Bonferroni T-test. 
*, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Although the cultures of China and Singapore are different from that stated by Hofstede, the 
results are not surprising as they were well documented in literature. Many studies have 
mentioned about the cultural transformation of China from collectivism to individualism, which 
is referred to as the individualisation of China (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2010). Yan (2010), 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2010), Cao (2009), Steele and Lynch (2013), and Zeng and 
Greenfield (2015) indicated the ongoing transition of Chinese culture from collectivism to 
individualism as a result of its drastic economic growth that has averaged 10 percent annually 
since the early 1990s, and its prominent economic reforms in 1978. According to Hofstede 
(2001), the higher the wealth and economic growth, the more likely the country is to be an 
individualism as poverty makes individuals become independent of their group both financially 
and mentally. Besides economic development, other reasons have been suggested by these 
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studies for the rapid pace of China’s cultural shift, namely, urbanisation, ecological change, 
globalisation, education, mass media, and change in social pattern.   
In the case of Singapore, due to a wide spectrum of its cultures, Singapore is epitomised as a 
multicultural country (Chan, 2013). The country comprises the Chinese (74.3%), Malays 
(13.3%), Indian (9.1%) and others (3.3%) (Ortiga, 2015). Over the last 50 years, Singapore has 
been one of the world’s fastest growing countries economically. It has been grown incredibly 
from a GDP per capita of US$320 to US$60,000, making it now the sixth richest country in the 
world (Thoughtco, 2017). For similar reason with the transition of China’s culture, as well as 
its dominant Chinese population, it is plausible for Singapore to be dominated by individualism.  
The statistical results are presented in the following sections and are structured through three 
main parts as stated in the Methodology section 5.3. Firstly, the ‘age-culture-FRT’ association 
in section 5.5.2 reveals the findings for the examination of cross-cultural difference in FRT 
through RP and/or RAtt; and whether age influences such cross-cultural differences if found to 
be present. The main statistical method employed for this part is the model-based mosaic 
analysis. However, the results of the mosaic bivariate analysis will be presented first as the 
baseline.  
5.5.2 Age-culture-FRT 
5.5.2.1 National analysis - Weber and Hsee’s (1998) approach: Using country as culture’s 
proxy and mosaic bivariate analysis 
The analysis starts with an exact replication of the approach Weber and Hsee (1998) used to 
examine the cross-cultural difference in FRT through RP and/or RAtt (Section 5.3.2.1). 
Basically, they employed the mosaic bivariate analysis (ANOVA and Bonferonni t-test) to 
compare FRT, RP, and RAtt of individuals from different countries. In other words, they use 
country as a proxy for culture (based on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions). Therefore, the 
interpretations of the obtained results are based on the cultural classification of each country 
defined by Hofstede (2001)38. Specifically, this section compares the FRT, RP and RAtt of 
collectivistic countries (China, Vietnam, and Singapore) with those of individualistic countries 
(the US and the UK).  
Table 5.7 provides summary of the mean judgements for willingness to pay (WTP), perceived 
riskiness (subjective RP), and risk attitude (RAtt) of individuals as a function of their country 
of nationality. The results from ANOVA imply that individual FRT and RP are significantly 
different across the five countries of investigation at the critical level of 1% (F-value(1) = 20.36, 
                                                 
38 Singelis’s (1994) cultural measure is taken out of the picture at this stage.  
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F-value(2) = 5.09). Accordingly, it ascertains that country lies at source of differences in 
individual FRT and RP. These findings prove the importance of the multivariate analysis, in 
which country variables can be controlled for, to better distinguish the cultural effect from the 
country effect at the later stage.  
Based on the superscripts which mark the results of the Bonferroni t-tests, the mean WTP of 
Vietnam, the most collectivistic country, (WTPVietnam = $1,887) is the highest among the five 
countries, which is statistically significantly higher than that of the UK, the US and Singapore, 
three individualistic countries. Concurrently, its mean value of RP (RPVietnam = 50.95) is the 
lowest and significantly lower than the UK and Singapore. These results imply that Vietnamese 
individuals exhibit the highest level of FRT, which may be attributed by their lowest level of 
RP. 
Following Vietnam, China clinches the second place in terms of its second highest mean WTP 
(WTPChina = $1775) and second lowest mean RP (RPChina = 53.053), both of which are 
significantly different from those of the UK, the US, and Singapore. On the other hand, the 
remaining three countries exhibit significantly lower FRT with significantly higher levels of 
RP when compared to China and Vietnam. However, their FRT and RP are not significantly 
different from each other.  
Overall, the results indicate that the collectivistic country group comprising of Vietnam, China, 
and Singapore, exhibit higher levels of FRT due to their lower levels of RP (WTP = $1887, 
$1775, and $1105; RP = 50, 53, and 57; respectively) when compared to their individualistic 
counterparts, namely, the US and the UK (WTP = $1011 and $886; RP = 54 and 55; 
respectively). These findings are consistent with those of Weber and Hsee (1998). 
Besides the significant cross-national differences in FRT and RP, individual RAtt is also found 
to vary as an effect of country (Table 5.7, Columns 3 and 4). The results are statistically 
significant at 5% critical level or below, which are consistent across both measures of RAtt (F-
value(3) = 7.29 and F-value(4) = 2.51). Nevertheless, the Bonferroni t-test results imply different 
stories, which are not consistent across different RAtt measures.  
With regards to cross-cultural differences in RAtt, the results are displayed in Table 5.7, 
Columns 3 and 4. Assuming that RP is constant across individuals and thus, objective measures 
of RAtt (bVAR) are employed, Vietnamese and Chinese respondents exhibit significantly higher 
positive attitudes toward financial risk when compared to the others. Using comparative words, 
it can be said that Vietnamese and Chinese individuals do not hate financial risk as much as 
respondents from the other three countries. Indeed, according to the mean objective RAtt 
113 
 
(bVAR), all respondents of the five tested countries are risk-seeking as their mean RAs are 
positive. Therefore, the finding indicates that with the same level of risk perceived (variance), 
Vietnamese and Chinese individuals like financial risk more than other respondents from 
Singapore, Britain and America. Hence, they are willing to pay more for the financial options 
(higher FRT).  
However, as the main underlying assumption of constant RP across individuals has been 
verified to be violated (Table 5.7, Column 2), the objective RAtt (bVAR) is not incorporated in 
the picture. Consequently, the subjective RA (bVAR) are taken into account (Column 4), which 
depicts a different picture. Firstly, the negative mean bR of the five countries (all except the US) 
indicates that the majority of respondents are risk-averse instead of being risk-seeking as 
objective RAtt suggests. Secondly, although ANOVA analysis provides a significant F-value 
at 5% level, no significant pair-wise difference is found when the cut-off significant level of 
the Bonferroni t-test is applied. This inherently indicates that country may not be a factor that 
influences individuals’ risk attitudes (RAtt). 
Table 5.7: Mean Judgements of Willingness-to-Pay, Subjective Risk Perception, 
and Risk Attitude as A Function Of Respondents’ Country 
Country 
Sample 
Size (N) 
WTP 
(1) 
Risk 
Perception 
(2) 
Objective 
RAtt - bVAR 
(3) 
Subjective 
RAtt - bR  
(4) 
The UK 387 885.764a 55.373a 0.000323a -15.487 
The US 413 1011.062b 53.968 0.000315b 1.244 
Singapore 382 1105.004c 57.104b 0.000192c -31.234 
Vietnam 328 1887.159a,b,c 50.950a,b 0.000760a,b,c -17.020 
China 379 1775.072a,b,c 53.053b 0.000444 -23.031 
F-Value (DF = 4) 20.36*** 5.09*** 7.29*** 2.51** 
Note: Two country groups with the same superscripts (comparing only with the first country group assigned 
with the superscript) down each column indicate that their means are significantly different at the 0.05 level 
using Bonferroni T-test. 
*, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
To sum up, with the Weber and Hsee’s (1998) approach, the whole cultural picture is the same 
as theirs and other studies39 such that cross-cultural difference in FRT are associated by cross-
cultural difference in RP but not RAtt. Furthermore, according to Hofstede individualism index, 
                                                 
39 Bontempo et al. (1997); Hsee and Weber (1999); and Weber et al. (1998); Fan and Xiao (2006) and Statman 
(2010) 
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it is found that collectivistic societies (Singapore, China, and Vietnam) are more risk tolerant 
owing to their lower RP when compared to their individualistic counterparts (the UK and the 
US), whilst individual RAtt across these countries is relatively the same. Consequently, as the 
current study employs the same FRT experimental task, the same measures of FRT, RP and 
RAtt, and the same statistical approach, the same findings are obtained. It implies that the data 
obtained in this study is comparable to that of Weber and Hsee (1998). Referring back to the 
reduction of 12 investment options to six investment options in the FRT experimental task 
(Section 2.4.1), this data’s comparability implies that the research can be conducted sufficiently 
with the adjustment. 
5.5.2.2 Mosaic bivariate analysis:  Individual level of culture analysis (Singelis’s SCS) 
In this section, results of another bivariate test is revealed. With this method, the mosaic 
bivariate analysis is still employed. However, instead of measuring culture at the national level 
(Weber and Hsee’s approach), the Singelis’s SCS is used to measure culture at the individual 
level. As discussed in Section 5.2.1.2 regarding the drawbacks of the national analysis using 
Hofstede’s cultural classification, this study mainly focuses on the individual analysis using the 
Singelis’s SCS, which can tackle those limitations. Therefore, the results obtained from the 
national analysis in the previous section (Section 5.5.2.1) is used as the baseline to compare the 
results with those of Weber and Hsee (1998), who employs the national analysis as the main 
statistical methodology. 
Table 5.8 reveals mean values of individual FRT (column 1), RP (column 2), and RAtt (columns 
3 and 4) across cultures. According to the ANOVA results, the mean values of WTP and RP 
are significantly different as a function of culture (F-valueWTP = 3.21, p-value = 0.05; F-valueRP 
= 4.80, p-value = 0.01). In other words, members of different cultures tend to exhibit different 
levels of FRT and RP.  
According to the Bonferroni t-test, individuals, who are dominated by the collectivism 
continuum, are significantly more risk tolerant in the financial context than those who are 
dominated by individualistic continuum (WTPCOL = $1430 versus WTPIND = $1191). On the 
other hand, individuals who are neither dominated by collectivism nor individualism on average 
are less risk tolerant than those that are dominated by collectivism, but are more risk tolerant 
than individualistic dominance individuals (WTPN = $1376). However, the pair-wise 
differences between them are not statistically significant. Specifically, the FRT of culturally 
neutral individuals are statistically similar to those of individualistic and collectivistic 
individuals. 
115 
 
Cross-cultural differences in one’s RP are also found to be statistically significant at 1% critical 
level (F-value = 4.80). This indicates that the cross-cultural difference in FRT are associated 
with cross-cultural differences in RP. The Bonferroni t-test further reveals a significantly lower 
risk perceived by collectivistic members relatively to those perceived by individualistic 
members (RPCOL = 52.74 versus RPIND = 55.6, p-value < 0.05). Culturally neutral individuals 
perceive lower risk than individualistic members, but higher risk than do collectivistic members 
(RPN = 53.2). Similar to FRT results, the differences in RP between culturally neutral 
individuals and those of individualism/collectivism are not statistically significant.  
The story thus far depicts that since collectivistic individuals perceive smaller financial risk 
than individualistic individuals, they are more willing to engage in risky financial options 
(higher FRT). Hence, cross-cultural differences in RP are the reason for cross-cultural 
difference in FRT. However, with regards to the mean RAtt of individuals with different 
cultural values, the ANOVA results for both measures of RAtt show that there are no significant 
cross-cultural difference in individual RAtt due to the nonsignificant F-value (F-value(3) = 0.59; 
F-value(4) = 1.23). This implies that attitudes towards the financial risk of individuals with 
different collectivism-individualism values are relatively similar. Therefore, the obtained cross-
cultural differences in FRT may be better explained by cross-cultural differences in RP, but not 
by the cross-cultural differences in RAtt.  
Table 5.8: Mean Judgements of Willingness-to-Pay, Subjective Risk Perception, and 
Risk Attitudes as A Function Of Respondents’ Cultural Value 
Culture 
Sample 
Size (N) 
WTP 
(1) 
Risk Perception 
(2) 
Objective 
RAtt - bVAR 
(3) 
Subjective 
RAtt - bR  
(4) 
Collectivism D. 802 1430.468a 52.735a 0.000438 -23.015 
Individualism D. 934 1191.6971a 55.585a 0.000364 -12.808 
Culture N. 153 1376.8045 53.207 0.000355 -8.505 
ANOVA F-test  3.21** 4.80*** 0.59 1.23 
Note: Two country groups with the same superscripts (comparing only with the first country group assigned with 
the superscript) down each column indicate that their means are significantly different at the 0.05 level using 
Bonferroni T-test. 
*, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
To conclude, because of a number of limitations of the national-level of culture analysis using 
Hofstede’s cultural dimension (Weber and Hsee’s approach), this study mainly employs the 
individual-level of culture analysis using the Singelis’s SCS. With the use of mosaic bivariate 
analysis and the measure of culture at individual level, this study updated the cultural values of 
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respondents at the time of research. With this improvement in the measure of culture, the 
findings remain in line with those obtained by Weber and Hsee (1998). However, due to a 
number of drawbacks of the bivariate analysis as discussed in Section 3.4.1, the main findings 
of this study are mainly drawn on the results produced by multivariate analysis. 
5.5.2.3 Model-based mosaic multivariate analysis - Individual level of culture analysis 
This section presents the regression results of five hierarchical model variations for each 
mosaic. The first model variation contains only variable group 1 (main variables) to capture the 
main cultural effect and the moderating effect of age. The second model variation inserts 
variable group 5 to control for the specific country effect. The third model variation, on the 
other hand, does not control for country effect but instead taking into account the demographic, 
socioeconomic, and attitudinal factors measured by variable groups 2, 3, and 4. The fourth 
variation only controls for variable group 6 that are related to cushion hypothesis of Weber and 
Hsee (1998, 1999). Lastly, the fifth model variation is the full model that contains all variables 
from the classified five groups listed in Table 5.1 (Section 5.3.2.3). 
The full results for the fifth variation of the estimating regression models are presented in the 
appendix section (Appendix 11-13). These appendix tables contain results for both uncentered 
and centered regressions, along with the corresponding variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all 
variables to test for multicollinearity. Furthermore, the results for heteroscedasticity, normality 
of error terms, and endogeneity can be found in Appendix 9 (Part 2) and Appendix 10 (Part 2), 
respectively. Overall, the results indicate that the estimating OLS models of this study do not 
have endogeneity problem but are subject to heteroscedasticity and non-normality issues. To 
tackle these issues, as discussed in Section 3.4.2, the mean-centering robust standard error 
approach is employed. 
Mosaic 1: Age influences the cross-cultural difference in RP 
 
 
 
Table 5.9 displays the results for mosaic 1, which identify whether members of different 
cultures perceive financial risk differently. The significantly negative coefficients of culture 
variable (COL_IDV) are consistently obtained for all five model variations at 1% level (βA = -
1.88, βB = -1.61, βC = -1.59, βD = -1.57, βE = -1.36). It indicates that more collectivistic 
individuals perceive the riskiness of the same investment option as lower. Furthermore, this 
cross-cultural difference in RP is not influenced by one’s age as the coefficients of the 
H4: More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly lower RP than less collectivistic 
and individualistic individuals.   
H8: Age significantly positively affects the cross-cultural difference in RP 
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interaction terms between culture and age (COL_IDV*Age) are not statistically significant (βA 
= 0.010, βB = 0.017, βC = 0.015, βD = 0.013, βE = 0.016; n.s). The results obtained for both H4 
and H8 conclude that the more collectivistic an individual is, the lower the risk they perceive; 
and this lower level of perceived risk does not change with age. In other words, the difference 
in RP between collectivism and individualism stays constant across age. The increased adjusted 
R-square values signify the enhancing explanatory power of the model as more independent 
variables are incorporated. The full model variation (E) has the strongest explanatory power as 
its adjusted R-square is the highest among the five (Adj. R-square(E) = 0.0608).  
Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Appendix 11 provides the full results for the fifth model variation (E) of mosaic 1. When the 
uncentered method is employed, culture is found to have no effect on RP (Appendix 11, β = -
4.908, t-value = -0.95, n.s). However, the variable’s VIF value raises a serious concern of 
nonessential multicollinearity40 (Appendix 11, VIFCOL_IDV = 111.58). To tackle the issue, mean-
centering method is used, which has effectively reduced the VIF value to 1.2, and cultural effect 
becomes statistically significant at 1% critical level (βCOL_IDV = -1.356, t-value = -2.71). 
According to partial-eta square results, culture is one of the foremost factors (after the SRA, 
economic expectation, and unemployment variables) that accounts for a large proportion of 
variance in individual RP (Appendix 11, η2partial = 0.0082). 
                                                 
40 More explanation on the issue, see Section 3.4.2.1 
Table 5.9:  Determinants of Financial Risk Perception. Dependent Variable: RP 
Mosaic 1  Centered-score Regression (Robust Standard Errors) 
Independent 
Variables 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Intercept 54.63787*** 53.66915*** 41.23775*** 54.69340*** 42.11438*** 
COL_IDV -1.88150*** -1.60992*** -1.59486*** -1.56595*** -1.35612*** 
COL_IDV*Age 0.00992 0.01742 0.01509 0.01267 0.01589 
Age 0.09222*** 0.09565*** 0.10744** 0.07610** 0.08882* 
Age2 -0.00503 -0.00472 -0.00548 -0.00551 -0.00573 
Group 2 
NO NO YES NO YES 
Group 3 
NO NO YES NO YES 
Group 4 
NO NO YES NO YES 
Group 5 
NO YES NO NO YES 
Group 6 
NO NO NO YES YES 
Sample size 
1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-Square 
0.0088 0.0153 0.0520 0.0235 0.0608 
118 
 
There are a number of other statistically significant determinants of RP (Appendix 11). These 
are the respondents’ age (βAge = 0.089), wealth as a moderator of age effect on RP (βAge*LnW = 
-0.031), unemployment (βUnemp = 4.989), reported general risk attitude (βRRA = 1.575), and the 
respondents’ expectation on the economy (βEcoexp = 1.042). These determinants of RP are 
consistent with those that were attained in the first empirical study (Section 4.5.2.2). 
Additionally, it is found that if one has access to greater social financial support and are more 
willing to ask for help, their RP significant reduce at 5% level or below (Appendix 11, βFinhelp 
= -0.444 and βHelpatt = -1.105).  
Mosaic 2: Age influences the cross-cultural differences in RAtt 
 
 
 
Mosaic 1 indicates that individuals with different cultural values exhibit different RP. 
According to the explanation provided in Section 3.4.3 concerning the most appropriate 
measure of RAtt, mosaic 1 has proven the absence of the constant RP across individuals. 
Consequently, the objective measure of RAtt (bVAR) is excluded from the picture.   
Table 5.10 displays the results for mosaic 2. When the subjective RAtt (bR) is employed as the 
main measure of RAtt, the coefficient of the culture variable (COL_IDV) across all model 
variations are statistically nonsignificant (βA = -3.148, βB = -1.784, βC = -4.009, βD = -2.324, βE 
= -2.263, n.s). Hence, it can be concluded that culture does not influence individual RAtt. In 
other words, individual’s attitude towards financial risk is constant across different cultural 
milieus.  
Whilst culture shows no impact on individual RAtt, the estimates of the interaction terms 
between culture and age across the five variations are positively significant at the marginal level 
(βA = 0.3920, βB = 0.4106, βC = 0.3945, βD = 0.4273, βE = 0.4294). This indicates the significant 
moderating effect of age on the cross-cultural differences in RAtt. Nevertheless, there are no 
cross-cultural differences in RAtt being observed in the first place. The interpretation of age as 
a moderator is ambiguous. Specifically, as the significant positive moderating effect of age (βE 
= 0.4294) would make the nonsignificant negative cultural effect of RAtt (βE = -2.263) become 
even more nonsignificant, hence, the moderating effect of age is rejected. 
Appendix 12 presents the full results for the fifth model variation (E) of mosaic 2 in which all 
variables are included. The almost zero adjusted R-square values of all model variations imply 
H5: More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly higher RAtt than less 
collectivistic and individualistic individuals.   
H9: Age significantly negatively affects the cross-cultural difference in RAtt 
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that virtually none of the explanatory factors significantly influence individual RAtt. This 
finding supports the stable nature of individual RAtt that is consistent with those obtained using 
the mosaic bivariate analysis and with the extant studies41.  
Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Mosaic 3: Age influences the cross-cultural difference in FRT 
 
 
 
The first two mosaics indicate that individuals with different cultural values exhibit similar 
attitudes toward financial risk. In other words, there are no differences in the degree to which 
collectivistic and individualistic individuals like/dislike financial risk. However, more 
collectivistic individuals see the riskiness of the same investment option as smaller than their 
individualistic counterparts. Together with these two mosaics, the third mosaic determines 
whether the cross-cultural differences in RP cause the cross-cultural difference in FRT.  
                                                 
41 Weber and Hsee, 1998 and 1999; Hsee and Weber, 1999; Weber et al., 1998; Bontempo et al., 1997. 
Table 5.10: Determinants of Subjective RAtt. Dependent Variable: bR 
Mosaic 2 Centered-score Regression (Robust Standard Errors) 
Subjective RAtt (bR) 
Independent 
Variables 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Intercept -18.9788*** -24.6834*** -27.8708 -18.3524*** -38.8625 
COL_IDV -3.1476 -1.7838 -4.0090 -2.3236 -2.2631 
COL_IDV*Age 0.3920*** 0.4106* 0.3945* 0.4273* 0.4294* 
Age 0.0761 0.0806 0.1214 0.0946 0.2029 
Age2 0.0131 0.0123 0.0235 0.0119 0.0195 
Group 2 
NO NO YES NO YES 
Group 3 
NO NO YES NO YES 
Group 4 
NO NO YES NO YES 
Group 5 
NO YES NO NO YES 
Group 6 
NO NO NO YES YES 
Sample size 
1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-Square 
0 0.0026 0.0003 0 0 
H6: More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly higher level of FRT than less 
collectivistic and individualistic individuals. 
H10: Age significantly negatively affects the cross-cultural difference in FRT 
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Furthermore, in spite of the cross-cultural difference in risk perception, such cross-cultural 
differences are not influenced by age. In other words, the differences in RP between the two 
cultures remain constant as individuals age. Nevertheless, it is still possible that age moderates 
the cross-cultural difference in FRT, but the moderating age effect does not operate through the 
channels of RP or RAtt. 
According to Table 5.11, all model variations for mosaic 3 support the same finding with the 
bivariate tests (Section 5.5.2.1 and 5.5.2.2). Specifically, individuals with higher values of 
collectivism are willing to pay more to engage with the investment options than the less 
collectivistic or individualistic individuals. In other words, collectivistic individuals are more 
risk tolerant than individualistic individuals. All positive coefficients of the culture variable 
(COL_IDV) are statistically significant at 1% critical level (βA = 0.330, βB = 0.303, βC = 0.292, 
βD = 0.308, βE = 0.293). This finding is consistent with the majority of previous cultural 
studies42. Combining all three mosaics obtained for the three hypotheses (H4 – H6), the study 
found the same stories as Weber and Hsee (1998). Particularly, collectivistic individuals are 
more risk tolerant than individualistic individuals as they perceive the same investment as less 
risky, though the attitudes toward financial risk are constant across cultures.  
Intriguingly, despite the significant cross-cultural differences in FRT, such differences are 
found to be influenced by one’s age. Evidently, the interaction term between culture and age 
(COL_IDV*Age) is significantly negative at 1% level across five variations (Table 5.11). This 
indicates that as age decreases the increased FRT is exhibited by more collectivistic individuals. 
Consequently, as an illustration, the finding implies that a 20-year-old collectivistic individual 
is more risk tolerant when compared to a 20-year-old individualistic individual. Nevertheless, 
the difference in FRT of those two 20-years-old individuals decreases across age (𝐹𝑅𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐿
20𝑦𝑟𝑠
 - 
𝐹𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐷
20𝑦𝑟𝑠
 > 𝐹𝑅𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐿
50𝑦𝑟𝑠
 - 𝐹𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐷
50𝑦𝑟𝑠
). The results also reveal that the model’s explanation power 
sustainably improves as more factors are controlled for. Particularly, the adjusted R2 increases 
from 2.51% (variation A) to 10.61% (variation E) after all controlling variables are included. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
42 See Section 5.2.2 for details of these studies: Weber and Hsee, 1998, 1999; Hsee and Weber, 1999; Weber et 
al., 1998; Bontempo et al., 1997; Fan and Xiao, 2006; Statman, 2010; and Wang and Fischbeck, 2010. 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Appendix 13 reveals the full results for the fifth variation (E) of mosaic 3. Firstly, it is important 
to take a note of the pure-effect of age on FRT. All model variations indicate significant 
negative age effect at 1% critical level (βA = -0.021, βB = -0.022, βC = -0.032, βD = -0.017, βE 
= -0.027). However, variation model E, which is claimed to possess the strongest explanatory 
power, provides a marginally significant positive estimate of the polynomial term Age2 (β = 
0.0008, p-value = 0.1). This implies a non-linear influence of age on FRT such that FRT 
decreases initially and subsequently increases at one point. Based on the center-score regression 
panel of Appendix 13, all statistically significant factors are incorporate into a function of FRT. 
The study indicates the minimum stationary point of age is 101 years old, after which the level 
of FRT will increase (Detailed calculation is presented in Appendix 14). As the sample’s age 
ranges from 19 to 65 years old, the general negative age effect is still valid, yet at a decreasing 
rate, as depicted in Figure 5.5. 
Table 5.11:  Determinants of Financial Risk Tolerance. Dependent Variable: LnWTP 
Mosaic 3 Centered-score Regression (Robust Standard Errors) 
Independent 
Variables 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Intercept 5.292*** 5.759*** 5.024*** 5.287*** 5.224*** 
COL_IDV 0.330*** 0.303*** 0.292*** 0.308*** 0.293*** 
COL_IDV*Age -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
Age -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.032*** -0.017*** -0.027*** 
Age2 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0006 0.00006 0.0008* 
Group 2 
NO NO YES NO YES 
Group 3 
NO NO YES NO YES 
Group 4 
NO NO YES NO YES 
Group 5 
NO YES NO NO YES 
Group 6 
NO NO NO YES YES 
Sample size 
1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-Square 
0.0251 0.0330 0.0758 0.0646 0.1061 
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Additionally, when the uncentered method is employed, the VIFs of the multiplicative terms 
and their components are very high (Appendix 13, VIFs > 10) indicating serious 
multicollinearity. The problem has been effectively alleviated using mean-centering method. 
Furthermore, the partial eta-square (η2partial) indicates that the four most important determinants 
of one’s FRT that are significant at 5%, or below, and account for the highest proportion of 
variance in FRT, are wealth, culture, self-reported risk aversion (SRA), and availability of 
financial help, in descending order with η2partial values of 0.0239, 0.0182, 0.0136, and 0.0126, 
respectively (Appendix 13). 
5.5.2.4 Summary of the Age-Culture-FRT findings 
Combining all three mosaics together, the full picture depicts that individuals exhibit similar 
attitudes toward financial risk across different cultures. However, with the same investment 
option, more collectivistic individuals perceive the option as less risky. As a result, because of 
their lower risk perception, they are more willing to get a chance to engage in that investment 
by offering a higher price. In other words, more collectivistic individuals are more risk tolerant 
than less collectivistic or individualistic individuals. Nevertheless, the increased FRT exhibited 
by collectivism reduces over the life stages. In fact, collectivism is still more willing to engage 
in the investment than individualism, but such stronger willingness is not as much as the 
younger individuals are. Hence, the FRT gap between collectivism and individualism is 
narrowed down across age. 
Moving away from the culture-FRT-age findings, the study investigates the underlying 
rationale for these findings. As the story progresses, the subsequent ‘Effect of cushion’ section 
presents the findings for the clarification of the cushion hypothesis advanced by Weber and 
Hsee (1998). using three different statistical approach: bivariate analysis (Weber and Hsee’s 
Figure 5.5: Pure age effects on Financial Risk Tolerance 
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approach), the four-step mediation model of Baron and Kenny (1986), and the structural 
equation modelling (SEM).  
5.5.3 Effect of the cushion (The cushion hypothesis) 
This section provides the results for the investigation of the cushion hypothesis as an 
explanation for the cross-cultural differences in FRT through cross-cultural difference in RP. 
Note that as cross-cultural similarity in RAtt was obtained (Mosaic 2, Section 5.5.2.3), the 
second mosaic is taken out of the picture. Particularly, the cross-cultural differences in FRT are 
not associated with cross-cultural differences in RAtt, no mediating effect of cushion (Finhelp) 
is expected. The effect of cushion is examined using three different statistical approaches: 
bivariate analysis (Weber and Hsee’s approach), the four-step mediation model of Baron and 
Kenny (1986), and the structural equation modelling (SEM). Details of these methods are 
presented in the Methodology section 5.3.3. 
5.5.3.1  Bivariate analysis 
Weber and Hsee (1998) conjectured the cushion hypothesis and subsequently, Hsee and Weber 
(1999) empirically proved that members of collectivistic culture have greater access to financial 
support than do their individualistic counterparts. When their method is employed, the same 
findings are obtained in this study. The results of ANOVA analysis presented in Table 5.12 
reveal significant differences in social contact (contact) and financial support availability 
(Finhelp) across culture at 1% critical level (F-valueContact = 6.30 and F-valueFinhelp = 8.67). 
Subsequently, Bonferonni adjusted t-test reveals that the mean values of social contact and 
financial support of individuals from a collectivistic dominant culture are significantly higher 
than those of individuals froms a individualistic dominant culture (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅COL = 8.55 versus 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅IDV = 7.48 and 𝐹𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ COL = 3.30 versus 𝐹𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ IDV  = 2.69). In brief, supporting the 
cushion hypothesis, the findings imply that collectivistic individuals not only keep more social 
contacts but also have more financial support available in case of financial failure and difficulty 
than individualistic ones.  
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Table 5.12: Mean Judgements of Social Network and Attitudes Toward 
Help As A Function Of Respondents’ Culture 
SINGELIS Contact Finhelp 
Collectivism Dominance 8.5461a 3.2968a 
Individualism Dominance 7.4786a 2.6916a 
Culture Neutrality 7.7255 2.9739 
ANOVA F-test 6.30*** 8.67*** 
Note: Two age groups with the same superscripts (comparing only with the first country group assigned 
with the superscript) down each column indicate that their means are significantly different at the 0.05 
level using Bonferroni T-test. 
*, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The following sections will provide results of the two additional models. Notably, as the cross-
cultural difference in FRT is associated mainly with the cross-cultural difference in RP but not 
with the cross-cultural difference in RAtt, individual risk attitude (RAtt) is excluded from the 
model sketched in Figure 5.1 (Mediation model 1) and Figure 5.2 (Mediation model 2). 
5.5.3.2 Mediation model 1: The four-step mediation model (Baron and Kenny, 1986) 
Firstly, the study investigates the mediating effect of financial support (Finhelp) on cross-
cultural differences in RP. Table 5.13 presents the results of the four-step mediation approach. 
In the first three steps, statistically significant effects of culture on RP (path c, βCOL_IDV = -
1.5354, p-value = 0.01), financial support on RP (path b, βFinhelp = -0.3305, p-value = 0.01), and 
culture on financial support (path a, βCOL_IDV = 0.1412, p-value = 0.05), are obtained. This 
validates the existence of the mediation effect. In the last regression, when both culture and 
financial support variables are included, the cultural effect reduces from βc = -1.5354 to βc’ = -
1.4917 yet remains statistically significant at the 1% level. Consequently, the partial mediating 
effect of financial support on RP is supported. In other words, more collectivistic individuals 
perceive lower financial risk partly because they have access to more financial support from 
their social network. 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Thus far, it has been found that individuals with stronger collectivistic values tend to perceive 
smaller risk because they have greater access to financial support. The cushion hypothesis will 
be fully validated if the mediation effect of financial support on cultural difference in FRT is 
also obtained. According to Table 5.14, the first three steps capture statistically significant 
effects of culture (COL_IDV) and financial support (Finhelp) on FRT at 1% critical level (path 
c, β = 0.3328 and path b, β = 0.1041, respectively), and a positive effect of culture on Finhelp 
at 5% level (path a, β = 0.1412). These results support the existence of a significant mediating 
effect of financial support on the cultural differences in FRT. The final step reveals whether the 
mediating effect is full or partial. When both culture and financial support variables are included 
in the regression, the coefficient of culture reduces to 0.3187, but remains statistically 
significant at 1% level (path c’). Therefore, partial mediation is supported. It implies that the 
cultural effect on FRT is partly explained by the greater financial support available to 
collectivistic individuals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.13: Mediation effects of financial support  
decomposed total effect of culture on financial risk perception (RP) 
Mosaic 1 Robust Centered-score Regression  
 Step 1 Step 2 
Step 3 
COL_IDV  Finhelp 
Step 4 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 41.4032*** 42.0155*** 2.8727*** 42.2935*** 
COL_IDV  -1.5354*** NO 0.14116** -1.4917*** 
FinHelp  NO -0.3305*** Dependent variable -0.3099*** 
Controlling 
variables 
YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.0572 0.0547 0.1205 0.0588 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
In conclusion, remaining consistent with the bivariate analysis, the four-step mediation model 
of Baron and Kenny (1986) partly supports the cushion hypothesis such that more collectivistic 
individuals tend to have greater access to financial help, which acts as a cushion when they fall 
‘financially’. Consequently, because of the social buffer, they perceive the same investment as 
less risky, and thus are more risk tolerant when compared to less collectivistic and 
individualistic individuals.  
Thus far, both the Hsee and Weber’s (1999) approach (the bivariate analysis) and the Baron 
and Kenny’s mediation model support the cushion hypothesis conjectured by Weber and Hsee 
(1998). The subsequent section will present the results for another statistical test, the SEM, to 
confirm the hypothesis. 
5.5.3.3 The structural equation modelling (SEM) 
The four-step mediation models tested in Section 5.5.3.2 are combined into one single proposed 
model displayed in Figure 5.2 using SEM (Section 5.3.3.3). The results obtained from these 
two mediation approaches are consistent with each other such that the cushion hypothesis is 
partly supported. Particularly, an individual’s personal cushion is found to play a role in 
mediating the influence of culture on one’s RP, through which the FRT is affected.  
The SEM result is shown in Table 5.15 and graphically depicted in Figure 5.5. Individuals’ 
access to financial support is the proxy for their personal cushion. The significant positive 
relationship between COL_IDV and Finhelp (β = .11, p < .01), and negative relationship 
between Finhelp and RP (β = -.08, p < .01) demonstrate that more collectivistic individuals tend 
to have more access to financial support. Hence, they exhibit lower RP. As a result, the more 
Table 5.14: Mediation effects of financial support  
decomposed total effect of culture on financial risk tolerance (LnWTP) 
Mosaic 3 Robust Centered-score Regression  
 Step 1 Step 2 
Step 3 
COL_IDV  Finhelp 
Step 4 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 5.3282*** 5.1012*** 2.8727*** 5.0418*** 
COL_IDV  0.33275*** NO 0.14116** 0.31868*** 
FinHelp  NO 0.10407*** Dependent variable 0.09968*** 
Controlling 
variables YES YES YES YES 
R-square 0.0850 0.0850 0.1205 0.0950 
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collectivism oriented individuals are more risk tolerant (βRPLnWTP  = .11, p < .01). However, 
culture per se has its own effects on one’s RP either directly or through other channels (β = -
.08, p < .01).  
The SEM results reveal that the cultural effect on one’s financial risk tolerance is fully mediated 
through one’s private cushion and their RP, respectively, as is demonstrated by the insignificant 
beta between COL_IDV and LnWTP. Furthermore, the cushion effect does not directly impact 
one’s risk tolerance (βFinhelpLnWTP = 0.01, n.s). These results indicate that an individual’s RP 
are an important determinant of their FRT as they have fully mediated the effects of both culture 
and cushion on the FRT. As is shown in Table 5.15, the proposed model shows a good fit with 
the data overall: χ2 = 162.5 p < .01, CFI = .95, GFI = 0.97, NFI = 0.95, and RMSEA= 0.292, 
90% confidence interval for RMSEA = (0.25, 0.33). 
Table 5.15: Results of SEM mediation tests 
 β (t-value) 
Path 
 COL_IDV  Finhelp 
 COL_IDV  RP 
 COL_IDV  LnWTP 
 Finhelp  RP 
 Finhelp  LnWTP 
 RP  LnWTP 
Overall fit 
 χ2 
 RMSEA 
 CFI 
 GFI 
 NFI 
 
0.111 (4.987)*** 
-0.078 (-3.410)*** 
0.011 (1.075) 
-0.083 (-3.640)*** 
0.010 (1.005) 
0.114 (10.825)*** 
 
162.491*** 
0.292 
0.951 
0.97 
0.95 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Figure 5.6: The SEM results with significant paths 
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5.5.3.4 Summary of the cushion hypothesis analysis 
To sum up, the cross-cultural differences in financial risk tolerance can be explained by the 
cushion hypothesis advanced by Weber and Hsee (1998, 1999) such that collectivism provides 
greater access to readily available financial support, which cushions individual when they fall. 
The subconscious perception of such support causes ones to see risk as smaller. Consequently, 
collectivistic individuals are more risk tolerant in financial context when compared to 
individualistic individuals.  
This ‘Effect of the cushion’ result chapter mainly explains the cushion hypothesis of Weber and 
Hsee (1998) using the same approach of Hsee and Weber (1999), and two additional statistical 
methods to confirm the result. The next section will explain the results for the ‘shrinkage of 
cushion effect’ as explained in Section 5.3.4. Particularly, in Section 5.5.2 (‘Age-culture-FRT’ 
section), besides confirming the cross-cultural differences in FRT through RP, this study also 
finds that the obtained cross-cultural differences in FRT are narrowed by age, but not through 
either the channel of RP or RAtt. The underlying reason for these findings will be presented in 
the subsequent section. 
5.5.4 Shrinkage of cushion effect 
To recap, this study found that although the higher level of FRT exhibited by more collectivistic 
individuals is reduced across age, the change in cross-cultural differences in FRT do not operate 
through RP or RAtt, but other channels. This section will provide statistical results that justify 
the findings. Particularly, the study finds a significant decrease in the private cushion of 
individuals across age. However, the reduction of individual cushions occurs for both 
collectivism and individualism, yet through different channels. Therefore, the moderating effect 
of age does not significantly influence the cross-cultural differences in RP. The reduction of 
cushion buffer across age will be first examined by the bivariate analysis as discussed in the 
next section.  
5.5.4.1 Bivariate analysis: ANOVA, Bonferroni t-test, and Pearson Correlation Test 
The ANOVA results shown in Table 5.16 indicate significant differences in both financial 
support availability (Finhelp) and financial help attitude (Helpatt) as a function of age at the 
1% critical level (F-valueFinhelp = 6.07 and F-valueHelpatt = 4.78). The mean values of Finhelp 
and Helpatt reveal consistent reductions across the four age groups (𝐹𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = 3.44, 2.93, 2.83, 
and 2.65 respectively; 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 4.16, 4.09, 3.99, and 3.95 respectively). Further to this, the 
Bonferonni adjusted t-test justifies that individuals aged from 40-65 years old (age groups 3 
and 4) have significantly less access to financial support and also have lower attitudes toward 
financial help when compared to younger individuals aged from 18-29 years old. This implies 
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that as age increases, individuals have less access to financial support as well as being less 
willing to ask for financial help from others. 
Table 5.16: Mean Judgements of Social Network and Attitudes toward Help As a 
Function of Respondents’ Age 
Age 
Group 
Respondents’ 
Age 
Sample 
Size (N) 
FinHelp 
(1) 
HelpAtt 
(2) 
1 18-29 492 3.4411a 4.1646a 
2 30-39 486 2.9321 4.0859 
3 40-49 468 2.8269a 3.9915a 
4 50-65 443 2.6456a 3.9565a 
ANOVA F-test 6.07*** 4.78*** 
Note: Two age groups with the same superscripts (comparing only with the first country group assigned with 
the superscript) down each column indicate that their means are significantly different at the 0.05 level using 
Bonferroni T-test. 
*, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
5.5.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Nonetheless, with the bivariate results, this implies that as the financial support availability and 
help attitude decreases as one ages, the FRT of both collectivistic and individualistic individuals 
is reduced. Moreover, as the analysis is applied on the full sample, it cannot be determined 
whether the reduction of cushion occurs in both cultures, or in just one of them. Therefore, as 
discussed in Section 5.3.4.2, multivariate analysis is tested on two sub-samples: individualism 
and collectivism samples.  
Table 5.17 reveals the results for age effects on financial support availability and financial help 
attitude across collectivistic and individualistic dominant cultures. All models fully control for 
variables listed in Table 5.3 (Section 5.3.4.2). Consistent with the conjecture the study 
developed (Section 5.2.3), it is found that financial support, which is readily available for 
collectivism does not change as one ages (β(1) = -0.0227, n.s.), but their attitudes toward help 
significantly decrease (β(1) = -0.0144, p-value = 0.01). In other words, collectivistic individuals 
have a constant access to their financial support across age, but as age increases, they are less 
willing to ask for those help. Such reductions in the willingness to seek for financial help of 
collectivistic individuals damages their perceived cushion. Accordingly, their RP may increase 
with age, and thus their FRT may decrease.  
Nevertheless, age does not moderate the cross-cultural differences in RP as predicted because 
the cushion of individualism also reduces across age. However, this reduction is not associated 
with a reduction in willingness to ask for help, but with the reduction in access to financial help 
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over time. Particularly, the financial support availability for individualism significantly reduces 
across age (β(3) = -0.028, p-value = 0.01) but their attitudes toward financial help stay the same 
as the younger individuals (β(4) = -0.00038, n.s). This change is coherent in individualistic 
society as when the members were young, they stay with their parents as well as maintaining 
close contacts with their relatives (such as uncles, aunts and cousins) and friends. However, as 
they get older, they will live their own life and pay much more focus to their immediate family 
or close relatives (parents and siblings). Therefore, their social circles become smaller reducing 
their access to financial support. On the other hand, their attitudes toward help remain 
unchanged because of the nature of individualism is based on ‘independence’, and thus they are 
not keen on being dependent on others.   
*, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Overall, all the main empirical findings (from the main statistical approach) as explained in this 
section are combined together. It can be concluded that older collectivistic individuals’ access 
to financial supports is the same as the access of the young, but they are less willing to ask for 
help, causing their perceived cushion to be thinner compared to that of the young. As 
conjectured, it may be because of their development in self-conscious emotions (guilt, shame, 
embarrassment and self-esteem) across age. However, simultaneously, the cushion of older 
individualism is also thinner because their access to financial support declines overtime, whilst 
their attitudes toward help is the same with younger individualistic individuals. Consequently, 
although there is a decline in cushion effect (reduction in help attitude) of collectivistic 
individuals across age, the declined cushion also occurs for individualism. Consequently, age 
Table 5.17: Cushion hypothesis for Collectivism and Individualism 
 
Centered-score Regression (Robust Standard Errors) 
Collectivism Individualism 
Independent 
Variables 
Finhelp 
(1) 
Helpatt 
(2) 
Finhelp 
(3) 
Helpatt 
(4) 
Intercept 
3.181*** 3.920*** 3.2285*** 4.1866*** 
Age 
-0.0227 -0.0144*** -0.028*** 0.00038 
Age2 
0.00013 -0.000085 0.00080 0.0004 
Group 2 YES YES YES YES 
Group 3 YES YES YES YES 
Group 4 YES YES YES YES 
Group 5 YES YES YES YES 
Group 6 YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 
802 802 934 934 
Adj. R-Square 
0.1170 0.0669 0.1439 0.0318 
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does not influence the cross-cultural difference in RP, and the moderating effect of age on the 
cross-cultural differences in FRT may go through different channels rather than RP. 
5.6 Robustness test: GMM and Aggregating Bootstrap Estimators 
This section displays the results for the robustness tests of this study as stated in Section 4.6. 
According to the results of GMM and bagging bootstrap method presented in Table 5.18, the 
final story remains unchanged such that individuals with higher collectivistic culture are more 
risk tolerant as they perceive risk lower than those with lower collectivistic score and 
individualistic-dominant score. However, as age increases, the higher levels of FRT reduce but 
the effect does not operate through changes in cross-cultural differences in RP across age. 
Evidence shows that when using a different derivations of RAtt (bagging estimators) and 
different analytical methods: Weber and Hsee’s (1998) bivariate method, multivariate or GMM 
approach, individual risk attitude remains constant across individuals with different ages, 
cultures, genders, and so on as found by previous studies.  
Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5.18: Robustness Tests (GMM) and Aggregating Bootstrapping RAtt (bR_b) 
GMM Regression Bagging Bootstrap 
IVs 
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 1: RP)  
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 2: bR) 
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 3: 
LnWTP) 
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 3: bR_b) 
Intercept 42.114*** -38.86 5.225*** -359.87 
COL_IDV -1.356*** -2.26 0.293*** 39.863 
COL_IDV*Age 0.0159 0.429* -0.015*** 3.645 
Age 0.089* 0.203 -0.027*** 5.736 
Age2 -0.0057 0.0195 0.0008* -0.380 
Group 2 YES YES YES YES 
Group 3 YES YES YES YES 
Group 4 YES YES YES YES 
Group 5 YES YES YES YES 
Group 6 YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-Square 0.0608 0 0.1061 0.0012 
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5.7 Summary and conclusion 
To have a concise view of the whole study, Table 5.19 provides a summary of all hypothesis 
testing results. 
Table 5.19: Empirical Study 2 – Summary of the Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypothesis Expected Effect Result 
H4 
More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly lower RP than 
less collectivistic and individualistic individuals 
Supported 
H5 
More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly higher RAtt 
than less collectivistic and individualistic individuals 
Supported 
H6 
More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly higher level of 
FRT than less collectivistic and individualistic individuals 
Supported 
H7 
More collectivistic individuals have significantly more access to 
financial support than less collectivistic and individualistic 
individuals 
Supported 
H8 
Age significantly positively affects the cross-cultural difference in 
RP 
Not 
Supported 
H9 
Age significantly negatively affects the cross-cultural difference in 
RAtt 
Not 
Supported 
H10 
Age significantly negatively affects the cross-cultural difference in 
FRT 
Supported 
H11 
Older collectivistic individuals have significantly less access to 
financial support than younger collectivistic individuals 
Not 
Supported 
H12 
Older collectivistic individuals are significantly less willing to ask 
for financial help than younger collectivistic individuals 
Supported 
 
The cross-cultural differences in financial risk tolerance (FRT) operating through the channel 
of risk perception (RP) have been examined and assured by a number of extant studies. A 
consistent story has been obtained such that collectivistic individuals have similar risk attitudes, 
but perceive the same investments as less risky when compared to individualistic individuals. 
Although the attitudes toward financial risk are similar across culture, because of the lower risk 
perception exhibited by collectivism, they are more risk tolerant than individualism. 
Subsequently, Weber and Hsee (1998) developed the cushion hypothesis as a conjecture for 
these findings and Hsee and Weber (1999) was the first to empirically test the conjecture. The 
cushion hypothesis asserts that collectivistic individuals have more access to financial support 
from their social networks than individualistic individuals. Larger access to financial support 
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acts as a cushion preventing individuals from falling financially. Therefore, collectivistic 
individuals perceive financial risk to be lower and thus is more tolerant to risk when compared 
to individualistic individuals.  
Enhancing this cross-cultural study in the financial risk tolerance topic, the current study aims 
at examining whether culture independently influences FRT, RP and RAtt. The idea was 
initially formed by the empirical results of Fan and Xiao (2006). According to their statistical 
results, it revealed that the reduction in reported FRT across age is faster with Chinese 
individuals than with Americans. This finding hinted that the cultural effect on FRT, RP and 
RAtt, may be moderated by age. Progressing the idea, drawing on the anthropological and 
psychological literatures, the study conjectures that developments in one’s self-conscious 
emotions as the underlying reason for the reduction in attitude towards financial help of 
collectivism across age. In essence, older collectivistic individuals care more about avoiding 
being put into the states of guilt, shame, embarrassment, and loss of self-esteem than younger 
collectivistic and individualistic individuals. Asking for help from others and letting others 
acknowledge about one’s financial difficulties and failures are likely to expose them to those 
risks. Therefore, the access to financial help of older collectivism may remain unchanged, but 
they are less willing to ask for help. In other words, the cushion of older collectivistic 
individuals is thinner than that of younger collectivistic individuals. As the result, their risk 
perception increases and hence, their risk tolerance becomes smaller. To sum up, the study 
hypothesizes that the reduction of cushion buffer across age of collectivism is the underlying 
reason for the moderating effect of age on cross-cultural difference in FRT through RP and/or 
RAtt. Note that as no study has developed a quantitative measure for these emotions, the 
examination of the conjecture is beyond the scope of this study.  
Before examining the main contribution, the current study re-examined the cross-cultural 
difference in FRT through RP and/or RAtt and the cushion hypothesis. By employing exactly 
the same methodologies, these being the use of country as the proxy for culture based on the 
Hofstede’s classification and the mosaic bivariate analysis, the same findings were obtained. 
Subsequently, the study employed the same statistical method with Hsee and Weber (1999) and 
confirmed the cushion hypothesis. As noticed, this study replicated the study of Weber and 
Hsee (1998) in many aspects: definitions and measure of FRT, RP and RAtt, theoretical 
frameworks, FRT experimental task. By re-examining their contributions and replicating their 
statistical approach, the same findings were obtained indicating that the data of this study is 
comparable to that of Weber and Hsee (1998). This comparability assures the sufficiency of the 
FRT experimental task with the reduction in the number of investment options (twelve to six) 
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presented to the respondents. After the data’s comparability is tested, the study confirmed the 
above results again using the individual-level of culture analysis (Singelis’s SCS) and the main 
statistical test (mosaic multivariate analysis). Especially, the examination of the cushion 
hypothesis was clarified using two additional tests:  the Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation 
model and the structural equation modelling (SEM). In general, the current study assured that 
individuals, who hold stronger collectivistic views have more access to financial support from 
their society, than less collectivistic or individualistic individuals. The greater financial support 
acts as a cushion preventing individuals from getting hurt by financial failure. As a result, with 
the same financial investment, those more collectivistic individuals perceive the investment as 
less risky when compared to less collectivistic and individualistic individuals. With lower risk 
perceptions, more collectivistic individuals are more willing to engage in the investment, 
showing their higher level of risk tolerance. 
Proceeding to the main academic contributions of this study, these are the moderating role of 
age in cross-cultural differences in FRT, RP and RAtt, together with the reduction of individual 
cushion buffer across age.  According to the statistical results, the study’s conjecture for 
reduction in social cushion of  collectivistic individuals is empirically confirmed. Specifically, 
it is found that older collectivistic individuals are less willing to ask for financial help whilst 
their access to help remains unchanged across age. However, such reduction in cushion of 
collectivism does not cause the gap in RP between collectivism and individualism to reduce as 
expected. The reason is that the cushion of individualism also declines with age. Nevertheless, 
the reduction is not associated with reduction in willingness to ask for support but with the 
reduction in access to financial help across age due to the nature of individualism.  
Consequently, as age increases, both social cushions of collectivism and individualism 
decrease, their RP may simultaneously increase. Consequently, age does not influence the 
cross-cultural differences in RP.  
Despite the insignificant influence of age on the cross-cultural difference in RP, age is found to 
reduce the cross-cultural difference in FRT, that is, the FRT gap between individualism and 
collectivism reduces as age increases. The result implies that age does play a significant role in 
determining the financial risk tolerance of individuals from different cultures. However, such 
moderating effect of age may operate directly or through different channels rather than RP. 
Therefore, future research can attempt to address this question.  
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Chapter Six: Empirical Study 3 
From Language to Financial Risk Tolerance through the Channels of Risk 
Perception and Risk Attitude 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at presenting the final empirical study of this thesis, whose principal interest 
is placed on the relationship between language and financial risk tolerance (FRT). Adopting the 
‘cross-cultural’ term used by Weber and Hsee (1998) to explain the difference in FRT across 
cultures, this study refers the difference in FRT across languages as the cross-linguistic 
difference in FRT.  
An extensive effort has been paid on different factors that influences individual FRT. Following 
this research route, the current study aims at investigating one predisposing environmental 
determinant of FRT as suggested in Irwin’s (1993) model (Figure 2.1, Section 2.2.2). This 
proposed factor is the language one speaks. Language may be categorised as an environmental 
predisposing factor because it is not an innate unique trait of an individual, but is affected by 
their social environment (Grable, 2016). A review of literature working on the FRT topic 
reveals that no research has investigated the influence of language on FRT. Therefore, this 
research is the first to hypothesize the association between language and FRT. The inspiration 
of this prediction arises from the study of Chen (2013). He investigated and assured that 
speakers of languages that grammatically associate the future and the present, tend to engage 
in more future-oriented behaviours when compared to speakers of languages that grammatically 
divide the future and the present. They save more, smoke less, practice safer sex and are less 
obese. The current study is built on Chen’s explanation for his linguistic-saving hypothesis. The 
explanation combines the effects of language structure on one’s bias in time perception and a 
simple model of intertemporal choice43.  
As the link between language and FRT is projected, the underlying mechanisms (RP and RAtt) 
are subsequently examined. The motivation of this investigation is the same as that of the first 
empirical study (Chapter 4). Basically, RP and RAtt were theoretically suggested in Irwin’s 
(1993) model as two mediating (precipitating) factors of FRT formation, and were researched 
in numerous empirical studies due to its intervention property. Therefore, it is important to 
examine whether the cross-linguistic difference in FRT (if found to be present) is associated 
with cross-linguistic difference in RP and/or cross-linguistic difference in RAtt.  
                                                 
43 Exponential discounted cash flow (Section 6.2.4) 
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The chapter starts with discussing the differences in the way in which languages encodes time, 
and how these differences influence one’s time perception. Subsequently, the study presents 
Chen’s explanation for his linguistic-saving hypothesis, which is appropriately adjusted and 
applied in this study’s linguistic-FRT hypothesis. The development of the main hypotheses is 
discussed is followed by sections presenting the methodology, empirical results and robustness 
test. After the main empirical hypotheses are tested and concluded, if the cross-linguistic 
difference in FRT is found to operate through RP and/or RAtt, an additional section is 
constructed providing suggestions of a few possible reasons for these findings. Note that the 
current study makes the first step into this research agenda to study the link between language 
and FRT and its underlying mechanisms. Academic researchers can observe and consider 
further extensions of the topic in the future.  
6.2 Literature review 
As mentioned, this study is the first to investigate language as a factor that influences individual 
financial risk tolerance (FRT). Consequently, the subsequent literature review section provides 
evidence from different fields that supports the conjecture for the link between language and 
FRT. Basically, language cannot itself affect FRT if it does not influence some forms of human 
internal cognitive processes, such as, attention, perception, memory, learning and reasoning. 
Consequently, the first section of this literature review discusses whether language influences 
human cognition.  
6.2.1 Language and human cognition (Perception, mind, and thought) 
Language is a special signal system which plays an important role in human life. It is a 
distinctive characteristic of human species, a unique gift for our human kind. Language is used 
as a means of social communication and can be understood as the method of human expressions 
through words. Indeed, the ways we talk describe so much about ourselves. Our dialects and 
accents could point out where we are originally from. The way we use vocabulary suggests our 
education levels. However, whether the languages that we use can determine our thoughts and 
our idea formation, remains a challenging discussion amongst anthropologists, cognitive 
psychologists, philosophers and linguists.  
Karl Marx once said in the German Ideology (1976): “Language is the immediate actuality of 
thought” (cited in Smith, 2004, p.451). Without language, humans cannot think. In other words, 
all human thinking operations are conducted on the substance of language. In the 1950s, 
linguists Edward Sapir (Sapir and Mandelbaum, 1949) and his student Benjamin Lee Whorf 
(Whorf, 1956) described two tenets of the relationship between language and thought:  
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“I. Structural differences between language systems will, in general, be paralleled 
by nonlinguistic cognitive differences, of an unspecified sort, in the native speakers 
of the two languages. 
II. The structure of anyone's native language strongly influences or fully determines 
the world-view he will acquire as he learns the language.” (Quoted from Brown, 
1976, p. 128) 
In general, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis states that human mind, thought, perception and 
cognition are affected through differences in the habituation and operation of the formal aspects 
of language. 
Edward Sapir (Sapir, 1958 [1929], p.69) stated that:  
“The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously 
built upon the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever 
sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality.”  
According to this hypothesis, individuals speaking different languages think differently and 
thus view the world differently in an unconscious way. Therefore, for example, it can be said 
that the mental world of Chinese people is different from the mental world of English people.  
This debatable psycholinguistic topic, specifically the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, has received 
extensive attention from academic researchers. Many cognitive psychologists conducted 
empirical research to examine the Whorfian view and obtained some remarkable results that 
supported the hypothesis. The most consistent findings are related to colour such that different 
languages cause differences in colour perception and/or cognition (Kay and Regier, 2006; 
Regier and Kay, 2009; Roberson et al., 1999; Roberson, 2005; Roberson and Hanley, 2007; 
Winawer et al., 2007; and Franklin et al., 2008; Athanasopoulos, 2011). Others obtained results 
for linguistic effects on conceptual presentation (Potter et al., 1984; Papafragou et al,. 2007), 
spatial thinking (Bowerman, 1996; and Levison, 1996; Li and Gleitman, 2002), and time 
perception44 (Chen, 2013; Boroditsky, 2001; Miles et al., 2011; Boroditsky et al., 2011; Chen 
and Su, 2011), to mention just a few.  
Overall, the study follows the view of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis such that language influences 
our cognition in numerous ways: colour perception, time perception, spatial thinking, and so 
on. However, through which of those linguistic influences, one’s willingness to pay ( measure 
                                                 
44 Among these studies, only the studies of Chen (2013), and Chen and Su (2011) are central to the purpose of 
this research. Therefore, these will be reviewed in detailed in later sections. 
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of FRT) is affected? Adopting Chen’s (2013) explanation, the main focus will be paid on the 
linguistic effect on time perception (perception in time). The subsequent section will first 
explain differences in language structure, specifically the way they encode time, before 
discussing how such time encoding affects time perception. 
6.2.2 Language and Future time reference (Future) 
Many linguistic relativists have been focusing on the effects of grammar and lexicon of a 
language on human time perception. The relationship between language and future time 
reference refers to the way language encodes the temporal relation in an event. Languages that 
grammatically mark the future to clearly distinguish it from the present and the past are referred 
to as strong future time reference languages (strong-future languages). In other words, speakers 
of strong-future languages are required to signal that they are talking about a future event by 
precisely structuring their sentences in accordance to the grammatical rules of the languages. 
Before discussing the future time reference of a language in more detailed, it is worthy to note 
that Chen (2013) use FTR as the abbreviation for future time reference, whilst this study uses 
‘future’. The reason is that this study uses FRT to denote financial risk tolerance, the use of 
FTR for future time reference may cause readers confusion between these terms. Therefore, 
Chen’s strong-FTR and weak-FTR languages are termed the strong-future and weak-future 
languages in this study, respectively.  
English and Vietnamese are two examples of strong-future languages, which distinctly mark 
the future. Grammatically, English uses the modal auxiliary ‘will’ or forms of ‘be going to’ to 
mark future time:  
 The train will leave at 5 in the afternoon 
 The train is going to leave at 5 in the afternoon 
Similarly, Vietnamese uses ‘sẽ’ to mark future events:  
 Xe lửa      sẽ        rời ga                    lúc    5 giờ          chiều  
 Train        will     leave the station     at     5 o’clock    afternoon     
 ‘The train will leave at 5 in the afternoon’ 
On the other hand, speakers of weak-future languages (futureless languages) are not obligated 
to use markers of modality to distinguish the future from the present. With the same description, 
if I want to tell my English-speaking friends about the train time tomorrow, according to English 
grammar, I must use the modal verbs (will, be going to) to signal that the event is in the future. 
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However, with Mandarin speakers, it is natural for them to omit those modal markers without 
misunderstanding and say Huǒ chē zài xià wǔ wǔ diǎn fā chē (Train leaves at 5 afternoon): 
 Huǒ chē    zài    xià wǔ         wǔ diǎn      fā chē 
 Train   in      afternoon    5 o’clock    leave 
 ‘The train will leave at 5 in the afternoon’ 
English and Vietnamese enforce their speakers to specify and signal the timing of the future 
events. In contrast, Chinese do not enforce their speakers to specify the duration of actions, the 
same verbs can be used to indicate actions that take place in the past, present or future. However, 
this does not mean that the Chinese cannot understand the concept of time. Instead, they are 
just not required to think about the time when describing a certain action. In general, speakers 
of strong-future languages are enforced to habitually make clear distinction between the present 
and future whilst speakers of weak-future languages are not.  
In brief, Chinese is a weak-future language that associates the future and the present. Speakers 
of this language are not required to grammatically mark the future tense to distinguish future 
events from the present ones. On the other hand, English and Vietnamese are strong-future 
languages that divide the future and the present. Speakers of these languages are obligated to 
distinguish future events by grammatically specifying their timing. Following this, the next 
chapter will discuss the question: when a person (while speaking) is forced to care and focus 
on the timing of events more than others, is his perception of time different?  
6.2.3 Language and time perception 
As noted by a renowned linguist Roman Jakobson: “Languages differ essentially in what 
they must convey and not in what they may convey.” (Jakobson, 1959, p.237). This aphorism 
helps us understand the real force of the native language such that “if different languages 
influence our minds in different ways, this is not because of what our language allows us to 
think but rather because of what it habitually obliges us to think about” (Deutscher, 2012, 
pp.51). Therefore, when the language one speaks requires them to specify certain information, 
they are forced to pay attention to some details and some aspects that speakers of other 
languages do not necessarily notice. As that happens regularly from the first year of life, it will 
subconsciously influence an individual’s idea formation, experience, perception, awareness, 
emotion, and cognition.  
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The ways one talks about the present, the future, and the past, influences their perception on 
temporal distance. Since the first century, many writers told their stories in the past using the 
present tense to make those historical stories more vivid and spirited. Longinus once wrote:  
“If you introduce things which are past as present and now taking place, you will 
make your story no longer a narration, but an actuality.” (Cited in Chen, 2013, p.5)  
Chen (2013) conjectured that “if speaking about current events in a distant tense makes them 
seem distant, languages which oblige speakers to use a future (distant) tense may make future 
events seem more distant” (pp.696). In other words, as speakers of different languages talk 
about time in different ways, they subconsciously perceive the temporal distance differently. 
Specifically, speakers of strong-future languages who habitually use future tenses may feel the 
same future events as more distant from the present when compared to speakers of weak-future 
languages (Chen, 2013). This statement naturally implies that an English-speaking or 
Vietnamese-speaking individuals perceive the same future event in five years’ time to be further 
away from the present than a Chinese-speaking individual.  
In case of multilingual individuals, according to Chen and Su (2011), Chinese speakers’ 
perceptions on the future phases of an event change as their experiences in English enhance. 
More precisely, the study concluded that Chinese-English bilinguals with high proficiency in 
English (CE-high) perceive the temporal phase of an event more readily than Chinese 
monolinguals or Chinese-English bilinguals with low proficiency in English (CE-low). As a 
result, whilst a Chinese monolingual or a CE-low bilingual “tends to describe the past and the 
future phase of an action as present” (Chen and Su, 2011, pg.355), a CE-high bilingual can 
precisely distinguish the boundaries between the present and the future phases of an event. The 
findings are coherent in a way such that when a Chinese learns English as a foreign language, 
they are required to pay lots of attention in English tenses, sometimes even more than an 
English-native speaker. Accordingly, they are forced to clearly distinguish the future, and the 
past, from the present. Taking these findings of Chen and Su (2011) and applying them in the 
linguistic-time perception link, it can be conjectured that a weak-future language speaker with 
high proficiency in at least one strong-future language (weak-strong multilingual) perceives 
future events as more distant than a monolingual of a futureless language. 
Up to now, the study has explained that because different languages enforce their speakers to 
focus on the timing of events differently, individuals tend to have different perceptions on the 
temporal distance between the present and the future. Specifically, because individuals 
speaking strong-future languages are required to clearly specify whether the events they are 
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talking about are in the future or the present, they perceive the future further away from the 
present when compared to individuals speaking weak-future languages (futureless languages). 
This link between language and perception in time conjectured by Chen (2013) has not yet been 
empirically tested as there is no literature developing a quantitative measure for time perception 
of an individual. Therefore, no direct measure of this construct is available. 
Nonetheless, based on a number of psychological research papers, this study considers a time-
related construct to proxy the notion of time perception. The construct is so-called future time 
perspective (FuturePerspective). Figure 6.1 provides a summary for the hypothesised links 
between language, time perception and FuturePerspective. As a quick recap, time perception is 
the time distance (time interval) between the timing of a future event and the present, which is 
subjectively perceived by an individual. Similar to time perception, FuturePerspective is an 
important dimension of one’s psychological time (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). It refers to the 
extent to which one focuses on the future (Hershey et al. 2007 and Jacobs-Lawson and Hershey, 
2005). A person is said to exhibit a strong FuturePerspective if he focuses strongly on the future 
rather than on the present. Alternatively, FuturePerspective can be defined in a more 
quantitative manner as “the length of the future time span which is conceptualized” (Wallace, 
1956, pp.240). According to this definition, FuturePerspective answers the question: “How 
many years into the future could I think of and focus on?” For example, Wallace’s (1956) study 
found that individuals with normal health condition can focus up to 30 years, approximately, 
whilst individuals being diagnosed with schizophrenia can only focus on around 12 years into 
the future. Evidently, the former exhibited longer FuturePerspective than the latter.  
Bringing the understanding of time perception and FuturePerspective onward, lets consider an 
example with a weak-future speaking individual A and a strong-future speaking individual B. 
As they speak different languages, their time perceptions are different. Specifically, A sees the 
future closer when compared to B. Therefore, it naturally implies that the same advanced-
planned event in 6 years’ time (for example, their kids start their undergraduate study), is more 
likely to be thought about and focused on by A than B, as A perceives that 6-year interval 
(objective time) closer to the present than B. As a result, it is expected that because of this 
difference in time perception, A is more likely to exhibit longer/stronger FuturePerspective. In 
other words, weak-future language speaking individual A focus more into the future (stronger 
FuturePerspective) than strong-future language speaking individual B.  
Furthermore, Chen (2013) found that differences in time perception across individuals speaking 
different languages caused differences in their future-oriented behaviours. Specifically, as 
weak-future speaking individuals perceive the future to be closer, they engage in more future-
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oriented behaviour, such as saving more, smoking less and remaining less obese. In other words, 
they focus more on the future. Stemming from these findings it can be hypothesised that 
speakers of weak-future languages have stronger FuturePerspective when compared to strong-
future language speaking individuals.  
Figure 6.1: Links between language, time perception and future time perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Building on the baseline of reasoning, this study employs FuturePerspective developed by 
Hershey et al. (2007) as a proxy for time perception. This allows the study of indirectly test for 
the linguistic-time perception association through the linguistic-FuturePerspective link. 
Consequently, the following hypothesis is examined: 
 
 
As FuturePerspective is used as proxy for time perception, hypothesis H13 indicates a linguistic 
effect on time perception. Subsequently by applying this cross-linguistic difference in time 
perception in the financial context, individuals investing their money today expect a profitable 
return in the future. With different time perceptions due to language, individuals have different 
H13: Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly stronger focus on 
the future (stronger FuturePerspective) than individuals speaking strong-future languages 
Weak-future Language Speakers Strong-future Language Speakers 
Perceive the future closer from the 
present  
Perceive the future further away from 
the present  
TIME PERCEPTION: Individual’s subjective perception on the temporal distance 
between the future and the present 
FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE (FuturePerspective): The extent to which one 
focuses on the future. It provides answer to the following question: 
“How many years into the future does an individual think of and focus on?” 
Stronger FuturePerspective  Weaker FuturePerspective  
 
For example: Weak-future speakers perceive an event in 6 years’ 
time as closer to the present comparing to strong-future speakers. 
 The event is more likely to be thought and 
focused by the former than the latter 
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perceptions on “how far is that future?” In other words, they possess different perceptions of 
the investment horizon. For example, a Chinese-speaking investor A and an English-speaking 
investor B invest in a stock for 5 years. Investor A perceives the same 5-year length to be shorter 
when compared to investor B because of his weak-future language. Due to this difference in 
their time perception, the study expects their willingness to pay (FRT) to be different. 
Consequently, the following section explains how this influence may take place.  
6.2.4 Language influence one’s financial risk tolerance (FRT) 
The link between language and FRT is built on the same conjecture developed by Chen (2013). 
Similar to the linguistic-saving hypothesis (Chen, 2013), the linguistic-FRT hypothesis also 
naturally springs from two different mechanisms: bias in time perception and the precision of 
beliefs about time. Considering the same simple subjective pricing discounted model, suppose 
a decision maker is deciding on how much to pay for an investment X (WTP) now, which 
expects to yield an expected return R at some time in the future. The variable WTP(X) is the 
price of X that is subjectively perceived by the decision maker. Suppose the decision maker is 
uncertain about when the return will materialize, she holds beliefs with distribution F(t). If her 
individual discounted rate is δ, then her willingness to pay (WTP) should be evaluated as 
follows:  
 𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑋) =  ∫ 𝑒−𝛿𝑡 𝑅𝑑𝐹(𝑡) (eq.6.1) 
There are two mechanisms as explained by Chen (2013) that project the linguistic-FRT 
association. Firstly, as weak-future language speakers perceive the future to be closer to the 
present, Fs(t) would first-order stochastically dominate (FOSD) FW(t). Therefore, WTPw(X) is 
greater or equal to WTPs(X).  
Specifically, the distribution of Fs(t) FOSD Fw(t) if and only if:  
Pw(T≥t) ≤ Ps(T≥t)  Fw(t) ≥ Fs(t) ∀t, then ∫ 𝑒−𝛿𝑡 𝑅𝑑𝐹𝑤(𝑡) ≥ ∫ 𝑒
−𝛿𝑡 𝑅𝑑𝐹𝑠(𝑡)  
↔ WTPw(x) > WTPs(x). Note that for any discount rate 𝛿 > 0, 𝑒−𝛿𝑡 is strictly continuous non-
increasing function. 
Secondly, as strong-future language speakers are obligated to habitually specify the timing of 
events, they may hold more accurate timing of the expected return R when compared to weak-
future language speakers (Chen, 2013). Consequently, Fw(t) is a mean-preserving spread of 
Fs(t), and hence, WTPw(X) is greater than WTPs(t). 
Specifically, the more precise timing of strong-future language speakers implies that 
Var[Fs(t)] ≤ Var[Fw(t)], thus Fw(t) is a m.p.s of Fs(t) ↔ Fs(t) second-order stochastically 
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dominate Fw(t), then ∫ 𝑒−𝛿𝑡 𝑅𝑑𝐹𝑤(𝑡) ≥ ∫ 𝑒
−𝛿𝑡 𝑅𝑑𝐹𝑠(𝑡) ↔ WTPw(x) > WTPs(x). Note that for 
any discount rate 𝛿 > 0, 𝑒−𝛿𝑡 is strictly continuous non-increasing function. 
As willingness to pay for an investment option measures one’s financial risk tolerance (FRT), 
these two mechanisms lead to the expectation that speakers of weak-future languages are more 
risk tolerant than speakers of strong-future languages. It is important to note that neither study 
of Chen (2013), nor the current study, empirically test for the linguistic effects on bias in time 
perception, or on precision in timing. These two conjectures are stemmed from linguistic and 
psycholinguistic literatures such that if the habit of specifying the timing of events leads to 
perceptions of further future and more precise beliefs about the timing, weak-future speakers 
will be more risk tolerant than strong-future speakers. Therefore, the following hypothesis will 
be tested:  
 
 
Subsequent to the examination of cross-linguistic difference in FRT, its underlying mechanisms 
will be examined. To investigate whether cross-linguistic difference in FRT is associated with 
cross-linguistic difference in RP and/or cross-linguistic difference in RAtt, the following 
hypothesis will be tested:  
 
 
 
 
6.3 Methodology 
6.3.1 Measure of Language Variable 
Following the majority of linguistic studies (Chen and Su, 2011; Boroditsky et al., 2011; Kay 
and Kempton, 1984; Boroditsky, 2001; Au, 1983), the current study uses respondents’ native 
language as the main proxy of the language that structures their thoughts. Most importantly, 
this study is based on the relativistic view of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which suggests that 
ones’ native language has an influence on their mind and thought (Section 6.2.1). Furthermore, 
in Borokitsky study (2001, p.1), he concluded that “one’s native language plays an important 
role in shaping habitual thought (e.g. how one tend to think about time) ...” As this study is 
H14: Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly higher FRT than 
individuals speaking strong-future languages 
H15: Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly lower RP than 
individuals speaking strong-future languages 
H16: Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly higher RAtt than 
individuals speaking strong-future languages 
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based on the linguistic effect on one’s perception in time, the native language of respondents is 
employed.  
To obtain linguistic variables, a question was constructed in the survey to capture the 
respondents’ native language as well as all other languages that they speak with corresponding 
proficiency in each language. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix 1, Part V. Based on 
the participants’ responses, each language will be classified as either strong-future language or 
weak-future language using Chen’s online-text based coding in which the future values of 39 
coded languages are included (Chen, 2013).  
There are two main categorical, dummy coded, linguistic variables. The first variable 
(Native_Weak) was coded to match the native language of each respondent. Native_weak 
equals to 1 if the native language one speaks is the weak-FRT language (futureless language) 
and zero otherwise. The second variable (Prof_Strong) captures any other languages the 
respondents speak with a high proficiency level in addition to their native language. According 
to the questionnaire for language (Appendix I, Part V), a respondent is classified as speaking a 
second language proficiently if the reported language is not “1: native speaker” and is either “2: 
Near native/Fluent” or “3: Excellent command/Highly proficient in spoken and written”. 
Subsequently, to consider multilingual aspect, an interaction variable 
Native_weak*Prof_strong (Nweak_Pstrong) is formed and coded 1 if the respondents are native 
speakers in a weak-future language and can speak proficiently in at least one strong-future 
language (Weak-Strong multilinguals).   
As discussed in Section 6.2.3, the language-FRT association is conjectured through the 
linguistic-induced bias in time perception. Specifically, individuals speaking weak-future 
languages perceive the future to be closer to the present when compared to individuals speaking 
strong-future languages. To test this conjecture, the subsequent section provides a preliminary 
examination for the linguistic effect on time perception (H13). However, there is no literature 
developing a direct quantitative measure for time perception of an individual. Therefore, based 
on the literature, the current study employs future time perspective (FuturePerspective) measure 
as a proxy for individual time perception.  
6.3.2 Language influences future time perspective (FuturePerspective) 
To obtain an individual’s future time perspective (FuturePerspective), four 7-point likert-scale 
items are presented to the respondents (Appendix 1, P.X). The future_perspective variable is 
constructed by calculating the mean value of the answers to those four questions. Consequently, 
the variable ranges from 1 (lowest future time perspective) to 7 (strongest future time 
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perspective). Note that question 3 and question 4 take an inverse scale, which require to be 
converted back to the common scale by subtracting the respondent’s answer from 8. The study 
employs the bivariate analysis comprising ANOVA and Bonferroni t-test to examine 
differences in FuturePerspective as a function of language.  
H13: FuturePerspectiveN_weak = FuturePerspectiveNweak_Pstrong = FuturePerspectiveN_strong;  
After testing for the conjecture of language-FRT relationship, the empirical analysis for the 
main research question (H14-H16) will be discussed in the following sections.  
6.3.3 Multivariate analysis: Model-based mosaic analysis 
As discussed in Section 3.4, the main statistical analysis is the model-based mosaic multivariate 
analysis. The picture is comprised of three mosaics. Firstly, as projected, mosaic 1 examines 
the effect of language on individual FRT. Subsequently, the other two mosaics test for the 
underlying mechanism of the linguistic influence, if found to be present. 
6.3.3.1 Mosaic 1: Language influences FRT 
To test the hypothesis “H14: Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly 
higher FRT than individuals speaking strong-future languages”, the regression specification as 
follows:  
Ln(WTP)i = αi + βG1Group1 + βG2Group2 + βG3Group3 + βG4Group4 + βG5Group5 + 
βG6Group6 + εi, 
 
 
 
Where the content for each independent variable group is listed in Table 6.1 (See Appendix 4 
for more explanation of each variable component). 
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Table 6.1: Classification content for each independent variable group 
Independent variable Classification content 
*Explanation see Appendix 4 
Group 1: Main variables Native_weak; Prof_Strong; Nweak_Pstrong 
Group 2: Demographic variables 
Nweak_Age; Nweak_COL_IDV; COL_IDV; 
COL_IDV*Age; Age; Age2; Age*LnW; Single; 
Gender; Child; Highschl; Hhsize; LnW; LnInc 
Group 3: Socioeconomic variables Unemp; Selfemp; Homeown 
Group 4: Attitudinal variables Rbelief; IncStab; Health; SRA; Ecoexp; Interestexp 
Group 5: Geographical US; UK; VN; SG 
Group 6:  
Cushion hypothesis variables 
Finhelp; Helpatt; Age*Finhelp; 
COL_IDV*Finhelp; Age*Helpatt; 
COL_IDV*Helpatt; COL_IDV*Helpatt; 
Finhelp*Helpatt; COL_IDV*Age*Finhelp; 
COL_IDV*Age*Helpatt 
 
6.3.3.2 Mosaic 2: Language influences RP 
To test the hypothesis “H15: Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly 
lower RP than individuals speaking strong-future languages”, the regression specification as 
follows:  
RPi = αi + βG1Group1 + βG2Group2 + βG3Group3 + βG4Group4 + βG5Group5 +  
βG6Group6 + εi, 
If significant linguistic effect is found, individuals’ perception on financial risk are influenced 
by the languages they speak. 
 
 
6.3.3.3 Mosaic 3: Language influences RAtt 
To test the hypothesis “H16: Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly 
higher RAtt than individuals speaking strong-future languages”, the regression specification as 
follows:  
(bVAR/bR)i = αi + βG1Group1 + βG2Group2 + βG3Group3 + βG4Group4 + βG5Group5 + 
βG6Group6 + εi, 
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This final mosaic examines whether language affects individual attitude towards financial risk. 
If significant positive results are obtained, H15 is supported. Furthermore, depending upon the 
results found in mosaic 2, either the objective RAtt (bVAR) or subjective RAtt (bR) is chosen as 
the main dependent variable for this mosaic. As discussed in Section 3.4.3.1, if RP is found to 
vary across individuals, objective RAtt will not be pursued further. 
 
 
6.4 Data description 
This section describes the data sample by presenting the descriptive statistics of all variables 
included in the current study. These are the three main dependent variables (FRT, RP and RAtt) 
and the five independent variable groups as discussed in Section 3.4.3 and explained in 
Appendix 4. However, to prevent repetition of the descriptive statistics of some variable, only 
the main independent variable group 1 (linguistic variables as discussed in Section 6.3.1) are 
discussed here. All other variables were discussed in the first and second empirical studies 
(Chapter 4, Section 4.4; and Chapter 5, Section 5.4). 
According to Table 6.2, there are 458 respondents, which represents 24.25% of the whole 
sample, speaking weak future time reference (future) languages as their mother tongue. The 
majority of them are from China (74.67% of the whole sample). This is logical as the main 
language spoken in China is Chinese Mandarin, which is classified as weak-future language. 
Whilst Chinese is a weak-future language, English and Vietnamese are two strong-future 
languages. These are the main languages in the US and the UK, and Vietnam, respectively. 
Therefore, the majority of respondents from the US, the UK and Vietnam (99.03%, 98.45%, 
and 98.48%, respectively) are coded to speak strong-future language. Singapore is a special 
sample as it is a multilingual country. Specifically, around 30% of Singaporean sample reported 
Chinese (weak-future language) as their mother tongue. This is also anticipated as according to 
a statistic, in Singapore, 35% of its population speak Mandarin and 23% speak English (World 
Languages, 2017). By including Singapore in the sample, the country effect is controlled for. 
Without the Singaporean sample, it could be a serious challenge to isolate the linguistic and 
country effect and thus to robustly conduct this research. Consequently, future studies need to 
include at least one controlling multilingual country as the controlling sample to prevent 
confounding research findings. 
According to the descriptive of the Prof_Strong variable, 390 respondents are multilinguals 
who speak at least one strong-future language proficiently in addition to their native weak-
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future languages. In China and Vietnam, only a small proportion of respondents are coded at 
unity for this variable (12.4% and 9.76%, respectively). It is not because people are not 
multilinguals but because it is challenging to be proficient in using foreign languages in 
countries with a rare chance for practice. In the case of Singapore, 111 respondents out of 382 
are claimed Chinese to be their native language; and 160 respondents (41.88%) reported that 
they can speak English proficiently. This high proportion comparing to that of Chinese and 
Vietnamese samples are plausible and anticipated because both Mandarin and English are 
popularly used in Singapore.  
 
6.5 Empirical results 
6.5.1 Language influences future time perspective (FuturePerspective) 
 
 
This section provides the results for the bivariate test that examines whether individuals’ future 
time perspectives (FuturePerspective) differ across languages. Since FuturePerspective is 
employed as a proxy for time perception, the results support the conjecture of the underlying 
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics of Language 
Linguistic Binary Variables Countries Count Percent N 
Native_weak  
The US 4 0.97 413 
The UK 6 1.55 387 
China 342 90.24 379 
Vietnam 5 1.52 328 
Singapore 111 29.06 382 
Whole 
Sample 
458 24.25 1,889 
Prof_strong  
The US 94 22.76 413 
The UK 57 14.73 387 
China 47 12.4 379 
Vietnam 32 9.76 328 
Singapore 160 41.88 382 
Whole 
Sample 
390 20.65 1,889 
H13: Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly stronger focus on 
the future (stronger FuturePerspective) than individuals speaking strong-future languages 
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channels through which language influences financial risk tolerance (FRT). The statistical 
results presented in Table 6.3 indicate a significant difference in FuturePerspective as a function 
of language at the 1% level (F-value = 10.36). Based on the Bonferroni t-test results, weak-
future native speakers tend to focus more on the future than strong-future native speakers 
(FuturePerspectiveNative_Weak > FuturePerspectiveNative_Strong = 4.49 > 4.2042, p-value = 5%). 
Furthermore, it is also found that the future time perspective of Weak-Strong multilinguals is 
significantly lower than that of weak-future monolinguals (FuturePerspectiveNative_Weak > 
FuturePerspectiveNweak_Pstrong = 4.49 > 4.1848, p-value = 5%). However, although the 
FuturePerspective of the Weak-Strong multilingual is lower than the strong-future 
monolinguals, the difference is insignificant.  
Table 6.3: Mean Future Time Perspective (FuturePerspective) As a 
Function Of Respondents’ Languages 
Language Sample Size (N) 
Future Time Perspective 
(FuturePerspective) 
Native_Weak 366 4.4931a 
Nweak_Pstrong 92 4.1848a 
Native_Strong 1431 4.2042a 
F-value (DF= 2)  10.36*** 
Note: Two country groups with the same superscripts (comparing only with the first country group 
assigned with the superscript) down each column indicate that their means are significantly different at 
the 0.05 level using Bonferroni T-test. 
*, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Overall, the ANOVA findings revealed in this section imply that weak-future native speakers 
see the future as closer to the present when compared to strong-future native speakers and to 
other weak-native speakers who can speak fluently in at least one strong-future language. As 
discussed in Section 6.2.4, this linguistic difference may lead to higher level of FRT. The later 
part of this Empirical Results section reports the results of a multivariate analysis for the cross-
linguistic difference in FRT through RP and/or RAtt to test for this hypothesis. 
6.5.2 Multivariate analysis 
In this section, regression results for five model variations of each mosaic are presented. The 
first model variation contains only variable group 1 (main variables) to capture the effect of 
language. The second variation controls for specific country effect by adding country variables 
in group 5. The third variation only controls for demographic, socioeconomic, and attitudinal 
factors measured by variable groups 2, 3, and 4. The fourth model variation controls for all 
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variables, but not variable group 6. Lastly, the fifth variation is the full model that contains all 
variables indicated in Table 6.1. 
The full results for the fifth variation of the estimating regression models are presented in the 
appendix section (Appendix 15-17). These appendix tables contain results for both the 
uncentered and centered regressions, along with the corresponding variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) of all variables to test for multicollinearity. Furthermore, the results for 
heteroscedasticity, normality of error terms, and endogeneity can be found in Appendix 9 (Part 
3) and Appendix 10 (Part 3), respectively. Overall, the results indicate that the estimating OLS 
models of this study do not have an endogeneity problem, but are subjected to heteroscedasticity 
and non-normality issues. To tackle these issues, as discussed in Section 3.4.2, the mean-
centering robust standard error approach is employed. 
6.5.2.1 Mosaic 1: Does language influence individual FRT? 
 
 
Table 6.4 reveals the results for the first mosaic, the main part of the whole picture, which 
examines if there is a cross-linguistic difference in FRT. According to the results, multivariate 
analysis produces a significant effect of language on FRT. Particularly, the main linguistic 
variable (Native_weak) is significantly positive at the 5% level or below across all five model 
variations (βA = 0.781, βB = 0.653, βC = 0.597, βD = 0.657, βE = 0.716). It implies that individuals 
speaking weak-future languages exhibit higher levels of FRT when compared to strong-future 
language speakers.  
The results also indicate that the multilingual aspect should be taken into consideration. 
Basically, the effect of weak-future language on FRT depends on whether those weak-future 
language native speakers can speak fluently in any strong-future language as the interaction 
term Nweak_Pstrong is significantly negative at 1% level for all model variations (βA = -1.334, 
βB = -1.282, βC = -1.135, βD = -1.142, βE = -1.265). This indicates that FRT levels of weak-
future language speakers, who can speak at least one strong-future language with high 
proficiency (Weak-Strong multilingual) are significantly lower than those who only speak 
weak-future languages. As explained, those weak-future language monolinguals perceive the 
future to be closer to the present comparing to other Weak-Strong multilinguals. The reason is 
that the strong-future second language that they can speak proficiently requires them to 
distinguish clearly the future events from the present ones (just as other strong-future native 
speakers). As a result, subconsciously those multilinguals perceive the future to be further away 
H14: Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly higher FRT than 
individuals speaking strong-future languages 
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from the present compared to the former monolingual group. This linguistic difference pulls 
down the FRT of Weak-Strong multilinguals. The full model variation E provides the highest 
value of adjusted R-square (Adj. R-square = 0.12), thus it has the strongest explanation power.  
Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Native_weak equals to 1 if the native language one speaks is the weak-FRT language (futureless language) 
and zero otherwise. Prof_Strong is coded 1 if respondents speak any other foreign languages with a high 
proficiency level in addition to their native language. Nweak_Pstrong is the interaction variable which equals 
to 1 if the respondents are weak-future language native speakers and can speak proficiently in at least one 
strong-future language. 
Appendix 15 provides the results for the full model variation E of mosaic 1, in which all 
variables are accounted for. The main analysis method is the centered-score regression, which 
has effectively eliminated the issue of non-essential multicollinearity demonstrated through the 
decreased VIF values of multiplicative variables and their components.  
Noticeably, the interaction term between language and culture (Nweak_COL_IDV) is 
statistically insignificant (Appendix 15, βNweak_COL_IDV = 0.0992, n.s). This indicates that culture 
does not have any impact on the effect of language on FRT. In other words, language and 
culture influence one’s minds and thoughts distinctively, and thus independently impact FRT. 
Intriguingly, the study obtains a significant moderating effect of age on the cross-linguistic 
difference in FRT (Appendix 15, βNweak_age = 0.032, p-value = 0.01). It implies that the increased 
FRT exhibited by the weak-future language native speakers increases with age, causing the 
cross-linguistic difference in FRT between the two linguistic groups to be larger. The reason 
for this may be that older individuals tend to see their future approach closer comparing to 
Table 6.4:  Determinants of Financial Risk Tolerance. Dependent Variable: LnWTP 
Mosaic 1  Centered-score Regression (Robust Standard Errors) 
Independent 
Variables 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Intercept 5.1415*** 5.3253*** 4.9399*** 4.8314*** 4.6969*** 
Native_Weak 0.7813*** 0.6535** 0.5973*** 0.6569** 0.7156*** 
Prof_Strong -0.1403 -0.1061 -0.3282* -0.3165* -0.27495 
Nweak_Pstrong -1.3339*** -1.2818*** -1.1351*** -1.1417*** -1.2649*** 
Group 2 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 3 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 4 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 5 
NO YES NO YES YES 
Group 6 
NO NO NO NO YES 
Sample size 
1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-Square 
0.0163 0.0178 0.0915 0.0907 0.1200 
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younger individuals (for both linguistic speaking groups). Nonetheless, weak-future native 
speakers possess relatively less precise timing and tend to see future as closer compared to 
strong-future native speakers. As a consequence, such age increase may impact on the weak-
future native speaking individuals more strongly such that the reduction in their perception on 
temporal distance across age is larger comparing to strong-future language speaking group.  
According to the partial-eta square (η2partial) values (Appendix 15, Centered-score regression 
panel), six main determinants of FRT are determined. These are language, culture, age, wealth, 
SRA (self-reported risk aversion), and financial help availability. Consistent with the previous 
two empirical studies, the same determinants of FRT, in addition to language, with the same 
signs of influence are obtained. These include the respondents’ culture (βCOL_IDV = 0.306), 
moderating effect of age on cultural effect (βCOL_IDV*Age = -0.014), age (βAge = -0.034), wealth 
(βLnW = 0.108), income (βLnInc = 0.058), reported risk-averse (βRRA = -0.258), financial support 
availability (βFinhelp = 0.116), and help attitude (βHelpatt = 0.228). Putting these effects in different 
words, individuals who hold stronger collectivistic view, at younger age, wealthier, with higher 
income, perceive themselves as risk-seeking in general, with more financial supports from 
others and are more willing to ask for those help, tend to be more tolerant to financial risk than 
otherwise. 
6.5.2.2 Mosaic 2: Does language influence individual RP? 
 
 
The result for mosaic 2 is displayed in Table 6.5. It indicates that considering the same 
investment option, weak-future language native speakers perceive the investment as less risky 
than do strong-future language speakers. The finding is drawn from the significant negative 
coefficients of the Native_Weak variable at the 1% critical level across the four model 
variations (βA = -2.897, βB = -4.918, βC = -2.688, βD = -5.065, βE = -5.360). The conjecture for 
this finding will be discussed in Section 6.7. Because of this lower level of risk perception, 
these weak-future monolinguals are more risk tolerant as was found in the first mosaic (Section 
6.5.2.1). 
Nonetheless, if weak-future language native speakers proficiently speak at least one strong-
future language (Weak-Strong multilinguals) their RP significantly increases. The finding is 
inferred by the significantly positive coefficients of the interactive term between weak-future 
native language and strong-future foreign languages (Nweak_Pstrong) at the 1% level (βA = 
11.323, βB = 12.233, βC = 11.341, βD = 12.250, βE = 12.619). Therefore, Weak-Strong 
H15: Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly lower RP than 
individuals speaking strong-future languages 
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multilinguals exhibit higher levels of RP when compared to individuals speaking weak-future 
language solely. Among the five model variations, the full model variation E has the highest 
value of adjusted R-square (Adj. R-SquareE = 0.0734). Therefore, it has the strongest 
explanatory power and should be relied on for finding interpretation.  
Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Native_weak equals to 1 if the native language one speaks is the weak-FRT language (futureless language) 
and zero otherwise. Prof_Strong is coded 1 if respondents speak any other foreign languages with a high 
proficiency level in addition to their native language. Nweak_Pstrong is the interaction variable which equals 
to 1 if the respondents are weak-future language native speakers and can speak proficiently in at least one 
strong-future language. 
For more information, the full results for the fifth model variation of mosaic 2 are presented in 
Appendix 16. It is found that the cultural effect and linguistic effect do not independently 
influence RP such that one’s cultural value impacts cross-linguistic difference in RP 
(βNweak_COL_IDV = 2.683, p-value = 0.05). Specifically, a higher collectivistic score narrows 
down the RP gap between weak-future language speakers and strong-future language speakers. 
This may occur because the collectivistic mentality reduces RP of both linguistic groups 
(cultural effect) but the negative effect is stronger with individuals speaking strong-future 
languages. Noticeably, although culture influences the effect of language on RP (mosaic 2, 
Appendix 16), it does not have any impact on the effect of language on FRT (mosaic 1, 
Appendix 15, βNweak_COL_IDV = 0.0992, n.s). This means that the moderating effect of culture on 
the cross-linguistic differences in RP is not resilient enough to cause cross-linguistic differences 
in FRT to change. 
Table 6.5:  Determinants of Financial Risk Perception. Dependent Variable: RP 
Mosaic 2  Centered-score Regression (Robust Standard Errors) 
Independent 
Variables 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Intercept 54.4832*** 56.2236*** 41.6910*** 44.9030*** 45.8320*** 
Native_Weak -2.8967*** -4.9182*** -2.6881** -5.0646*** -5.3598*** 
Prof_Strong -0.7265 -2.0107 -0.5308 -1.2918 -1.4519 
Nweak_Pstrong 11.3230*** 12.2334*** 11.3406*** 12.2500*** 12.6193*** 
Group 2 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 3 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 4 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 5 
NO YES NO YES YES 
Group 6 
NO NO NO NO YES 
Sample size 
1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-Square 
0.0102 0.0186 0.0635 0.0655 0.0734 
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Remaining consistent with the previous two empirical studies, the same determinants of RP, in 
addition to language, with the same signs of influence are obtained. These include the 
respondents’ culture (βCOL_IDV = -1.79), age (βAge = 0.10), moderating effect of wealth on age 
effect (βAge*LnW = -0.03), unemployment (βUnemp = 4.72), reported risk-averse (βRRA = 1.54), 
expectation of the future economy (βEcoexp = 1.02), financial support availability (βFinhelp = 0.43), 
and help attitude (βHelpatt = -1.16). Putting these effects in different words, individuals who hold 
stronger collectivistic views, at younger age, wealthier, having a stable employment, risk-
seeking in general, with more financial supports from others and are more willing to ask for 
those help, tend to perceive lower risks than otherwise.  
According to the partial eta-square (η2partial), the interaction term, which takes into account the 
multilingual aspect, possesses a stronger explanation power than the monolingual variable per 
se (η2partial_Nweak_Pstrong = 0.0108 > η2partial_Nweak = 0.0002). This indicates that the multilingual 
perspective of language should be accounted for as it significantly influences the linguistic 
effect on individual RP. Indeed, the Nweak_Pstrong variable is the second greatest factor as it 
accounts for the highest proportion of variance in RP, after the SRA variable. The cultural effect 
clinches the third place with η2partial = 0.0103. 
6.5.2.3 Mosaic 3: Does language influence individual RAtt? 
 
 
Due to the obtained cross-linguistic difference in RP, the subjective RAtt (bR) is chosen as the 
applicable measure of RAtt. Table 6.6 presents the results for the linguistic effect on RAtt. With 
the subjective RAtt (bR), no significant linguistic effect on RAtt is found in the last three model 
variations C, D, and E (βC = -13.22, βD = -16.86, βE = -17.06). Notably, as more factors are 
controlled for, language gradually loses its effect on RAtt (βA = -16.93, p-value = 5%; βB = -
21.84, p-value = 10%). The almost zero adjusted-R2 values of the five variations once again 
indicate the stable characteristic of RAtt, as indicated in the previous two empirical studies. 
Furthermore, according to the Appendix 17, which provides the full results for the fifth model 
variation E, virtually no factor reveals significant effect on RAtt.  
Consequently, the cross-linguistic difference in FRT found by mosaic 1 (Section 6.5.2.1) is not 
associated with the cross-linguistic difference in RAtt, but instead mainly associated with cross-
linguistic difference in RP. 
 
H16: Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly higher RAtt than 
individuals speaking strong-future languages 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Native_weak equals to 1 if the native language one speaks is the weak-FRT language (futureless language) 
and zero otherwise. Prof_Strong is coded 1 if respondents speak any other foreign languages with a high 
proficiency level in addition to their native language. Nweak_Pstrong is the interaction variable which equals 
to 1 if the respondents are weak-future language native speakers and can speak proficiently in at least one 
strong-future language. 
To sum up, combining the three mosaics together, as expected, there is a significant cross-
linguistic difference in FRT which is caused mainly by the cross-linguistic difference in RP. 
Specifically, weak-future language native speakers are more risk tolerant than strong-future 
language native speakers because they see the same financial investment as less risky. However, 
if those weak-future language speakers can speak proficiently in at least one strong-future 
language, their RP is increased to a higher level when compared to weak-future language 
monolinguals, and thus leading to their lower FRT.  
6.6 Robustness test: GMM and Aggregating Bootstrap Estimators 
This section displays the results for the robustness tests of this study as stated in Section 4.6. 
According to the results of GMM and bagging bootstrap method presented in Table 6.7, the 
final qualitative story remains unchanged. The picture depicts that individuals speaking weak-
future languages are more risk tolerant (mosaic 1, βNative_Weak = significant positive) as they 
perceive the investment options as less risky (mosaic 2, βNative_Weak = significant negative) than 
those speaking strong-future languages. It is also found that if the weak-future language 
speakers are able to speak proficiently at least one strong-future language, their risk perceptions 
Table 6.6: Determinants of Subjective RAtt. Dependent Variable: bR 
Mosaic 3 Centered-score Regression (Robust Standard Errors) 
Subjective RAtt (bR) 
Independent 
Variables 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Intercept -12.5382*** -3.43687 -26.53257 -25.10416 -22.72926 
Native_Weak -16.9339** -21.83989* -13.21914 -16.86212 -17.06213 
Prof_Strong 0.62010 3.18757 -1.51592 1.06122 1.04579 
Nweak_Pstrong -5.69261 -2.26833 -3.87768 -1.49279 -1.58604 
Group 2 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 3 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 4 
NO NO YES YES YES 
Group 5 
NO YES NO YES YES 
Group 6 
NO NO NO NO YES 
Sample size 
1889 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-Square 
0.0011 0.0031 0.0008 0.0020 0 
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increase (mosaic 2, βNweak_Pstrong = significant positive). Consequently, their FRT would reduce 
significantly (mosaic 1, βNweak_Pstrong = significant negative) when compared to individuals who 
only speak weak-future languages. The evidence suggests that even when using different 
derivations of RAtt (bagging estimators) and different analytical methods, individual RAtt is 
found to be constant across individuals who speak different languages. This constant RAtt 
across language is matched with previous studies (Section 4.2.2), which also found that RAtt is 
similar across age, culture, gender, and so on. 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Thus far, the study has confirmed the cross-linguistic differences in FRT. Furthermore, the 
differences are mainly associated with cross-linguistic differences in RP rather than with cross-
linguistic differences in RAtt. As discussed, the conjecture for this relationship starts from the 
influence of language of time perception of the individuals. Specifically, as individuals 
speaking weak-future languages perceive the distance between the future and the present to be 
closer than individuals speaking strong-future languages, they may perceive risk differently. As 
mentioned, the current study has made the first move into the language-FRT topic. Since it has 
been confirmed that language significantly influences FRT through RP, there is much future 
work to be done within this area. Nonetheless, this study would like to suggest a few conjectures 
for why cross-linguistic differences in RP exist through time perception. These are presented in 
the following section. 
Table 6.7: Robustness Tests (GMM) and Aggregating Bootstrapping RAtt (bR_b) 
GMM Regression  Bagging Bootstrap  
IVs 
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 1: LnWTP)  
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 2: RP) 
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 3: bR) 
Coefficients 
(Mosaic 3: bR_b) 
Intercept 4.6969*** 45.832*** -22.73 -378.41 
Native_Weak 0.71556*** -5.3598*** -17.06 88.149 
Prof_Strong -0.27495 -1.45188 1.046 -32.604 
Nweak_Pstrong -1.2649*** 12.6193*** -1.586 -438.175 
Group 2 YES YES YES YES 
Group 3 YES YES YES YES 
Group 4 YES YES YES YES 
Group 5 YES YES YES YES 
Group 6 YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Adj. R-Square 0.1200 0.0734 0.0201 0.0023 
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6.7 Time perception influences RP: Risk-time relationship 
In essence, most conventional pricing models (such as CAPM and Fama-French) are conceived 
as normative and descriptive, which suggest the fundamental value of an investment under the 
assumption of rationality in investor’s behaviour. Notably, since the work of Markowitz (1952), 
risk is operationalised most commonly as standard deviation (Klos et al., 2005). However, this 
operationalisation has been extensively questioned by many studies “from a descriptive 
perspective, showing that judgments of perceived risk that predict behaviour do not coincide 
with standard deviation or standard deviation estimates” (Klos et al., 2005, p. 1788, and 
Duxbury and Summers, 2004). Furthermore, findings obtained in research conducted by Nosic 
and Weber (2012) suggested that objective risk is a worse predictor of risk-taking behaviour 
than subjective risk measures. Basically, it would be unrealistic to say that everyone 
understands the concept and computation of standard deviation, or any other objective risk 
measures including mean excess loss, probability of loss, and Weber’s coefficient of variation45. 
Therefore, subjective risk perception tends to be more pragmatic as Kritzman stated: “risk has 
no universal definition; rather, like beauty, it is in the eye of the beholder” (Kritzman, 1994, p. 
67). As the study focuses on individual FRT (that is, subjective WTP), the main interest lies on 
how time influence one’s RP subjectively, not objectively. There are two reasons for the 
association between time perception and RP: the uncertain nature of the future and the temporal 
resolution of uncertainty. Note that these underlying reasons remain conjectures for the 
linguistic-RP association. Their empirical tests are beyond the scope of this study, which can 
be considered in future research.  
6.7.1  The uncertain nature of the future 
In the financial context, when individuals assess and judge the riskiness of an investment, it is 
understandable for them to perceive higher risk for investment with longer maturity. Basically, 
the longer it takes for investors to access their investment funds and returns, the riskier they 
feel for their investment positions. The main reason for the increased RP lies at the uncertain 
nature of the future. For example, it is easier to predict what will happen in 1 year than in 10 
years. A famous saying of Pascal (1910) stated that: “It is not certain that everything is 
uncertain”. It means that nothing is certain, even the saying itself. Therefore, what you will 
definitely get in the future is not an answerable question as nothing is ‘definite’. We are not 
futurists. No one knows what will happen. In the future, there are risks of natural disasters, 
changes in institutional policies as well as in the intense powers of market competition, 
                                                 
45 Coefficient of variance (CV) of a lottery is calculated as its standard deviation divided by its expected return 
(Weber, 2004) 
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economic conditions: expansion or recession, peace or war, and many others unpredicted and 
unquantifiable risks. Consequently, it is possible that for the same type of investment, the longer 
the investment horizon, the higher risk is perceived. 
6.7.2 The temporal resolution of uncertainty 
To a great extent it can be seen that the notion of risk being mentioned mainly focuses on 
changes in outcomes (volatility of outcomes, and possibility of downside outcomes). However, 
the Allais paradox of Allais (1953), certainty effect of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and 
Ellsberg’s paradox of Ellsberg (1961) have pointed out that decision-makers are not only 
sensitive to risk related to outcomes but also to uncertainty and ambiguity. Generally, 
uncertainty or ambiguity imposes increased distress on decision-makers, and thus is repelled.  
Krep and Porteus (1978) examined the notion of temporal resolution of uncertainty, which 
refers to the time that uncertainty of an investment is resolved, in the context of temporal lottery. 
In Krep and Porteus’s recursive expected utility model, the timing of the resolution of 
uncertainty is intrinsically accounted for. They mathematically proved that a decision-maker is 
risk averse for lotteries resolving at any point of time, if she possesses a concave utility function 
for lotteries resolving immediately (t=0), and if she prefers earlier resolution of uncertainty. In 
the work by Robichek and Myers (1966), they suggested that security prices might be positively 
affected by early resolution of uncertainty as investors perceive the early resolution of 
uncertainty as valuable. Regarding risks of securities with different timing of resolution of 
uncertainty, Robichek and Myers (1966) considered two securities A and B which are identical 
in all aspects (expected dividends at time t = T, and the subjective probability). The only 
difference between them is that dividends are announced with certainty at t = 1 for A and t = T 
for B. In other words, the uncertainty of security A is resolved earlier than security B. Due to 
such difference, their study suggests that investors would value security A at higher price than 
security B because “the market value of the security B would be subject to greater fluctuation 
over time than A” (Robichek and Myers, 1966, p.226). In addition to the increased objective 
risk measured by volatility of security B, the study also conjectured an alternative explanation 
for the preference of A to B such that early uncertainty resolution allows investors more 
opportunities to adjust and revise their consumptions and investment decisions in case of 
adverse outcomes, and to take advantage of good outcomes. This advantage is referred to as a 
gain in physical preparedness by Wu (1999). Besides physical preparedness, Wu (1999) also 
mentioned about psychological preparedness as a reason why people prefer uncertainty to be 
resolved immediately regardless of the actual payoff time. With an early resolution of 
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uncertainty, a number of relevant psychological concerns such as anxiety, dread, anticipation, 
fear, hope, tension and impatience, can be avoided.  
The relationship between time perception and risk perception may based on the concept of 
temporal resolutions of uncertainty. Specifically, it can be asserted that individuals would prefer 
to know the outcome as early as possible due to both physical and psychological reasons. 
Imagine two individuals, with one speaking a strong-future language and the other speaking a 
weak-future language, are considering the same investment with time horizon t = T (payoff 
time; objective time). Assuming that Ts and Tw denote their subjective perceptions in the timing 
of the investment’s uncertainty to be resolved (Ts and Tw ≤≥ T) respectively. As the strong-
future language speaker perceives T as larger than the weak-future language speaker (Ts > Tw). 
He is put into a state of emotional dis-satisfaction resulting from anxiety, dread, fear, and 
impatience for a longer period of time than the other person. Additionally, he also forgoes the 
opportunity to obtain the gains in physical preparedness provided by the earlier resolution of 
uncertainty. Consequently, the individual speaking strong-future language may perceive the 
risk as higher. 
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6.8 Summary and conclusion  
The study has presented tests for the three hypotheses developed to provide findings for the 
third empirical research. Table 6.8 presents a summary of the hypothesis testing results. 
Table 6.8: Empirical Study 3 – Summary of the Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypothesis Expected Effect Result 
H13 
Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly 
stronger focus on the future (stronger FuturePerspective) than 
individuals speaking strong-future languages 
Supported 
H14 
Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly 
higher FRT than individuals speaking strong-future languages 
Supported 
H15 
Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly 
lower RP than individuals speaking strong-future languages 
Supported 
H16 
Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly 
higher RAtt than individuals speaking strong-future languages 
Not 
Supported 
Various research has been conducted within the financial risk tolerance (FRT) topic due to its 
importance in determining an individual’s risk appetite. As a consequence, many factors have 
been found to influence one’s risk tolerance. This study adds to the field an additional 
significant determinant of FRT, namely, language. Furthermore, the study also found that the 
underlying mechanism of language-FRT relationship is the perception on financial risk 
exhibited by individuals. Therefore, findings obtained in this study can be used as a proxy to 
assess one’s FRT as well as altering it through an intervention in RP. 
The linguistic-FRT hypothesis of this study developed based on the conjecture for linguistic-
saving hypothesis developed by Chen (2013). According to his explanation, languages encode 
time in different ways. Some languages associate the future and the present, whilst others 
clearly differentiate between them. The former group is referred to as weak-future languages 
and the latter is strong-future languages. Chen (2013) projected that these differences in 
language structure cause differences in individual’s perception of time. Particularly, strong-
future languages enforce their speakers to distinguish the future from the present using 
grammatical markers. On the other hand, speakers of weak-future languages are not obligate to 
do so. Therefore, as strong-future speakers habitually specify the timing of events, they perceive 
future further away from the present than weak-future speakers do. Based on that difference, it 
is conjectured that language influences FRT through linguistic-induced bias in time perception 
and in the precision of timing. Whilst Chen (2013) only hypothesised the linguistic-time 
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perception association, this study attempts to provide some evidence to justify it.  Based on the 
literature, the study projects an individual’s time perception to be associated with their future 
time perspective (FuturePerspective). Specifically, if individuals see the future to be closer to 
the present, they tend to pay more focus in the future (stronger FuturePerspective). 
Consequently, although no study has developed a quantitative measure of time perception, the 
study employed the measure of FuturePerspective developed by Hershey et al. (2007) as its 
proxy. According to the results, it is found that weak-future native speakers tend to focus more 
in the future, thus may see the future as closer to the present when compared to strong-future 
native speakers and weak-future multilinguals in at least one strong-future language (weak-
strong multilinguals).   
Subsequently, the study empirically tested the linguistic-FRT hypothesis. The study found that 
with the same investment option, weak-future language speaking individuals are more willing 
to engage with the investment by offering a higher price (more risk tolerant) than strong-future 
language speaking individuals. The cross-linguistic difference in FRT can be explained mainly 
by the cross-linguistic differences in risk perception. In essence, individuals speaking weak-
future languages perceive the investment as less risky than individuals speaking strong-future 
languages do. Nonetheless, if those weak-future language speakers can fluently speak at least 
one strong-future language, their risk perceptions will significantly increase. As a result, those 
weak-strong multilinguals are less risk tolerant when compared to weak-future language 
monolinguals. 
Lastly, the moderating effect of multilingual aspect is anticipated. Although individuals 
speaking weak-future languages are not required to distinguish between the future and the 
present when they speak, they are forced to do so when acquiring and being able to speak 
proficiently in an additional strong-future language. That change lengthens the perceived 
investment maturity, perhaps, more than the time perceived by the strong-future language 
monolinguals because foreign speakers are required to pay greater attention to the temporal 
grammatical points.   
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Chapter Seven: 
Conclusion and Implications 
7.1 Overview of the research 
The thesis is mainly concerned with exploring uncovered factors (age, culture and language) 
that influence individuals’ financial risk tolerance (FRT), and examining risk perception (RP) 
and risk attitude (RAtt) as the two fundamental underlying psychological channels, through 
which those influences on FRT take place. Definitions of financial risk tolerance (FRT), risk 
perception (RP), and risk attitude (RAtt) are summarised in Figure 2.2 (Section 2.2). Based on 
solid theoretical foundations, the measures of these constructs are developed (Sections 2.3 and 
2.4, respectively).  
The objectives of this study include: (1) investigating the mediating roles of RP and RAtt on 
the age effect on FRT (study 1, Chapter 4), (2) testing for the moderating effect of age on the 
cross-cultural differences in FRT and its underlying mechanisms (RP and RAtt), (3) examining 
the reduction in cushion buffer across age as an explanation for (2) (study 2, Chapter 5), and 
(4) investigating the effect of language on FRT and its underlying mechanisms (study 3, 
Chapter 6). In brief, the study has successfully enhanced the understanding of the influences of 
age and culture on FRT and intriguingly discovered language as an important factor causing 
difference in FRT across individuals.  
During the process of achieving the above objectives, certain choices and trade-offs were 
inevitably made regarding the research design (Sections 2.4 and 3.2), study sample (Section 
3.3), and methodology (Section 3.4). The investigation was conducted in five diverse cultural 
and linguistic countries: The United States, The United Kingdom, Singapore, China and 
Vietnam. The justifications for these choices are discussed in Section 1.3.4. Overall, the 
implementation of the data collection stage was considered highly successful in achieving the 
thesis’s objectives, with a final sample size of 1,889 individuals (at least 300 respondents from 
each country).  
In terms of the quality of the obtained data, the study tested for its data’s comparability with 
Weber and Hsee’s (1998) data by employing the same methodology with them. Technically, 
this research thesis replicates the study of Weber and Hsee, one of the leading research in the 
cross-cultural context of FRT, in many aspects. These include the definitions, theoretical 
background, experimental task and computations of the main constructs. Besides, by employing 
the same statistical methods (mosaic bivariate analysis) as the baseline, the study obtained the 
same findings with those obtained by Weber and Hsee (Sections 4.5.1, 5.5.2.1, and 5.5.3). As 
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a result, it can be concluded that this study’s data is comparable to that of Weber and Hsee. This 
provides the thesis with more credibility in terms of its final findings. Nonetheless, this baseline 
method is employed mainly for ensuring the data’s quality before the main contributions of the 
thesis are achieved. Note that those empirical contributions significantly add values to the 
literature of the FRT topic (Table 2.1, Section 2.2.3).  
Nevertheless, due to a number of limitations exposed to the bivariate approach, the study 
employed the model-based mosaic multivariate approach as the main statistical analysis to 
derive the final findings. According to the statistical results, individuals were consistently found 
to perceive risk differently from one another. Therefore, subjective RP is the main measure of 
RP. As individuals perceive risk subjectively, the applicable measure of RAtt is the subjective 
RAtt (bR). To get a better insight into the main findings of the three empirical studies of this 
thesis, more information will be provided in the subsequent section.  
7.2 Main findings of the study 
7.2.1 Empirical study 1 (Chapter 4). Financial Risk Tolerance Across Age: An 
Examination of the Mediating roles of Risk Perception and Risk Attitude 
Academic researchers increasingly pay attention on whether differences in willingness to take 
risk (FRT) across individuals is because they have different risk perception (RP) and/or 
different risk attitude (RAtt). Accordingly, the mediating roles of RP and RAtt on the influences 
of many factors on FRT have been investigated, except for age despite the fact that it has been 
widely accepted as one of the most prominent demographic determinants of FRT (Hallahan et 
al., 2003). As a result, the study contributes to this research gap by examining the two 
underlying mechanisms (RP and RAtt) of the age influence on FRT. Prior to this main 
contribution, an examination of the existence of age-FRT relationship was initially conducted: 
H1: “There is a statistically significant difference in individual FRT across age”, was supported 
and negative age effect was obtained.  
The result for H1 is consistent with the life-cycle risk aversion hypothesis. It indicates that age 
negatively influences one’s level of FRT. More precisely, older individuals are less willing to 
engage in risky financial options. Subsequently, two additional hypotheses (H2 and H3) were 
tested to investigate the underlying reason for the finding of H1.  
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H2: “There is a statistically significant difference in individual RP across age”, was supported 
and positive coefficient of age was obtained. 
H3: “There is a statistically significant difference in individual RAtt across age”, was not 
supported. 
Among the two hypotheses, only H2 was supported with a significant positive coefficient of age 
indicating that the attitudes toward financial risk of older and younger individuals are relatively 
similar (insignificant H3). The reason for older individuals being more willing to take financial 
risk is that they subjectively perceive the same investment option as riskier comparing to 
younger individuals (significant H2).  
Conclusion:  Considering the same investment option, older individuals are less willing to 
engage in the option because they perceive the option as riskier and they dislike financial risk 
more than younger individuals. 
7.2.2 Empirical study 2 (Chapter 5). Does Age Influence Cross-cultural Difference in 
Financial Risk Tolerance? Reduction of Cushion Buffer in Older Individuals 
The second empirical study started with the examination of cross-cultural differences in FRT 
through RP and/or RAtt (H4 to H6), and the Weber and Hsee’s (1998) cushion hypothesis (H7). 
Overall, regardless whether the study employs Weber and Hsee’s (1998) approach (bivariate 
and national-level of culture analysis) or other approaches (multivariate and individual-level of 
culture analysis), the same findings were obtained. 
H4: “More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly lower RP than less collectivistic and 
individualistic individuals”, was supported. 
H5: “More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly higher RAtt than less collectivistic and 
individualistic individuals”, was not supported. 
The negative effect of culture on RP was supported (H4) indicating that with the same 
investment option, more collectivistic individuals perceive the investment as less risky. 
However, the effect of culture on RAtt were not supported (H5). It implies that there is cross-
cultural similarity in individual attitudes toward financial risks. The subsequent H6 would 
indicate that whether the lower RP of more collectivistic causes them to be more risk tolerant.  
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H6: “More collectivistic individuals exhibit significantly higher level of FRT than less 
collectivistic and individualistic individuals”, was supported.  
The result of H6 indicates that individuals with higher values of collectivism are willing to pay 
more to engage with the investment options than are less collectivistic or individualistic 
individuals. Combining all three hypotheses, it is concluded that cross-cultural difference in 
FRT is associated mainly with cross-cultural in RP but not in RAtt. The next hypothesis (H7) is 
tested to clarify whether the cushion (access to financial help) possessed by more collectivistic 
individuals is the reason that makes them see lower financial risk. 
H7: “More collectivistic individuals have significantly more access to financial support than 
do less collectivistic and individualistic individuals”, was supported. 
To test this hypothesis H7, this study employs three different statistical methods: bivariate 
analysis, Baron and Kenny’s four-step mediation model, and Structural Equation Modelling. It 
is consistently found that individuals with stronger collectivistic values tend to have greater 
access to financial support. As a result, they perceive smaller risk, which causes their higher 
level of risk tolerance. In other words, the cushion hypothesis is supported.  
Note that these hypotheses are the main contributions of Weber and Hsee (1998). This study 
replicates their paper in many aspects: the definitions, theoretical background, experimental 
task and computations of the main constructs (FRT, RP and RAtt). By re-examining these 
contributions using exactly the same statistical method (mosaic bivariate analysis with the use 
of Hofstede’s cultural classification as the proxy of individual culture), the same findings infer 
that the data of this thesis is comparable to that of Weber and Hsee (1998). Consequently, the 
reduction of the number of financial investment options (twelve to six) in the FRT task 
employed from Weber and Hsee (1998) is sufficient to conduct this study robustly. 
According to findings obtained thus far in this second empirical study, the key point is that there 
is cross-cultural difference in FRT, which is mainly associated with cross-cultural in RP. 
Moving forward to the main research, subsequent hypotheses H8 to H10 determine whether age 
influences the cultural difference in RP and/or RAtt, and whether such moderation age effect is 
strong enough to influence the cross-cultural difference in FRT.  
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H8: “Age significantly positively affects the cross-cultural difference in RP”, was not 
supported. 
H9: “Age significantly negatively affects the cross-cultural difference in RAtt”, was not 
supported. 
H10: “Age significantly negatively affects the cross-cultural difference in FRT”, was supported. 
Evidently, the first two hypotheses H8 and H9 were not supported. This indicates that cultural 
effects on RP and RAtt are independent of one’s age. Recalling H5, culture was found to not 
influence RAtt. Therefore, it was expected that the moderating effect of age in H9 was 
insignificant. On the other hand, although cross-cultural differences in RP were evident from 
H4, the age moderating effect on that difference is not statistically significant. In other words, 
the difference in RP across culture is constant with age.  
Nevertheless, with the insignificant results of H8 and H9, hypothesis H10 was supported. 
Implicitly, this means that although age does not influence the cross-cultural differences in RP, 
it is found to reduce the cross-cultural difference in FRT. In other words, the FRT gap between 
collectivism and individualism reduces with age. To explain these findings, the study tested for 
the difference in individual cushion across age. 
Particularly, the study initially conjectured that the development of shame, guilt, 
embarrassment, and self-esteem across age occurs strongly for collectivism. Therefore, older 
collectivistic individuals are less willing to ask for financial support, even if the support is the 
same with younger collectivistic individuals. In this case, there is financial support available, 
but it may not be considered/perceived as ‘cushion’. Consequently, the study hypothesised H11 
and H12 to examine whether the cushion gets thinner with age for the collectivism exclusively.  
H11: “Older collectivistic individuals have significantly less access to financial support than 
younger collectivistic individuals”, was not supported. 
H12: “Older collectivistic individuals are significantly less willing to ask for financial help than 
younger collectivistic individuals”, was supported. 
The reduction in the social cushion of collectivism across age was empirically confirmed. As 
conjectured, that reduction was not caused by reduction in financial support availability (H11) 
but by a reduction in individuals’ willingness to seek for help (H12). Nevertheless, to explain 
for the insignificant moderating age effect on cross-cultural differences in RP (H8), the study 
conducted an additional statistical test on the cushion of individualism across age. The result 
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indicated that the social cushion buffer of older individualistic individuals also reduced in a 
similar way to older collectivistic individuals. However, that reduction for individualistic 
individuals is because of the lower access to financial support due to the nature of individualism, 
not their attitude to seeking help. Indeed, their willingness to ask for help remains the same 
across age. This is expected since individualism is known for their independency upon the 
group.  
Conclusion: Individuals, who hold stronger collectivistic view, have more access to financial 
support from their society, than do less collectivistic or individualistic individuals. The 
greater financial support acts as a cushion buffering individuals from getting hurt by 
financial failure. As a result, with the same financial investment, more collectivistic 
individuals perceive the investment as less risky, but their attitudes toward financial risk are 
the same as those of less collectivistic or individualistic individuals. With lower risk 
perceptions, more collectivistic individuals are more willing to engage in the investment, 
showing their higher level of risk tolerance. 
Nonetheless, the higher level of risk tolerance exhibited by collectivistic individuals are 
reduced with age. However, that reduction may be caused through other channels rather than 
risk perception as expected. Specifically, the difference in risk perceptions between 
collectivism and individualism remains unchanged across age. The reason is that the 
cushions of both collectivism and individualism decline across age.  
7.2.3 Empirical study 3 (Chapter 6). From Language to Financial Risk Tolerance through 
the Channels of Risk Perception and Risk Attitude 
A review of the literature in the FRT topic revealed that this study is the first to investigate 
language as a factor influencing one’s risk tolerance level. Building on the explanation of Chen 
(2013) for his linguistic-saving hypothesis, the linguistic-FRT hypothesis H14 is developed and 
tested: 
H14: “Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly higher FRT than 
individuals speaking strong-future languages”, was supported.  
The support for H14 indicates that individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit higher 
levels of FRT when compared to strong-future language speakers. However, it is also found 
that FRT levels of weak-future language speakers, who can speak at least one strong-future 
language with high proficiency, are significantly lower than ones that only speak weak-future 
languages. 
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As linguistic effect on FRT is confirmed, its underlying mechanisms are investigated in 
hypotheses H15 and H16. 
H15: “Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly lower RP than  
individuals speaking strong-future languages”, was supported: 
H16: “Individuals speaking weak-future languages exhibit significantly higher RAtt than 
individuals speaking strong-future languages”, was not supported: 
Among the two tested hypotheses, only H15 is supported. It confirmed that language does have 
a role to play in influencing one’s risk perception. The results indicate that considering the same 
investment option, weak-future language speakers see the investment less risky than strong-
future language speakers. Nonetheless, individuals speaking weak-future native languages with 
the proficiency in speaking at least one strong-future language, exhibit higher levels of RP when 
compared to individuals speaking weak-future language solely. 
This supported hypothesis matches completely well with the first mosaic (H14). Combining the 
three mosaics together, it implies that the cross-linguistic difference in FRT found in H18 is 
associated with the cross-linguistic difference in RP but not in RAtt.  
Conclusion: The study found that with the same investment option, weak-future language 
speaking individuals are more willing to engage with the investment by offering higher price 
(more risk tolerant) than strong-future language speaking individuals. The cross-linguistic 
difference in FRT can be explained mainly by cross-linguistic differences in risk perception. 
In essence, individuals speaking weak-future languages perceive the investment as less risky, 
than individuals speaking strong-future languages. 
Nonetheless, if those weak-future language speakers can fluently speak at least one strong-
future language, their risk perceptions will significantly increase. As a result, those 
multilinguals are less risk tolerant when compared to weak-future language monolinguals. 
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7.3 Implications 
Given the assessment and understanding of financial risk tolerance as a fundamental factor that 
highly impacts investor’s risk-taking behaviour, the thesis can practically be of interest to a 
wide range of financial practitioners. These include (1) individual, (2) financial advisers (or 
financial planners) and investment managers, and (3) the financial service industry regulators.  
7.3.1 Implications for Individual Investors 
It is pertinent for individual investors, especially those not seeking financial advice and 
assistance from professionals, to be aware of their own financial risk tolerance. Failure to assess 
one’s own FRT would lead to inappropriate portfolio allocation decisions, and hence, 
unnecessary losses may occur (Yao et al., 2011). This research supports investors in assessing 
their FRT based on their age, culture, and language. Furthermore, as RP is found to be the 
underlying mechanism of one’s FRT formation, individuals can attempt to alter their RP by 
means of training and education in financial investments. Hopefully, with better understanding 
in finance, their RP and hence FRT can be adjusted to a more appropriate level. 
7.3.2 Implications for Financial Advisers and Investment Managers 
As addressed in Chapter 1 regarding the increasing need of better quality of financial services, 
financial advisers and investment managers are encouraged to enhance their assessment of the 
FRT of their clients.  
Financial advisers and investment managers can use the findings reported in this thesis as 
proxies to estimate the clients’ FRT. Specifically, they can recommend more risky investments 
to younger, or more collectivistic, or weak-future speaking individuals. Note that since age was 
found to moderate the cross-cultural difference in FRT, financial advisers should take into 
account both clients’ cultural backgrounds and their age in the risk appetite estimation 
procedure. In the current era of globalisation, it may be necessary for financial planners to 
assess the clients’ cultural values using an individual construal cultural scale (e.g. Singelis, 
1994) and all the languages that they can speak (multilingual aspect). Because age, culture and 
language are measured at individual level, the generalisation of this research is applicable across 
many countries and at different time point.  
Furthermore, the thesis’s findings also suggest financial advisers to attempt to understand the 
risk perception of their clients. Given the results of this research, risk perception rather than risk 
attitude is the main mechanism causing individuals to either overstate or understate the riskiness 
of financial investments. If the advisers suspect ill-judged risk perception they can try to provide 
them with more financial basic knowledge and information, such as, risk-return relationship, 
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with the hope that their RP can be adjusted, and hence their FRT to more reasonable level. In 
the long term, future research can investigate and develop more robust mechanisms that allow 
practitioners to effectively alter individual FRT through RP to a more appropriate level and to 
tailor their advices to individual more precisely such that individual well-being and utility can 
be maximised.    
Indeed, the assessment of RP in conjunction with FRT during the advisory process is mandatory 
even after having an accurate estimate of the client’s FRT. The reason is that the risk perceptions 
of a financial professional and a financially naïve investor are not the same. If the advisers do 
not understand how much risk the clients perceive they may end up mismatching the portfolio 
with their clients’ risk tolerance.  
Furthermore, to expand the demand for financial services, financial advisors and investment 
managers should enhance their relationship with under-served client groups, such as, young 
investors, minorities (e.g. Vietnamese investors in the US), investors speaking different 
languages (e.g. investors living in the US but can only fluent in Chinese), and so on. They can 
develop and tailor new services and programs that are suitable and appeal to those minor groups, 
or hire advisors with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds that relate well to different 
clients.  
Overall, this study would like to address a general recommendation to financial advisers such 
that more observations should be conducted. Financial advisers should spend more time with 
their clients to help both parties effectively assess the personal levels of FRT and RP of the 
clients as well as assisting the clients to understand more about the riskiness levels of the 
investment options.  
7.3.3 Implications for Industry Regulators 
Given the importance of investors’ RP as an underlying process of FRT formation, further 
research on this topic should take place to assure the mediating role of RP. As a result, the 
findings of this thesis can be practically applied at richer level. In the long term, the industry 
leaders and professional organisations may consider revising the current guidelines requiring 
financial advisers and investment managers to assess their client risk perception in conjunction 
with their financial risk tolerance during the advisory process.  
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7.4 Suggestions for future research 
With detailed discussions about the study’s findings, contributions and implications, this final 
Section aims at identifying future directions and research opportunities in the area.  
(1) By the employment of cross-sectional data, this research cannot explicitly draw on the 
changes in FRT, RP, and RAtt, as people age. Therefore, future research should consider 
using longitudinal study to examine the possible reduction in these constructs over the 
life-cycle.  
(2) One potential issue of the risk perception (RP) measurement is that the difference in RP 
across individuals may be instead a result of different scaling being employed by each 
person. Therefore, future research should attempt to develop a new measure of RP that 
can tackle this issue.  
(3) The survey approach has a limitation such that without the presence of the researcher, 
quality of the respondents’ responses cannot be ensured, despite many quality check 
methods have been utilised (Section 3.3.2). Therefore, if possible, future research should 
employ mixed methods, including, survey, interview, and focus group, to confirm the 
findings obtained in this thesis.  
(4) Using an online survey as the main data collection process may lead the data to subject 
to self-selection bias. Particularly, the characteristics of respondents who found the 
survey and decided to complete it may be different from others. Future research may 
consider collect their data from different sources: students, office working place, on the 
street, shopping mall, and online survey. With such data, a Heckman selection-bias 
correction can be employed to address this issue.  
(5) Two potential controlling and moderating factors that are related to age and FRT should 
be taken into account in future research, namely, investment experience and cognitive 
ability across the life span. In essence, older people tend to accumulate more investment 
experience (Yao et al., 2011) but their cognitive ability is declined overtime (Fair, 1994).  
(6) Although a myriad of research studied the effects of many factors on FRT, a scarcity of 
research was conducted on RP and RAtt to justify the channels through which those 
effects take place. This provides room for future research to fill in this gap. For example, 
mediating effects of RP and RAtt on effects of, such as wealth and income, on FRT.  
(7) Thus far, the research explores the investors’ minds or thoughts without any 
justifications on their actual behaviour. It is not a surprise if people act differently from 
what they think and are willing to do. Consequently, future research can be conducted 
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to examine whether financial risk tolerance accurately predicts one’s actual investment 
behaviours. 
(8) The linguistic-FRT hypothesis is built on the conjecture that language influences 
individual’s time perception. Specifically, speakers of weak-future languages perceive 
the future closer when compared to speakers of strong-future languages. Up to now, 
quantitative measure of individual’s time perception has yet been developed. Future 
research can focus on this gap and develop a measure for this psychological construct. 
(9) Language was first found in this research as a factor influencing one’s FRT through RP. 
Future investigation should attempt to identify the underlying reason of the findings. 
For example, the current thesis proposed two possible reasons. These are (1) the 
uncertain nature of the future (6.7.1), and (2) the temporal resolution of uncertainty 
(Section 6.7.2). Future research may try to test these two conjectures empirically, or 
identify alternative explanations. 
(10) In terms of practical implications, as mentioned in Section 7.3, further research should 
be conducted to explore precise channels so that studies working on RP and FRT can be 
applied effectively in the real-world setting. So far, academic research has only 
suggested factors that can be used to predict one’s FRT, and that FRT can change by 
altering RP. To apply these findings more effectively, it would be useful if future 
research can investigate the appropriate levels of FRT and RP for each individual. 
Accordingly, financial practitioners can decide if FRT should be adjusted through RP.
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Information letter and Questionnaire 
Research Information Sheet (English version) 
Research project:   
I would like to invite you to participate in this survey as part of my doctoral research project 
on Effects of cultural ethos and language on financial risk tolerance across the life span and 
ways of achieving a conceptual model for Behavioural Finance and Economics. It is entirely 
up to you whether you participate but your responses would be valued. This sheet provides 
you with information about why the research is being done, by whom and what is involved. 
This background information is to ensure that you are able to make an informed decision 
about whether or not to take part in the survey. This project has been approved by the Ethical 
Panel of the Newcastle University. 
Who is the Researcher?  
The research is conducted by Ngan Duong Cao (Rosie), a PhD candidate of Newcastle 
University in Finance and Economics; and is supervised by Professor Darren Duxbury and 
Professor Susan Chilton. 
What is the research about?  
My research is aimed at finding out changes in individual’s financial risk tolerance across the 
life span. The primary aim of my research is to provide a unifying framework for the 
examination of cross-national differences in individuals’ financial risk tolerance across the life 
course, drawing on and uniting contributions from a range of diverse fields, including finance, 
economics, psychology, linguistic, sociology and anthropology. At the heart of the research 
agenda is a desire to better understand individuals’ decision making under risk and uncertainty 
and over time in the context of investment behaviour, how these may change over the life span. 
Who are the participants?  When is the project running?  
Potential participants will be residents of the four countries of investigation: China, Vietnam, 
the UK and the US. Participants will be above the age of 18. Participants will be recruited 
entirely online. The project runs from October 2014 to October 2017.  
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Is this voluntary? What if you change your mind about taking part? 
Your involvement in this research project is voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the 
research at any point you wish UP TO submission. If you do so, you do not have to give a 
reason. As the survey is completely anonymous, any wish of withdrawal after submission 
cannot be fulfilled.  
What would be involved? 
If you choose to participate, we would like to ask you a series of broad questions about your 
willingness to take on financial risk and actual financial investments, questions related to your 
psychological constructs; together with your personal information about your cultural values 
and beliefs. These broad questions are about the following:  a) Your financial risk tolerance and 
perception of risk b) Your actual financial asset investments c) Your languages and cultural 
backgrounds d) Psychological-related questions e) Your demographic, socioeconomic and 
attitudinal information.  
How will the survey data be treated?  
The survey requires neither participant name nor any identifying details. The questionnaire 
will be completed anonymously. Responses from completed questionnaires will be collated 
for analysis using a statistical package (STATA); once this is complete the original 
questionnaires will be retained until successful completion of a PhD. Up to this stage, the data 
will then be transferred via spreadsheets on to a computer. The computer and research folder 
are password protected. 
Will everything you say to me be kept private? 
Yes, all information will be anonymous and thus minimise the issue of confidentiality.  
The requirements of Newcastle University’s ethical guidelines will be strictly observed. 
This means that at all times the researcher must observe the welfare of the research 
participants and respect the dignity and personal privacy of the individual. All data collected 
will also be stored securely and safely. All data to be published will be completely 
anonymous in order to protect the confidentiality of participants. 
In practical terms, this means that:  
 All data will be fully anonymised.   
 This is achieved via the use of pseudonyms.  
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 This anonymity is extended to any other individual or organisation referred to.  
 The data will be used to advance academic knowledge and/or professional practice 
only and will not be used for any other purpose.   
 With this express aim, anonymised data may be incorporated into articles or 
presentations.  
What next?  
I will produce the general outcomes of our research on the website. If there are any areas 
that require further clarification, you are welcome to contact me via the ‘Contact’ page on 
the website. I will be pleased to answer any questions. If you choose not to take part in this 
research, I wish to thank you for your time. You need take no further action.  
Contact: Rosie Cao (PhD candidate) Newcastle University Business School (Room 6.22) 
Email: n.d.cao1@newcastle.ac.uk   
Office number: (+44) 1912081601
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Questionnaire (English version – The US survey) 
Project: Effects of culture and language on financial risk tolerance 
1 I have read and understood the information about 
the project, as provided in the information sheet  
 
 
2 I have been given the opportunity to ask 
questions about the project and my participation 
 
 
3 I voluntarily agree to participate in the project 
 
 
4 I understand that I can withdraw at any time 
without giving reasons and that I will not be 
penalised for withdrawing, nor will I be 
questioned on why I have withdrawn 
 
 
5 The procedures regarding confidentiality (e.g. the 
use of names, pseudonyms, anonymisation of 
data, etc.) have been clearly explained to me 
 
 
6 The use of data in research, publications, sharing 
and archiving has been explained to me 
 
 
 
  
I consent to participate in this project YES NO 
I consent to any information I provide to the project being used in 
the writing up of the research, in publications, uploaded to websites 
and included in archives of research reports, provided that unless I 
give my express permission, my name and other identifying personal 
details will not be associated with the information I provide 
YES NO 
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PART I: GENERAL INFORMATION 
1) In what year were you born? 
      
2) What is your gender? 
          
3) What is your marital status? 
          
4) Do you have any children?  
          
5) How many family members do you have in your household, besides yourself? 
                
6) What is the highest level of education you have completed or the highest degree you 
have received? 
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PART II: FINANCIAL RISK TOLERANCE 
In the following question, you will be presented with an example question and 
guideline answer before answering the real questions. 
EXAMPLE QUESTION and GUIDELINE ANSWER: 
Assume that you have a maximum of $30,000 to invest in each investment product.  
The investment product S has three potential outcomes. P1, P2, and P3 indicate the 
probabilities of obtaining outcome 1, outcome 2, and outcome 3, respectively. 
Investment 
 Product 
Outcome 1 P1 Outcome 2 P2 Outcome 3 P3 
S $1000 59 % -$500 30 % -$2000 11% 
Question: What is the maximum price you would be willing to pay for this investment 
product, rather than forgoing it? [If you wouldn’t buy it at any price, write 0]  
Answer: $X ⇒ You are happy to pay up to $X to buy this product S, which gives you 59% 
chance to win $1000; 30% chance of losing $500, and 11% chance of losing $2000. And 
remember that you will not get back the $X you paid. Therefore, with Outcome 1, you would 
RECEIVE $1000, and with Outcome 2 or Outcome 3, you would PAY EXTRA either $500 
or $2000, respectively.  
 Note: $X is the highest price you would be willing to pay, not the lowest price.  
QUESTIONS: 
You will now examine 6 investment products separately, considering the possible 
losses and gains. 
REMEMBER: 
 You start EACH investment decision with $30,000 
 You do not get the cost of investment back 
 There are no right or wrong answers 
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Investment 
Product 
Outcome 1 P1 Outcome 2 P2 Outcome 3 P3 
1 $600 56 % -$200 38 % -$1,100 6% 
    
 
1. What is the maximum price you would be willing to pay for this investment 
product, rather than forgoing it? [If you wouldn’t buy it at any price, write 0] 
 
 
 
2. On a scale of 0 to 100, how risky do you think this investment product is? [Where 0 is 
“Not at all risky” and 100 is “Extremely risky”] 
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 Investment 
Product 
Outcome 1 P1 Outcome 2 P2 Outcome 3 P3 
2 $5,200 79 % -$7,900 20 % -$24,000 1% 
 
 
3. What is the maximum price you would be willing to pay for this investment 
product, rather than forgoing it? [If you wouldn’t buy it at any price, write 0] 
 
 
 
4. On a scale of 0 to 100, how risky do you think this investment product is? [Where 0 is 
“Not at all risky” and 100 is “Extremely risky”] 
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Investment  
Product 
Outcome 1 P1 Outcome 2 P2 Outcome 3 P3 
3 $13,900 11% $5,100 44% -$3,600 45% 
 
 
5. What is the maximum price you would be willing to pay for this investment 
product, rather than forgoing it? [If you wouldn’t buy it at any price, write 0] 
 
 
 
6. On a scale of 0 to 100, how risky do you think this investment product is? [Where 0 is 
“Not at all risky” and 100 is “Extremely risky”] 
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Investment  
Product 
Outcome 1 P1 Outcome 2 P2 Outcome 3 P3 
4 $6,900 56% -$2,500 38% -$12,100 6% 
 
 
 
7. What is the maximum price you would be willing to pay for this investment 
product, rather than forgoing it? [If you wouldn’t buy it at any price, write 0] 
 
 
 
8. On a scale of 0 to 100, how risky do you think this investment product is? [Where 0 is 
“Not at all risky” and 100 is “Extremely risky”] 
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Investment  
Product 
Outcome 1 P1 Outcome 2 P2 Outcome 3 P3 
5 $1,300 11% $500 44% -$300 45% 
 
 
9. What is the maximum price you would be willing to pay for this investment 
product, rather than forgoing it? [If you wouldn’t buy it at any price, write 0] 
 
 
 
10. On a scale of 0 to 100, how risky do you think this investment product is? [Where 0 is 
“Not at all risky” and 100 is “Extremely risky”] 
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Investment  
Product 
Outcome 1 P1 Outcome 2 P2 Outcome 3 P3 
6 $25,800 1% $12,400 20 % -$700 79% 
 
 
11. What is the maximum price you would be willing to pay for this investment 
product, rather than forgoing it? [If you wouldn’t buy it at any price, write 0] 
 
 
 
12. On a scale of 0 to 100, how risky do you think this investment product is? [Where 0 is 
“Not at all risky” and 100 is “Extremely risky”] 
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PART III: SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
1) Which of the following categories best describes your employment status? 
           
2) Do you or someone in your household own as house/apartment?  
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3) What is your total estimated net worth/wealth: what you own, including cash, 
investment, your home and other personal-use assets; minus what you owe? (($ US Dollar) 
       
4) Within the wealth band you have chosen above, please give the estimate of your net 
worth/wealth? ($) 
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5) What is your personal annual income before tax from all sources? This includes 
income from jobs; net income from business, farm, or rent; pensions; dividends; interest; 
social security payments; and any other money income received by YOU. 
DO NOT SUBTRACT:  
 Taxes 
 National Insurance Contribution 
 Superannuation Payments  
 Health Insurance Payment  
 
6) Within the income band you have chosen above, please give the estimate of your 
personal annual income before tax from all source? ($) 
         
7)  Do you consider your current income stream to be stable or risky? 
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PART IV: CULTURE 
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not you agree with the statement 
“1”: Strongly disagree 
“7”: Strongly agree 
1) I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects 
 
2) I can talk openly with a person who I meet for the first time, even when this person is 
much older than I am 
 
3) Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument 
 
4) I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact 
 
5) I do my own thing, regardless of what others think 
 
6) I respect people who are modest about themselves 
 
7) I feel it is important for me to act as an independent person 
 
8) I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in 
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9) I’d rather say “No” directly, than risk being misunderstood 
 
10) Having a lively imagination is important to me 
 
11) I should take into consideration my parents’ advice when making education/career 
plans 
 
12) I feel my fate is intertwined with the fate of those around me 
 
13) I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I’ve just met 
 
14) I feel good when I cooperate with others 
 
15) I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards 
 
16) If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible 
 
17) I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my 
own accomplishments 
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18) Speaking up during a class (or a meeting) is not a problem for me 
 
19) I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor (or my boss) 
 
20) I act the same way no matter who I am with 
 
21) My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me 
 
22) I value being in good health above everything 
 
23) I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I am not happy with the group 
 
24) I try to do what is best for me, regardless of how that might affect others 
 
25) Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me 
 
26) It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group 
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27) My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me 
 
28) It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group 
 
29) I act the same way at home that I do at school (or work) 
 
30) I usually go along with what others want to do, even when I would rather do 
something different 
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PART V: LANGUAGE 
1) What languages do you speak?  
 
 
Rolling menu 
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PART VI: ATTITUDINAL CHARACTERISTICS 
1) Do you have a strong religious belief? 
          
2) How healthy are you in general? 
 
3) Which of the statements below comes closest to the amount of financial risk that you 
(and your husband/wife) are willing to take when you save or make investments? 
          
4) What is your expectation for the economy over the next 5 years? 
          
5) What is your expectation for the interest rates in the next year? 
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PART VII: SOCIAL NETWORK 
1) Excluding your spouse, with how many members of your family (parents, 
grandparents, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins, children, etc.) do you live? 
       
2) Except for the ones you live with, with how many members (parents, grandparents, 
siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins, children, etc.) of your family do you maintain contact 
(visiting, calling, or writing to them least once a month)? 
        
3) How many of those could you approach if you needed financial help or material 
support? 
         
4) How many of those would you approach if you needed financial help or material 
support? 
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PART VIII: HELP-SEEKING ATTITUDES 
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not you agree with the statement 
“1”: Strongly disagree 
“7”: Strongly agree 
1) If, for whatever reason, I were to have financial difficulties, I would do whatever 
possible to avoid asking help from anyone 
 
2) If I were to face a big sum of loss in investment, I would try to conceal this from my 
friends 
 
3) If a serious financial problem were to arise, I would be willing to talk about it with a 
professional, or with a friend or relative, but in any case I would not keep it to myself 
 
4) Financial problems are so distressing that they cannot be managed alone 
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PART IX: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
1) How long is your planning horizon for saving? (Years) 
          
2) Do you fully or partially support your family? 
          
3) To what extent do you expect your children to support you financially in retirement? 
 
4) How long have you been investing in stocks? (months) 
          
5) How important to leave an inheritance? 
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PART X: FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE VARIABLES 
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not you agree with the statement 
“1”: Strongly disagree 
“7”: Strongly agree 
1) I enjoy thinking about how I will live years from now in the future 
 
2) I follow the advice tosave for a rainy day 
 
3) The distant future is too uncertain to plan for 
 
4) The future seems very vague and uncertain to me 
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Debriefing Form 
 
Thanks for taking part in this survey 
 
Researcher:  Ngan D. Cao (Rosie) 
Supervisors: Professor Darren Duxbury and Professor Susan Chilton 
Institution: Newcastle University, the United Kingdom 
Department: Newcastle University Business School 
 
 What are the aims of the study?  
This is a cross-national study that investigates the impacts of one’s psychological 
constructs on individual’s financial risk tolerance and investment behaviour across the life 
course.  
 What if I have any questions about the study that I would like to ask now?  
Online study contact provided on the “Contact page” of the website. 
 How can I contact the researcher if I have any further questions or if, for any reason, I 
wish to withdraw my data once I have left?  
Researcher’s email: n.d.cao1@newcastle.ac.uk   
 Can I obtain a summary of the results of the study?  
To obtain details of the results contact the researcher at n.d.cao1@newcastle.ac.uk   
 
 
Thank you again for your participation in this study!  
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Appendix 2: DETAILS ON CURRENCY EXCHANGE 
Method 1: LPPI method 
The first method uses the Local Purchasing Power Index (LPPI), which indicates the purchasing 
power in buying goods and services of inhabitants with an average salary in each countries 
relative to inhabitants with an average wage in the US. Table I provides summary for the market 
exchange rate and the LPPI in 2016. For illustration, the LPPI of the UK is 86.23, this means 
that the residents in the UK with the average salary can afford to buy 12.77% less typical goods 
and services than American residents with an average salary. 
Table I: Exchange Rate and Local Purchasing Power Index (LPPI) in 201646 
Currency Exchange rate Countries LPPI (2016) 
USD 1  The US 100 
USD/GBP 0.6858  The UK 86.23 
USD/SGD 1.3969  Singapore 79.40 
USD/CNY 6.5548  China 55.63 
USD/VND 21,920 Vietnam 18.60 
 
The calculation for currency exchange rates accounting for purchasing power using LPPI can 
be written as:  
 S$/i_adj = S$/i * 
𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐼 (𝑖)
𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐼 (𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑈𝑆)
  
where S$/i_adj and S$/i are the exchange rates of target currency per US Dollar after and before 
adjusting for PPP, respectively.   
Method 2: CPI+R method [EMPLOYED METHOD] 
[INCLUDED IN THE MAIN TEXT SECTION 3.2.2] 
                                                 
46 Sources:  
Currency Conversion (Yahoo Finance, 2016) 
Cost of Living Index for Countries in 2016 (Numbeo, 2016) 
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Method 3: PPP conversion factor method 
The last currency conversion approach uses the Power Purchasing Parity (PPP) conversion 
factor, which is the amount of each currency required to purchase the same bundle of goods 
and services in their domestic market that one US Dollar would buy in the US market. Table II 
provides the PPP conversion factors for the five countries of investigation. The PPP conversion 
factor for the UK is 0.71, which indicates that £0.71 could buy the same amount of goods and 
services in the UK market as one US Dollar could buy in the US market. Consequently, the 
exchange rate of each target currency per US Dollar after adjusting for PPP is also the PPP 
conversion factor. The PPP conversion factors are provided for 47 economies by Eurostat and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  
Table II: Power Purchasing Parity (PPP) Conversion Factor in 201447 
Countries Currency PPP Conversion Factor (2014) 
The US US Dollar ($) 1 
The UK British Pound (£) 0.71 
Singapore Singaporean Dollar (S$) 0.86 
China Chinese Yuan (¥) 2.73 
Vietnam Vietnamese Dong (VND) 7710.48 
 
CPI+R method as the main currency conversion approach 
Considering advantages and drawbacks of each approach, the study chooses the second 
approach, that is, currency conversion based on the cost of living of each country relative to 
that of the United States. The rationale for the decision is based on the following four criteria:  
1) Plausible and logically reasonable application. 
2) One conversion rate is appropriate to use across the whole study. 
3) Most up-to-date market exchange rate and power purchasing parity index. 
4) Being supported by preceding literature. 
                                                 
47 Sources:  
Currency Conversion (Yahoo Finance, 2016) 
Cost of Living Index for Countries in 2016 (Numbeo, 2016) 
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Table III provides summary for the evaluation of the three currency exchange method.  
Table III: Criteria evaluation for each exchange conversion method 
Criteria 
Method 1 
Local Purchasing 
Power Index 
(LPPI) 
Method 2 
Consumer Price 
Plus Rent Index 
(CPI+R) 
Method 3 
Power 
Purchasing 
Parity (PPP) 
Conversion 
Factor 
Appropriate and logically 
reasonable to apply 
 √ √ 
One conversion rate used 
across the whole study 
 √ √ 
Most up-to-date information √ √  
Being consistent with 
previous literature 
    √48     
 
Among the three approaches, all the criteria set out were fulfilled if the CPI+R method is put 
into use. For the LPPI method, purchasing power of average salary earners in each targeted 
country relative to those in the US is taken into account.  According to this method, the real 
value of the conversion rate for each currency to the average earning inhabitants in each country 
is the same with the real value of $1 to the US inhabitants with average earnings. Under such 
interpretation, this method is not plausible to apply as only perspectives of average salary 
earners are considered. For example, according to the LPPI method, if respondents are provided 
with a maximum investment endowment of $30,000 in the US survey, and £20,000 in the UK 
survey, it means that, to British respondents with average salary, £20,000 worth as much as 
$30,000 to American respondents with average earnings. Therefore, the purchasing parity can 
only be achieved for average earners but not for respondents with higher or lower salary than 
the average salary.  
On the other hand, the CPI+R and PPP conversion factor methods are more appropriate. The 
two methods are based on the general cost of living of each country. For example, the 
conversion rates using these two methods indicate that £20,000 of income would be able to 
purchase the same bundle of goods and services in the UK market as would $30,000 of income 
in the US market. Therefore, comparability is feasible across individuals with different incomes 
                                                 
48 Bontempo, Bottom, and Weber (1997), Rieger, Wang, and Hens (2014), Weber and Hsee (1998), Wang and 
Fischbeck (2008) 
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and wealth. Nevertheless, one drawback of the PPP conversion factor approach which makes it 
less favourable than the CPI+R method is that its latest information is in 2014; whilst CPI+R is 
available for 2016. Consequently, among the three proposed methods, the CPI+R method is the 
most appropriate and thus is employed in the current study.
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Appendix 3: PILOT STUDY PROCESS 
PART I: FEEDBACK SHEET 
1. Is there any question that is unclear, ambiguous, and hard to understand?  
2. Is there any question that you did not want to answer (either due to privacy, sensitivity, 
or because it is too difficult to understand or measure)?  
If yes, please kindly advise me on the reasons. 
3. Is the survey layout and presentation clear and easy to follow? 
4. In general, do you understand the instructions of the first experimental question? (i.e. the 
FRT question)  
5. Is the order of the survey appropriate? 
6. Does it create a positive impression that motivates people to respond? 
7. Do you feel tired or bored while answering the survey (due to either the length or the 
topic of the survey)? 
8. Are all given choices for multiple choice questions appropriate and sufficient? 
9. Is the range of response choices actually used? 
10. Is there any question that subjectively lead you to answer in a certain way? 
 
 
 
  
205 
 
PART II: FEEDBACK QUESTIONS FOR THE FRT TASK 
1. Is the task instruction clear to you? 
2. Can you interpret the investment product 1 and your answer? 
3. How do you find the length of this task?  
4. Is 12 investment products a good number? IF answer is ‘NO’ 
5. How many investment products are good enough to maintain your focus and quality of 
your answers? 
6. Do you understand whether £20,000 is the endowment for each investment option or is 
allocated among six investment options? 
7. Do you understand whether you can get back the cost of investment?  
8. Do the outcomes of the investment product 1 influence the price you are willing to pay 
for the investment product 2? 
9. Are the costs you stated the maximum you would willing to pay? You will give up the 
investments if they turn out to be £1 more expensive? 
10. In case the answer is inappropriate, the following question was asked:  
11. Why are you willing to pay £X for this investment but you will only get back £Y (<X) 
for the best scenario? 
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PART III: QUALITY CHECK POINTS 
1) For the FRT task, respondents answer must be: 
- Lower than the given investment initial endowment. 
- Lower than the highest possible gain.  
 Respondents are excluded as they did not understand the question. 
2) Logical follow-up questions were set:   
 Respondents were asked to answer two questions: 
Q1: How many people COULD you approach for financial help? 
Q2: How many people WOULD you approach for financial help? 
Plausibly, answer to Q2 must be less than or equal to answer to Q1 
 For questions regarding respondent’s wealth and income, respondents are first asked about 
the range of their income and wealth, and subsequently are asked to provide an estimate. If 
the estimates they provided do not lie within the ranges they previously stated, they will be 
disqualified. 
3) For Vietnamese sample specifically, respondents that state monetary values of less than 
<1000 VND will be excluded. The reason is that there is no monetary value that is less than 
1,000VND is used.   
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Appendix 4: Data Coding (Independent Factors and Interaction Terms) 
The whole study contains 23 independent factors, which are claimed to have impacts on individual FRT. The 23 factors are divided into six groups: 
Explanatory factors, demographic factors, socioeconomic factors, attitudinal factors, geographical factors, and cushion hypothesis factors. This appendix 
briefly describes the questionnaires, measures and coding of those factors, together with a number of multiplicative terms used in the multivariate analysis.  
 Factors influencing FRT  
VARIABLE 
GROUP 
MEASURE 
(Questionnaire in Appendix 1) 
DESCRIPTION TYPE/SCALE 
Group 1: 
Explanatory 
factors 
Age 
P.I (Q1) 
Age of respondents (in years) capturing linear effect of age. It is 
constructed as: 
Age = 2016 – Year of birth 
Ratio (19-65) 
COL_IDV 
P.IV (Q1 – Q30) 
The main cultural measure is the Singelis self-construal scale, 
which forms an ordinal variable ranged from -6 (most 
individualistic) to 6 (most collectivistic). 
Ordinal (1-7) 
Native_Weak 
P.V (Q1) 
This variable captures the native language of respondents. 
Native_Weak = 1 if the language is weak future language 
Binary (0-1) 
Prof_Strong 
P.V (Q1) 
This variable captures other languages that respondents speak with 
high proficiency level besides their native language. Prof_Strong = 
1 if respondents speak AT LEAST one strong future language 
professionally 
Binary (0-1) 
Wealth 
P.III (Q3&4) 
A measure of household wealth in US Dollar 
Ratio  
(0-5,000,000) 
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Group 2: 
Demographic 
factors 
Single 
P.I (Q3) 
This variable captures one’s marital status. Single = 1 if 
respondent is single 
Binary (0-1) 
Gender 
P.I (Q2) 
Gender = 1 if respondent is male Binary (0-1) 
Child 
P.I (Q4) 
Child = 1 if respondent has at least one child Binary (0-1) 
Highschl 
P.I (Q6) 
This variable captures one’s education level. Highschl = 1 if 
respondent completed high school   
Binary (0-1) 
HhSize 
P.I (Q5) 
Number of family members living in respondent’s household Ratio (1-16) 
Income 
P.III (Q5&6) 
A measure of respondent’s personal annual income in US Dollar 
Ratio  
(0-864,000) 
Group 3: 
Socioeconomic 
factors 
Unemp 
P.III (Q1) 
Unemp = 1 if respondent is unemployed 
Binary (0-1) 
Selfemp 
P.III (Q1) 
Selfemp = 1 if respondent is self-employed 
Homeown 
P.III (Q2) 
Homeown = 1 if respondent has at least one house 
Rbelief 
P.VI (Q1) 
Rbelief = 1 if respondent has a strong religious belief Binary (0-1) 
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Group 4: 
Attitudinal 
factors 
IncStab 
P.III (Q7) 
A measure of income stability which is subjectively reported by 
respondent 
Ordinal (1-10) 
Health 
P.VI (Q2) 
A measure of respondent’s health condition which is subjectively 
reported by respondent 
Ordinal (1-10) 
SRA 
P.VI (Q3) 
SRA stands for self-reported risk aversion. A measure of 
respondent’s risk aversion in general which is subjectively 
reported 
Ordinal (1-5) 
Ecoexp 
P.VI (Q4) 
A measure captures respondent’s expectation on the economy over 
the next five years 
Ordinal (1-5) 
Interestexp 
P.VI (Q5) 
A measure captures respondent’s expectation on future interest rate Ordinal (1-5) 
Group 5: 
Geographical 
factors 
US US = 1 if respondents are from the United State 
Binary (0-1) 
UK UK = 1 if respondents are from the United Kingdom 
VN VN = 1 if respondents are from Vietnam 
SG SG = 1 if respondents are from Singapore 
Group 6: 
Cushion 
hypothesis 
factors 
Finhelp 
P.VII 
This variable measures one’s financial support availability. 
Specifically, it reveals the number of people one can approach for 
help in financial difficulty 
Ratio (0-40) 
Helpatt 
P.VIII 
A measure of one’s attitudes toward financial help which is 
calculated as the mean score of the answers to four questions 
Ordinal (1-7) 
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 Multiplicative 
terms 
Nweak_Pstrong 
The interaction variable examines the moderating effect of speaking professionally in at 
least one strong future language on the effect of speaking weak future native language 
Nweak_Age 
The interaction variable examines the moderating effect of age on the effect of speaking 
weak future native language 
Nweak_COL_IDV 
The interaction variable examines the moderating effect of culture on the effect of 
speaking weak future native language 
COL_IDV*Age The interaction variable examines the moderating effect of age on the cultural effect 
Age*LnW 
The interactive term between respondents’ age and wealth is used to test for moderation 
effects of wealth 
Age*Finhelp A measure of moderating effect of financial help availability (Finhelp) on age effect 
COL_IDV*Finhelp A measure of moderating effect of financial help availability (Finhelp) on cultural effect 
Age*Helpatt A measure of moderating effect of help attitude (Helpatt) on age effect 
COL_IDV*Helpatt A measure of moderating effect of help attitude (Helpatt) on cultural effect 
Finhelp*Helpatt 
A measure of moderating effect of help attitude (Helpatt) on the effect of financial help 
availability (Finhelp) 
The last two variables are three-way interaction variables. Though they are not directly explained the research question, if 
significant results are obtained for other interaction terms in which Finhelp and Helpatt are one of the components, it is 
appropriate to take into account these three-way interaction terms to improve the model fit 
COL_IDV*Age*Finhelp Three-way interaction between culture, age, and financial help availability 
COL_IDV*Age*Helpatt Three-way interaction between culture, age, and financial help attitude 
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Appendix 5: Extant Studies on Influences of Demographic, Socio-Economic and 
Attitudinal Factors on FRT 
Factors Variables Literature 
Demographic 
Age 
P.I (Q1) 
Grable (2000); Cohn et al. (1975), Yao et al. (2011); Wang 
and Hanna (1997); Harlow and Brown (1990); Hallahan et 
al. (2003); Hallahan et al. (2004); Summers et al. (2006); 
Bellante and Green (2004); Tanaka et al. (2010); Halek and 
Eisenhauer (2001); Morin and Suarez (1983); Grable et al. 
(2004); Riley and Chow (1992); Faff et al. (2008); Schooley 
and Worden (1996); Palsson (1996); Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek (2006); Faff et al. (2011) 
Gender 
P.I (Q2) 
Grable (2000); Yao et al. (2011); Harlow and Brown (1990); 
Hallahan et al. (2003); Hallahan et al. (2003); Hallahan et al. 
(2004); Bellante and Green (2004); Tanaka et al. (2010); 
Halek and Eisenhauer (2001); Grable et al. (2004); Faff et al. 
(2008); Schooley and Worden (1996); Palsson (1996); 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (2006); Faff et al. (2011) 
Marital status 
P.I (Q3) 
Cohn et al. (1975); Grable (2000); Yao et al. (2011); Wang 
and Hanna (1997); Hallahan et al. (2003); Hallahan et al. 
(2004); Halek and Eisenhauer (2001); Grable et al. (2004); 
Faff et al. (2008); Palsson (1996); Jianakoplos and Bernasek 
(2006) 
Child 
P.I (Q4) 
Bellante and Green (2004); Halek and Eisenhauer (2001); 
Palsson (1996); Jianakoplos and Bernasek (2006) 
Education 
P.I (Q6) 
Cohn et al. (1975); Grable (2000); Yao et al. (2011); Wang 
and Hanna (1997); Bellante and Green (2004); Hallahan et 
al. (2003); Tanaka et al. (2010); Halek and Eisenhauer 
(2001); Grable et al. (2004); Riley and Chow (1992); Faff et 
al. (2008); Faff et al. (2011) 
Household size 
P.I (Q5) 
Hallahan et al. (2004); Faff et al. (2008) 
Wealth 
P.III (Q3&4) 
Wang and Hanna (1997); Hallahan et al. (2003); Hallahan et 
al. (2004); Halek and Eisenhauer (2001); Morin and Suarez 
(1983); Riley and Chow (1992); Faff et al. (2008); Schooley 
and Worden (1996); Palsson (1996); Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek (2006); Faff et al. (2011) 
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Income 
P.III (Q5&6) 
Cohn et al. (1975); Grable (2000); Yao et al. (2011); Wang 
and Hanna (1997); Hallahan et al. (2003); Hallahan et al. 
(2003); Hallahan et al. (2004); Tanaka et al. (2010); Grable 
et al. (2004); Riley and Chow (1992); Faff et al. (2008); 
Schooley and Worden (1996); Palsson (1996); Faff et al. 
(2011) 
Socioeconomic 
Unemployed 
P.III (Q1) 
Yao et al. (2011); Halek and Eisenhauer (2001); Palsson 
(1996) 
Self-employed 
P.III (Q1) 
Yao et al. (2011); Halek and Eisenhauer (2001); Palsson 
(1996); Jianakoplos and Bernasek (2006) 
Home owner 
P.III (Q2) 
Palsson (1996); Jianakoplos and Bernasek (2006) 
Attitudinal 
Religious belief 
P.VI (Q1) 
Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) 
Health 
P.VI (Q2) 
Yao et al. (2011); Wang and Hanna (1997); Bellante and 
Green (2004); Jianakoplos and Bernasek (2006) 
SRA 
P.VI (Q3) 
Schooley and Worden (1996) 
Macroeconomic 
expectations 
P.VI (Q4&5) 
Grable (2000); Schooley and Worden (1996) 
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Appendix 6: EMPIRICAL STUDY 1 - MOSAIC 1 - Regression Result for the Full Model 
Determinants of FRT. Dependent Variable: LnWTP 
Mosaic 1 Uncentered Regression Centered-score Regression 
IVs Coefficient t-statistic VIF Coefficient t-statistic VIF η2partial 
Intercept 6.94567 5.69*** 0 5.42089 8.17*** 0  
Age -0.09281 -2.16** 70.53381 -0.02712 -4.16*** 1.70555 0.0061 
Age2 0.00052720 1.09 61.56238 0.00052720 1.09 1.24277 0.0002 
Age*LnW 0.00224 1.11 33.24472 0.00224 1.11 1.07151 0.0012 
Single -0.31941 -1.71* 2.22304 -0.31941 -1.71* 2.22304 0.0128 
Gender -0.00983 -0.08 1.07307 -0.00983 -0.08 1.07307 0.0014 
Child 0.19115 1.06 2.16559 0.19115 1.06 2.16559 0.0025 
Highschl 0.19085 1.10 1.18021 0.19085 1.10 1.18021 0.0072 
Hhsize -0.00493 -0.11 1.39954 -0.00493 -0.11 1.39954 0.0000 
LnW 0.03510 0.41 13.70295 0.12367 4.21*** 1.55101 0.0242 
LnInc 0.03864 1.17 1.36457 0.03864 1.17 1.36457 0.0007 
Unemp 0.21828 0.89 1.27754 0.21828 0.89 1.27754 0.0001 
Selfemp -0.32554 -1.17 1.05000 -0.32554 -1.17 1.05000 0.0011 
Homeown -0.06728 -0.40 1.28042 -0.06728 -0.40 1.28042 0.0001 
Rbelief 0.08770 0.63 1.25444 0.08770 0.63 1.25444 0.0003 
Incstab -0.00540 -0.20 1.10021 -0.00540 -0.20 1.10021 0.0000 
Health 0.03980 1.10 1.17097 0.03980 1.10 1.17097 0.0016 
SRA -0.27627 -4.73*** 1.26187 -0.27627 -4.73*** 1.26187 0.0132 
Ecoexp 0.05170 0.80 1.30972 0.05170 0.80 1.30972 0.0001 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Interestexp -0.00178 -0.02 1.29324 -0.00178 -0.02 1.29324 0.0003 
US -0.34686 -1.64* 2.21336 -0.34686 -1.64* 2.21336 0.0000 
UK -0.57199 -2.81*** 1.89681 -0.57199 -2.81*** 1.89681 0.0020 
VN -0.25442 -1.03 1.98272 -0.25442 -1.03 1.98272 0.0000 
SG -0.49918 -2.20** 2.17096 -0.49918 -2.20** 2.17096 0.0026 
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Appendix 7: EMPIRICAL STUDY 1 - MOSAIC 2 - Regression Result for the Full Model 
Determinants of Risk Perception (RP). Dependent Variable: RP 
Mosaic 2 Uncentered Regression Centered-score Regression 
IVs Coefficient t-statistic VIF Coefficient t-statistic VIF η2partial 
Intercept 21.77842 2.50*** 0 41.04004 7.43*** 0  
Age 0.77130 2.44** 70.53381 0.09726 2.06** 1.70555 0.0023 
Age2 -0.00420 -1.18 61.56238 -0.00420 -1.18 1.24277 0.0007 
Age*LnW -0.03190 -2.26** 33.24472 -0.03190 -2.26** 1.07151 0.0033 
Single -0.13736 -0.09 2.22304 -0.13736 -0.09 2.22304 0.0035 
Gender -1.37745 -1.54 1.07307 -1.37745 -1.54 1.07307 0.0055 
Child -1.70839 -1.19 2.16559 -1.70839 -1.19 2.16559 0.0038 
Highschl 2.20649 1.75* 1.18021 2.20649 1.75* 1.18021 0.0000 
Hhsize 0.13115 0.39 1.39954 0.13115 0.39 1.39954 0.0000 
LnW 0.82454 1.41 13.70295 -0.43854 -2.12** 1.55101 0.0099 
LnInc 0.06168 0.22 1.36457 0.06168 0.22 1.36457 0.0002 
Unemp 4.94369 2.76*** 1.27754 4.94369 2.76*** 1.27754 0.0064 
Selfemp 1.99551 0.97 1.05000 1.99551 0.97 1.05000 0.0006 
Homeown 1.92184 1.39 1.28042 1.92184 1.39 1.28042 0.0003 
Rbelief -1.13388 -1.14 1.25444 -1.13388 -1.14 1.25444 0.0013 
Incstab 0.27193 1.42 1.10021 0.27193 1.42 1.10021 0.0014 
Health -0.05328 -0.18 1.17097 -0.05328 -0.18 1.17097 0.0012 
SRA 1.61833 3.62*** 1.26187 1.61833 3.62*** 1.26187 0.0113 
Ecoexp 1.23349 2.55*** 1.30972 1.23349 2.55*** 1.30972 0.0078 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Interestexp 0.54037 0.99 1.29324 0.54037 0.99 1.29324 0.0005 
US 0.88001 0.57 2.21336 0.88001 0.57 2.21336 0.0000 
UK 1.28466 0.86 1.89681 1.28466 0.86 1.89681 0.0002 
VN -1.63724 -1.02 1.98272 -1.63724 -1.02 1.98272 0.0028 
SG 2.82440 1.79* 2.17096 2.82440 1.79* 2.17096 0.0016 
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Appendix 8: EMPIRICAL STUDY 1 - MOSAIC 3 - Regression Result for the Full Model 
Determinants of RAtt – Subjective RAtt. Dependent Variable: bR 
Mosaic 3 Uncentered Regression Centered-score Regression 
IVs Coefficient t-statistic VIF Coefficient t-statistic VIF η2partial 
Intercept -9.25629 -0.18 0 -42.66406 -1.71* 0  
Age -1.78128 -0.95 70.53381 0.10580 0.29 1.70555 0.0000 
Age2 0.02139 1.06 61.56238 0.02139 1.06 1.24277 0.0002 
Age*LnW 0.01801 0.28 33.24472 0.01801 0.28 1.07151 0.0000 
Single 0.73087 0.09 2.22304 0.73087 0.09 2.22304 0.0001 
Gender 13.16070 1.90** 1.07307 13.16070 1.90* 1.07307 0.0023 
Child -0.06887 -0.01 2.16559 -0.06887 -0.01 2.16559 0.0003 
Highschl 0.97388 0.11 1.18021 0.97388 0.11 1.18021 0.0000 
Hhsize 3.69850 1.68* 1.39954 3.69850 1.68 1.39954 0.0004 
LnW -0.37861 -0.14 13.70295 0.33456 0.39 1.55101 0.0002 
LnInc 0.95807 0.88 1.36457 0.95807 0.88 1.36457 0.0002 
Unemp 10.69264 1.54 1.27754 10.69264 1.54 1.27754 0.0010 
Selfemp -21.68656 -0.93 1.05000 -21.68656 -0.93 1.05000 0.0012 
Homeown 6.24811 0.64 1.28042 6.24811 0.64 1.28042 0.0000 
Rbelief -2.36443 -0.27 1.25444 -2.36443 -0.27 1.25444 0.0001 
Incstab 1.95929 1.51 1.10021 1.95929 1.51 1.10021 0.0008 
Health -0.21381 -0.14 1.17097 -0.21381 -0.14 1.17097 0.0000 
SRA -1.58684 -0.51 1.26187 -1.58684 -0.51 1.26187 0.0005 
Ecoexp -5.40503 -1.56 1.30972 -5.40503 -1.56 1.30972 0.0023 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Interestexp -1.89481 -0.46 1.29324 -1.89481 -0.46 1.29324 0.0002 
US 21.08339 1.78* 2.21336 21.08339 1.78* 2.21336 0.0030 
UK 8.93014 0.77 1.89681 8.93014 0.77 1.89681 0.0011 
VN -1.73153 -0.13 1.98272 -1.73153 -0.13 1.98272 0.0001 
SG -11.47046 -1.00 2.17096 -11.47046 -1.00 2.17096 0.0004 
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Appendix 9: Heteroskedasticity and Error Normality Tests 
PART 1: Empirical study 1 
Equation Test DF Statistic 
lnWTP 
White's Test 141 335.0** 
Breusch-Pagan 11 124.2** 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.9386*** 
RP 
White's Test 141 406.7** 
Breusch-Pagan 11 60.81** 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.9844*** 
bVAR 
White's Test 141 343.0** 
Breusch-Pagan 11 40.94* 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.8021*** 
bR 
White's Test 141 269.5 
Breusch-Pagan 11 24.23 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.4571*** 
Note: * and ** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
  
220 
 
PART 2: Empirical study 2 
Equation Test DF Statistic 
lnWTP 
White's Test 289 625.8*** 
Breusch-Pagan 17 132.7*** 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.952*** 
RP 
White's Test 289 638.4*** 
Breusch-Pagan 17 83.60*** 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.985*** 
bVAR 
White's Test 289 603.8*** 
Breusch-Pagan 17 56.05*** 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.805*** 
bR 
White's Test 289 427.5*** 
Breusch-Pagan 17 26.29* 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.460*** 
Note: * and ** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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PART 3: Empirical study 3 
equation Test DF Statistic 
lnWTP 
White's Test 360 794.1*** 
Breusch-Pagan 19 148.2*** 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.9579*** 
RP 
White's Test 360 769.4*** 
Breusch-Pagan 19 92.20*** 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.9841*** 
bVAR 
White's Test 360 725.6*** 
Breusch-Pagan 19 60.81*** 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.8069*** 
bR 
White's Test 360 533.9*** 
Breusch-Pagan 19 31.59** 
Shapiro-Wilk  0.4632*** 
Note: * and ** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Appendix 10: Endogeneity Tests (2SLS Analysis) 
PART 1: Empirical Study 1 
Variables Instrumental variables Rho t-value (p-value) 
Wealth 
SavHorizon 0.01 (0.9916) 
Fsupport 0.21 (0.8325) 
Retsupport N/A 
Investhorizon -0.05 (0.9631) 
Inheritimp 0.15 (0.8812) 
Income 
SavHorizon 0.00 (0.9999) 
Fsupport 0.21 (0.8340) 
Retsupport 1.18 (0.2390) 
Investhorizon -0.00 (0.9992) 
Inheritimp  
Self-reported risk aversion 
(SRA) 
SavHorizon -0.40 (0.6919) 
Fsupport -0.21 (0.8342) 
Retsupport 1.09 (0.2738) 
Investhorizon 0.02 (0.9876) 
Inheritimp -0.01 (0.9937) 
 
  
223 
 
PART 2: Empirical Study 2 
Variables Instrumental variables Rho t-value (p-value) 
Wealth 
SavHorizon 0.01 (0.9922) 
Fsupport 0.01 (0.9919) 
Retsupport N/A 
Investhorizon -0.24 (0.8081) 
Inheritimp 0.58 (0.5596) 
Income 
SavHorizon  0.00 (0.9999) 
Fsupport 0.21 (0.8358) 
Retsupport 0.81 (0.4199) 
Investhorizon -0.00 (0.9980) 
Inheritimp N/A 
Self-reported risk aversion 
(SRA) 
SavHorizon -0.31 (0.7601) 
Fsupport -0.21 (0.8361) 
Retsupport 0.77 (0.4395) 
Investhorizon 0.24 (0.8078) 
Inheritimp -0.60 (0.5488) 
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PART 3: Empirical Study 3 
Variables Instrumental variables Rho t-value (p-value) 
Wealth 
SavHorizon 0.47 (0.6377) 
Fsupport -0.00 (0.9997) 
Retsupport N/A 
Investhorizon -0.30 (0.7608) 
Inheritimp 0.25 (0.8021) 
Income 
SavHorizon 0.00 (0.9999) 
Fsupport -0.00 (0.9973) 
Retsupport 1.00 (0.3167) 
Investhorizon -0.00 (0.9979) 
Inheritimp -0.00 (0.9999) 
Self-reported risk aversion 
(SRA) 
SavHorizon -0.46 (0.6484) 
Fsupport 0.00 (0.9977) 
Retsupport 0.94 (0.3461) 
Investhorizon 0.30 (0.7606) 
Inheritimp -0.25 (0.8016) 
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Appendix 11: EMPIRICAL STUDY 2 - MOSAIC 1 - Regression Result for the Full Model 
Determinants of Risk Perception (RP). Dependent Variable: RP 
Mosaic 1 Uncentered Regression Centered-score Regression 
IVs Coefficient t-statistic VIF Coefficient t-statistic VIF η2partial 
Intercept 16.50361 1.45 0 42.11438 7.65*** 0  
COL_IDV -4.90840 -0.95 111.57565 -1.35612 -2.71*** 1.20101 0.0082 
COL_IDV*Age 0.04385 0.33 101.27800 0.01589 0.43 1.18410 0.0000 
Age 1.06103 2.89*** 100.83186 0.08882 1.83* 1.80036 0.0022 
Age2 -0.00573 -1.60 63.73569 -0.00573 -1.60 1.28665 0.0013 
Age*LnW -0.03102 -2.15** 33.98732 -0.03102 -2.15** 1.09545 0.0036 
Single -0.31673 -0.21 2.23671 -0.31673 -0.21 2.23671 0.0028 
Gender -1.50552 -1.69* 1.08518 -1.50552 -1.69* 1.08518 0.0059 
Child -1.75016 -1.24 2.19835 -1.75016 -1.24 2.19835 0.0031 
Highschl 2.14355 1.71* 1.18801 2.14355 1.71* 1.18801 0.0000 
Hhsize 0.21718 0.65 1.41105 0.21718 0.65 1.41105 0.0001 
LnW 0.87171 1.47 14.00043 -0.35670 -1.73* 1.56811 0.0094 
LnInc -0.00337 -0.01 1.37673 -0.00337 -0.01 1.37673 0.0005 
Unemp 4.98927 2.83*** 1.28085 4.98927 2.83*** 1.28085 0.0062 
Selfemp 1.61347 0.78 1.06683 1.61347 0.78 1.06683 0.0006 
Homeown 2.03160 1.46 1.28769 2.03160 1.46 1.28769 0.0004 
Rbelief -0.95952 -0.97 1.26616 -0.95952 -0.97 1.26616 0.0014 
Incstab 0.25680 1.35 1.11069 0.25680 1.35 1.11069 0.0014 
Health -0.01963 -0.07 1.17926 -0.01963 -0.07 1.17926 0.0012 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
SRA 1.57479 3.57*** 1.26604 1.57479 3.57*** 1.26604 0.0115 
Ecoexp 1.04167 2.17** 1.32726 1.04167 2.17** 1.32726 0.0070 
Interestexp 0.65916 1.22 1.30217 0.65916 1.22 1.30217 0.0006 
US -0.38723 -0.25 2.31916 -0.38723 -0.25 2.31916 0.0001 
UK 0.46544 0.31 1.98380 0.46544 0.31 1.98380 0.0000 
VN -1.14325 -0.71 2.00716 -1.14325 -0.71 2.00716 0.0023 
SG 1.87097 1.17 2.24255 1.87097 1.17 2.24255 0.0014 
Finhelp 1.44378 3.23*** 21.55264 -0.44376 -3.05*** 1.28381 0.0025 
Helpatt 0.41578 0.25 15.41817 -1.10466 -2.45** 1.09744 0.0041 
Age*Finhelp -0.02905 -2.64*** 11.58109 -0.02905 -2.64*** 1.19230 0.0020 
COL_IDV*Finhelp 0.51360 1.06 20.29819 -0.20409 -1.35 1.10464 0.0010 
Age*Helpatt -0.02475 -0.64 30.47115 -0.02475 -0.64 1.16056 0.0001 
COL_IDV*Helpatt 0.34478 0.26 111.37070 0.59774 1.37 1.14390 0.0009 
Finhelp*Helpatt -0.18188 -1.91* 13.35542 -0.18188 -1.91* 1.17336 0.0009 
COL_IDV*Age*Finhelp -0.01812 -1.62 19.09581 -0.01812 -1.62 1.16992 0.0011 
COL_IDV*Age*Helpatt 0.00639 0.19 101.43040 0.00639 0.19 1.16647 0.0000 
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Appendix 12: EMPIRICAL STUDY 2 - MOSAIC 2 - Regression Result for the Full Model 
Determinants of RAtt –Subjective RAtt. Dependent Variable: bR 
Mosaic 2 Uncentered Regression Centered-score Regression 
IVs Coefficient t-statistic VIF Coefficient t-statistic VIF η2partial 
Intercept -50.00693 -0.62 0 -38.86251 -1.57 0  
COL_IDV -15.06364 -0.61 111.57565 -2.26310 -0.62 1.20101 0.0007 
COL_IDV*Age 0.15798 0.26 101.27800 0.42939 1.73* 1.18410 0.0009 
Age -1.35928 -0.54 100.83186 0.20286 0.52 1.80036 0.0001 
Age2 0.01954 0.93 63.73569 0.01954 0.93 1.28665 0.0001 
Age*LnW 0.01033 0.16 33.98732 0.01033 0.16 1.09545 0.0000 
Single -0.02885 -0.00 2.23671 -0.02885 -0.00 2.23671 0.0001 
Gender 12.80147 1.83* 1.08518 12.80147 1.83* 1.08518 0.0023 
Child -0.65031 -0.08 2.19835 -0.65031 -0.08 2.19835 0.0003 
Highschl 1.22746 0.14 1.18801 1.22746 0.14 1.18801 0.0000 
Hhsize 3.66665 1.67* 1.41105 3.66665 1.67* 1.41105 0.0004 
LnW 0.04294 0.02 14.00043 0.45206 0.52 1.56811 0.0002 
LnInc 0.93647 0.86 1.37673 0.93647 0.86 1.37673 0.0002 
Unemp 12.07834 1.69* 1.28085 12.07834 1.69* 1.28085 0.0010 
Selfemp -20.34141 -0.90 1.06683 -20.34141 -0.90 1.06683 0.0012 
Homeown 6.57330 0.67 1.28769 6.57330 0.67 1.28769 0.0000 
Rbelief -2.74611 -0.31 1.26616 -2.74611 -0.31 1.26616 0.0001 
Incstab 1.96404 1.53 1.11069 1.96404 1.53 1.11069 0.0008 
Health -0.22622 -0.15 1.17926 -0.22622 -0.15 1.17926 0.0001 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
SRA -1.77856 -0.58 1.26604 -1.77856 -0.58 1.26604 0.0005 
Ecoexp -5.74035 -1.68* 1.32726 -5.74035 -1.68* 1.32726 0.0024 
Interestexp -1.85837 -0.45 1.30217 -1.85837 -0.45 1.30217 0.0002 
US 18.03682 1.49 2.31916 18.03682 1.49 2.31916 0.0027 
UK 6.20786 0.51 1.98380 6.20786 0.51 1.98380 0.0010 
VN -0.43545 -0.03 2.00716 -0.43545 -0.03 2.00716 0.0001 
SG -13.41159 -1.14 2.24255 -13.41159 -1.14 2.24255 0.0005 
Finhelp 7.37218 1.39 21.55264 -1.03453 -0.67 1.28381 0.0001 
Helpatt 7.60718 0.63 15.41817 3.23824 0.92 1.09744 0.0002 
Age*Finhelp -0.04707 -0.47 11.58109 -0.04707 -0.47 1.19230 0.0001 
COL_IDV*Finhelp 0.77227 0.21 20.29819 -0.30250 -0.25 1.10464 0.0002 
Age*Helpatt 0.01080 0.04 30.47115 0.01080 0.04 1.16056 0.0000 
COL_IDV*Helpatt -1.60295 -0.25 111.37070 1.83676 0.69 1.14390 0.0000 
Finhelp*Helpatt -1.61448 -1.72* 13.35542 -1.61448 -1.72* 1.17336 0.0015 
COL_IDV*Age*Finhelp -0.02714 -0.34 19.09581 -0.02714 -0.34 1.16992 0.0000 
COL_IDV*Age*Helpatt 0.08687 0.56 101.43040 0.08687 0.56 1.16647 0.0001 
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Appendix 13: EMPIRICAL STUDY 2 - MOSAIC 3 - Regression Result for the Full Model 
Determinants of FRT. Dependent Variable: LnWTP 
Mosaic 3 Uncentered Regression Centered-score Regression 
IVs Coefficient t-statistic VIF Coefficient t-statistic VIF η2partial 
Intercept 10.23374 6.66*** 0 5.22457 8.05*** 0  
COL_IDV 1.72302 3.22*** 111.57565 0.29335 4.36*** 1.20101 0.0182 
COL_IDV*Age -0.04231 -2.84*** 101.27800 -0.01450 -3.06*** 1.18410 0.0036 
Age -0.20987 -4.30*** 100.83186 -0.02714 -4.16*** 1.80036 0.0087 
Age2 0.00079059 1.68* 63.73569 0.00079059 1.68* 1.28665 0.0000 
Age*LnW 0.00267 1.41 33.98732 0.00267 1.41 1.09545 0.0019 
Single -0.25840 -1.39 2.23671 -0.25840 -1.39 2.23671 0.0115 
Gender 0.02931 0.23 1.08518 0.02931 0.23 1.08518 0.0015 
Child 0.21500 1.19 2.19835 0.21500 1.19 2.19835 0.0021 
Highschl 0.16174 0.95 1.18801 0.16174 0.95 1.18801 0.0062 
Hhsize -0.01625 -0.37 1.41105 -0.01625 -0.37 1.41105 0.0002 
LnW 0.00124 0.02 14.00043 0.10702 3.77*** 1.56811 0.0239 
LnInc 0.04788 1.45 1.37673 0.04788 1.45 1.37673 0.0012 
Unemp 0.20562 0.87 1.28085 0.20562 0.87 1.28085 0.0001 
Selfemp -0.15660 -0.58 1.06683 -0.15660 -0.58 1.06683 0.0011 
Homeown -0.05883 -0.36 1.28769 -0.05883 -0.36 1.28769 0.0001 
Rbelief 0.08487 0.62 1.26616 0.08487 0.62 1.26616 0.0004 
Incstab 0.00013270 0.01 1.11069 0.00013270 0.01 1.11069 0.0000 
Health 0.02487 0.70 1.17926 0.02487 0.70 1.17926 0.0016 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
SRA -0.25980 -4.53*** 1.26604 -0.25980 -4.53*** 1.26604 0.0136 
Ecoexp 0.08337 1.29 1.32726 0.08337 1.29 1.32726 0.0003 
Interestexp -0.02312 -0.31 1.30217 -0.02312 -0.31 1.30217 0.0003 
US -0.09997 -0.47 2.31916 -0.09997 -0.47 2.31916 0.0004 
UK -0.38175 -1.85* 1.98380 -0.38175 -1.85* 1.98380 0.0012 
VN -0.34621 -1.43 2.00716 -0.34621 -1.43 2.00716 0.0000 
SG -0.30005 -1.31 2.24255 -0.30005 -1.31 2.24255 0.0024 
Finhelp -0.18784 -3.04*** 21.55264 0.11773 5.47*** 1.28381 0.0126 
Helpatt -0.61686 -2.53*** 15.41817 0.22608 3.36*** 1.09744 0.0087 
Age*Finhelp 0.00474 2.89*** 11.58109 0.00474 2.89*** 1.19230 0.0026 
COL_IDV*Finhelp -0.07007 -0.92 20.29819 0.05342 2.42** 1.10464 0.0040 
Age*Helpatt 0.01911 3.45*** 30.47115 0.01911 3.45*** 1.16056 0.0049 
COL_IDV*Helpatt -0.15969 -1.16 111.37070 0.02142 0.40 1.14390 0.0002 
Finhelp*Helpatt 0.02906 2.48*** 13.35542 0.02906 2.48** 1.17336 0.0012 
COL_IDV*Age*Finhelp 0.00312 1.60 19.09581 0.00312 1.60 1.16992 0.0021 
COL_IDV*Age*Helpatt 0.00457 1.19 101.43040 0.00457 1.19 1.16647 0.0007 
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Appendix 14: Minimum stationery point (Table 8, Variation E) 
LnWTP = 5.22457 - 0.027*Age_c + 0.0008*(Age_c)2 – 0.015*COL_IDV*Age_c + 
0.10702*LnW - 0.25980*SRA + 0.11773*Finhelp +  0.22608*Helpatt + 
0.0047*Finhelp_c*Age_c + 0.05342*COL_IDV*Finhelp + 
0.02*Helpatt_c*Age_c + 0.02906*Finhelp*Helpatt 
  
𝛿𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑇𝑃
𝛿𝐴𝑔𝑒_𝑐
 = -0.027 + 0.002*Age_c – 0.015*COL_IDV + 0.005*Finhelp_c + 
0.02*Helpatt_c 
 
𝛿𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑇𝑃
𝛿𝐴𝑔𝑒
   = -0.027 + 0.002*(Age-39.6) – 0.015*COL_IDV + 0.005*(Finhelp-2.98) + 
0.02*(Helpatt-4.05) 
  = -0.027 + 0.002*Age – 0.079 – 0.015*COL_IDV + 0.005*Finhelp – 0.015 + 
0.02*Helpatt – 0.081 
 
𝛿𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑇𝑃
𝛿𝐴𝑔𝑒
 = 0 @ the stationery point 
 -0.027 + 0.002*Age – 0.079 – 0.015*COL_IDV + 0.005*Finhelp – 0.015 + 0.02*Helpatt – 
0.081 = 0 
 0.002*Age – 0.202 – 0.015*COL_IDV + 0.005*Finhelp + 0.02*Helpatt = 0 
Pure age effect on FRT @ the stationery point given other factors = 0 
 0.002*Age – 0.202 = 0 
 0.002*Age = 0.202 
 Agemin = 101 (years old)
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Appendix 15: EMPIRICAL STUDY 3 - MOSAIC 1 - Regression Result for the Full Model 
Determinants of FRT. Dependent Variable: LnWTP 
Mosaic 1 Uncentered Regression Centered-score Regression 
IVs Coefficient t-statistic VIF Coefficient t-statistic VIF η2partial 
Intercept 9.87760 6.34*** 0 4.69690 6.86*** 0  
Native_Weak -0.53467 -1.02 15.32860 0.71556 2.76*** 3.63170 0.0074 
Prof_Strong -0.27495 -1.61 1.45503 -0.27495 -1.61 1.45503 0.0052 
Nweak_Pstrong -1.26487 -3.40*** 1.65593 -1.26487 -3.40*** 1.65593 0.0080 
Nweak_age 0.03157 2.69*** 13.18135 0.03157 2.69*** 1.43661 0.0009 
Nweak_COL_IDV -0.07846 -0.46 1.21860 -0.07846 -0.46 1.21860 0.0009 
COL_IDV 1.78333 3.36*** 111.65852 0.30554 4.20*** 1.41898 0.0159 
COL_IDV*Age -0.04430 -3.00*** 101.40248 -0.01403 -3.01*** 1.19812 0.0032 
Age -0.21219 -4.38*** 101.13818 -0.03417 -4.79*** 2.18328 0.0153 
Age2 0.00075423 1.61 63.94237 0.00075423 1.61 1.29082 0.0000 
Age*LnW 0.00231 1.18 34.49971 0.00231 1.18 1.11196 0.0011 
Single -0.23579 -1.27 2.24628 -0.23579 -1.27 2.24628 0.0088 
Gender 0.01739 0.14 1.08882 0.01739 0.14 1.08882 0.0014 
Child 0.18294 1.01 2.22923 0.18294 1.01 2.22923 0.0016 
Highschl 0.17776 1.06 1.19118 0.17776 1.06 1.19118 0.0057 
Hhsize -0.02530 -0.58 1.41330 -0.02530 -0.58 1.41330 0.0001 
LnW 0.01651 0.20 14.23443 0.10795 3.81*** 1.57815 0.0227 
LnInc 0.05762 1.72* 1.38344 0.05762 1.72* 1.38344 0.0018 
Unemp 0.25878 1.11 1.28628 0.25878 1.11 1.28628 0.0005 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Selfemp -0.12822 -0.48 1.06966 -0.12822 -0.48 1.06966 0.0008 
Homeown -0.02416 -0.15 1.29062 -0.02416 -0.15 1.29062 0.0001 
Rbelief 0.13105 0.96 1.27229 0.13105 0.96 1.27229 0.0020 
Incstab -0.00185 -0.07 1.11861 -0.00185 -0.07 1.11861 0.0000 
Health 0.02732 0.78 1.18267 0.02732 0.78 1.18267 0.0014 
SRA -0.25797 -4.51*** 1.27575 -0.25797 -4.51*** 1.27575 0.0138 
Ecoexp 0.09542 1.49 1.34207 0.09542 1.49 1.34207 0.0006 
Interestexp -0.04239 -0.56 1.30672 -0.04239 -0.56 1.30672 0.0000 
US 0.37154 1.26 4.46328 0.37154 1.26 4.46328 0.0009 
UK 0.08932 0.31 4.11704 0.08932 0.31 4.11704 0.0002 
VN 0.12338 0.38 3.91307 0.12338 0.38 3.91307 0.0002 
SG 0.17740 0.68 3.40654 0.17740 0.68 3.40654 0.0000 
Finhelp -0.18807 -3.00*** 21.59022 0.11559 5.53*** 1.28565 0.0123 
Helpatt -0.65296 -2.69*** 15.48212 0.22790 3.42*** 1.09904 0.0089 
Age*Finhelp 0.00441 2.80*** 11.65658 0.00441 2.80*** 1.20007 0.0021 
COL_IDV*Finhelp -0.08765 -1.21 20.38874 0.05438 2.58*** 1.11712 0.0042 
Age*Helpatt 0.01986 3.60*** 30.59770 0.01986 3.60*** 1.16538 0.0053 
COL_IDV*Helpatt -0.16335 -1.20 111.48846 0.02834 0.54 1.14636 0.0003 
Finhelp*Helpatt 0.03184 2.69*** 13.38041 0.03184 2.69*** 1.17556 0.0014 
COL_IDV*Age*Finhelp 0.00359 2.01** 19.23203 0.00359 2.01** 1.17827 0.0028 
COL_IDV*Age*Helpatt 0.00484 1.29 101.49573 0.00484 1.29 1.16722 0.0008 
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Appendix 16: EMPIRICAL STUDY 3 - MOSAIC 2 - Regression Result for the Full Model 
Determinants of Financial Risk Perception. Dependent Variable: Risk perception (RP) 
Mosaic 2 Uncentered Regression Centered-score Regression 
IVs Coefficient t-statistic VIF Coefficient t-statistic VIF η2partial 
Intercept 18.47588 1.60 0 45.83202 8.26*** 0  
Native_Weak -2.53498 -0.70 15.32860 -5.35976 -3.06*** 3.63170 0.0002 
Prof_Strong -1.45188 -1.07 1.45503 -1.45188 -1.07 1.45503 0.0018 
Nweak_Pstrong 12.61932 4.53*** 1.65593 12.61932 4.53*** 1.65593 0.0108 
Nweak_age -0.07134 -0.89 13.18135 -0.07134 -0.89 1.43661 0.0006 
Nweak_COL_IDV 2.68305 2.53** 1.21860 2.68305 2.53** 1.21860 0.0002 
COL_IDV -5.27818 -1.03 111.65852 -1.79352 -3.22*** 1.41898 0.0103 
COL_IDV*Age 0.04983 0.37 101.40248 0.00472 0.13 1.19812 0.0001 
Age 1.09588 2.99*** 101.13818 0.09959 1.84* 2.18328 0.0044 
Age2 -0.00570 -1.60 63.94237 -0.00570 -1.60 1.29082 0.0015 
Age*LnW -0.03248 -2.28** 34.49971 -0.03248 -2.28** 1.11196 0.0031 
Single -0.38733 -0.26 2.24628 -0.38733 -0.26 2.24628 0.0021 
Gender -1.51713 -1.72* 1.08882 -1.51713 -1.72* 1.08882 0.0058 
Child -1.77869 -1.25 2.22923 -1.77869 -1.25 2.22923 0.0025 
Highschl 2.17705 1.75* 1.19118 2.17705 1.75* 1.19118 0.0000 
Hhsize 0.26037 0.79 1.41330 0.26037 0.79 1.41330 0.0001 
LnW 0.97277 1.65* 14.23443 -0.31330 -1.54 1.57815 0.0087 
LnInc -0.07693 -0.28 1.38344 -0.07693 -0.28 1.38344 0.0008 
Unemp 4.71597 2.69*** 1.28628 4.71597 2.69*** 1.28628 0.0060 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Selfemp 1.56797 0.76 1.06966 1.56797 0.76 1.06966 0.0007 
Homeown 1.84448 1.35 1.29062 1.84448 1.35 1.29062 0.0003 
Rbelief -1.13328 -1.14 1.27229 -1.13328 -1.14 1.27229 0.0018 
Incstab 0.28672 1.51 1.11861 0.28672 1.51 1.11861 0.0018 
Health -0.01103 -0.04 1.18267 -0.01103 -0.04 1.18267 0.0011 
SRA 1.54162 3.52*** 1.27575 1.54162 3.52*** 1.27575 0.0115 
Ecoexp 1.01576 2.14** 1.34207 1.01576 2.14** 1.34207 0.0062 
Interestexp 0.79530 1.48 1.30672 0.79530 1.48 1.30672 0.0012 
US -3.36738 -1.63 4.46328 -3.36738 -1.63 4.46328 0.0002 
UK -2.70148 -1.33 4.11704 -2.70148 -1.33 4.11704 0.0000 
VN -4.19542 -1.99** 3.91307 -4.19542 -1.99** 3.91307 0.0041 
SG -0.63355 -0.34 3.40654 -0.63355 -0.34 3.40654 0.0000 
Finhelp 1.41864 3.19*** 21.59022 -0.43284 -2.96*** 1.28565 0.0024 
Helpatt 0.51969 0.31 15.48212 -1.16403 -2.58*** 1.09904 0.0045 
Age*Finhelp -0.02762 -2.51** 11.65658 -0.02762 -2.51** 1.20007 0.0016 
COL_IDV*Finhelp 0.58025 1.20 20.38874 -0.24761 -1.63 1.11712 0.0015 
Age*Helpatt -0.02849 -0.74 30.59770 -0.02849 -0.74 1.16538 0.0001 
COL_IDV*Helpatt 0.38835 0.30 111.48846 0.55452 1.29 1.14636 0.0008 
Finhelp*Helpatt -0.18697 -1.99** 13.38041 -0.18697 -1.99** 1.17556 0.0010 
COL_IDV*Age*Finhelp -0.02091 -1.86* 19.23203 -0.02091 -1.86* 1.17827 0.0015 
COL_IDV*Age*Helpatt 0.00420 0.13 101.49573 0.00420 0.13 1.16722 0.0000 
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Appendix 17: EMPIRICAL STUDY 3 - MOSAIC 3 - Regression Result for the Full Model 
Determinants of RAtt – Relative Subjective RAtt. Dependent Variable: bR 
Mosaic 3 Uncentered Regression Centered-score Regression 
IVs Coefficient t-statistic VIF Coefficient t-statistic VIF η2partial 
Intercept -31.44399 -0.37 0 -22.72926 -0.86 0  
Native_Weak -8.96349 -0.30 15.32860 -17.06213 -1.25 3.63170 0.0027 
Prof_Strong 1.04579 0.08 1.45503 1.04579 0.08 1.45503 0.0000 
Nweak_Pstrong -1.58604 -0.06 1.65593 -1.58604 -0.06 1.65593 0.0000 
Nweak_age -0.20453 -0.33 13.18135 -0.20453 -0.33 1.43661 0.0001 
Nweak_COL_IDV 16.86484 1.59 1.21860 16.86484 1.59 1.21860 0.0008 
COL_IDV -16.78540 -0.68 111.65852 -4.84363 -1.44 1.41898 0.0013 
COL_IDV*Age 0.15935 0.26 101.40248 0.40018 1.67* 1.19812 0.0009 
Age -1.48971 -0.59 101.13818 0.24831 0.60 2.18328 0.0000 
Age2 0.02081 1.00 63.94237 0.02081 1.00 1.29082 0.0002 
Age*LnW 0.00603 0.10 34.49971 0.00603 0.10 1.11196 0.0000 
Single 0.89019 0.10 2.24628 0.89019 0.10 2.24628 0.0001 
Gender 12.71042 1.81* 1.08882 12.71042 1.81* 1.08882 0.0022 
Child -0.64688 -0.09 2.22923 -0.64688 -0.09 2.22923 0.0002 
Highschl 1.99280 0.23 1.19118 1.99280 0.23 1.19118 0.0001 
Hhsize 3.71736 1.72* 1.41330 3.71736 1.72* 1.41330 0.0004 
LnW 0.33154 0.12 14.23443 0.57043 0.66 1.57815 0.0004 
LnInc 0.75068 0.68 1.38344 0.75068 0.68 1.38344 0.0001 
Unemp 10.80859 1.52 1.28628 10.80859 1.52 1.28628 0.0006 
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Note: *, **, and *** denotes the result is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Selfemp -20.27149 -0.90 1.06966 -20.27149 -0.90 1.06966 0.0013 
Homeown 6.35248 0.65 1.29062 6.35248 0.65 1.29062 0.0001 
Rbelief -2.70744 -0.31 1.27229 -2.70744 -0.31 1.27229 0.0000 
Incstab 1.94357 1.51 1.11861 1.94357 1.51 1.11861 0.0007 
Health -0.37390 -0.24 1.18267 -0.37390 -0.24 1.18267 0.0000 
SRA -1.93217 -0.63 1.27575 -1.93217 -0.63 1.27575 0.0005 
Ecoexp -5.58291 -1.61 1.34207 -5.58291 -1.61 1.34207 0.0021 
Interestexp -1.47526 -0.36 1.30672 -1.47526 -0.36 1.30672 0.0000 
US 2.43205 0.15 4.46328 2.43205 0.15 4.46328 0.0019 
UK -9.18348 -0.55 4.11704 -9.18348 -0.55 4.11704 0.0004 
VN -14.51655 -0.83 3.91307 -14.51655 -0.83 3.91307 0.0000 
SG -24.18622 -1.74* 3.40654 -24.18622 -1.74* 3.40654 0.0011 
Finhelp 7.13899 1.36 21.59022 -0.96169 -0.63 1.28565 0.0001 
Helpatt 6.41683 0.53 15.48212 3.10265 0.89 1.09904 0.0002 
Age*Finhelp -0.04098 -0.41 11.65658 -0.04098 -0.41 1.20007 0.0000 
COL_IDV*Finhelp 1.16150 0.32 20.38874 -0.52351 -0.44 1.11712 0.0003 
Age*Helpatt 0.03623 0.15 30.59770 0.03623 0.15 1.16538 0.0001 
COL_IDV*Helpatt -1.81487 -0.28 111.48846 1.77347 0.68 1.14636 0.0000 
Finhelp*Helpatt -1.59841 -1.71* 13.38041 -1.59841 -1.71* 1.17556 0.0014 
COL_IDV*Age*Finhelp -0.04255 -0.53 19.23203 -0.04255 -0.53 1.17827 0.0001 
COL_IDV*Age*Helpatt 0.09062 0.59 101.49573 0.09062 0.59 1.16722 0.0001 
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